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Introduction 
In the mid−1990s several academics published papers on a significant change within 
terrorism; religion was replacing the traditional political ideologies in terrorist groups.
1
 Walter 
Laqueur (1996:36) referred to Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway, noting 
that the apocalyptic groups of the future are ‘beyond terrorism as we have known it. New 
definitions and new terms may have to be developed for new realities, and intelligence 
services and policymakers must learn to discern the significant differences among terrorists 
motivations, approaches and aims.’. The new terrorism will ‘emerge in all kinds of new 
guises that are inconsistent with traditional experience’ (Laqueur, 1998:178). RAND’s Bruce 
Hoffman opened his 1996(:79) article ‘Holy Terror: An Act of Divide Duty’ with examples of 
religious terrorist incidents which ‘all arguably point to the beginning of a new era of 
international terrorism – more lethal and severe than any other’. Raufer (1999:30) agreed that 
terrorism no longer was a ‘marginal and localized problem’ but now ‘all-invasive’ and that it 
had changed ‘dramatically’ from ‘its past form’. That same year, the RAND Corporation 
summed up the state of ‘new terrorism’ in a report for the United States Airforce; 
“The old image of a professional terrorist motivated by ideology or the desire for “national 
liberation,” operating according to a specific political agenda, armed with guns and 
bombs, and backed by overt state sponsors, has not quite disappeared. It has been 
augmented – some would say overtaken – by other forms of terrorism. This new terrorism 
has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and,’…’ greater lethality’… 
‘Terrorists are organizing themselves in new, less hierarchical structures and using 
“amateurs” to a far greater extent than in the past. All of this renders much previous 
analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete, and complicates the task of 
intelligence-gathering and counterterrorism’. (Lesser, 1999:1-2). 
The new terrorism is; religious, more lethal, transnational, differently organised. The 
new terrorists cannot be negotiated with, have extreme world views and are significantly more 
likely to use suicide attacks and weapons of mass destruction. The perception of a new 
paradigm within terrorism spread to journalists, policy makers, experts and politicians alike – 
especially after 9/11 (Crenshaw, 2008:117). The academic debate on the validity of the new 
terrorism is still on-going, nearly two decades later. Are there, in fact, so many more 
religiously motivated terrorist incidents in recent years? Are, in fact, most terrorist incidents 
today religiously motivated? Are religious terrorist incidents more lethal than other terrorist 
                                                 
1
 See for example Ciluffo & Tomarchio, 1998; Hoffman, 1996, 1999, 2001; Jürgensmeyer, 1997; Laqueur, 1996, 
1998; Raufer, 1999 
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incidents? Is suicide terrorism inextricably linked to religious terrorism? Are religious 
terrorist incidents more likely to cross border, and become transnational? These are all 
questions that are directly relevant not only to the debate of new terrorism, but to anyone who 
has to relate to terrorism. Knowing what is going on inside terrorism is a prerequisite for 
effective counter-terrorism policies. 
 In academia, the concepts and questions of new terrorism has been addressed by many 
researchers (See for example Pape, 2005; Moghadam, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Piazza, 2009; 
Enders & Sandler, 1999, 2002, Field, 2009; Tucker, 2001; Brandt, 2010). The qualitative 
debate appears to be at a stalemate, limited to discussing a relatively small sample of terrorist 
groups which supposedly embody the traits of new terrorism. The quantitative research effort 
has, up until this thesis, been limited to either transnational terrorist incidents over a long 
period of time – or transnational and domestic incidents over a relatively short period of time 
(see Piazza, 2009; Rasler & Thompson, 2009; Enders & Sandler 1999, 2002; Bellany, 2007). 
As far as I know, no tests have been carried out with domestic incidents over a time period 
sufficient to capture the rise of religious terrorism – yet domestic incidents are thought to 
outnumber transnational incidents by as much as seven to one (LaFree, 2010:25). This means 
that we have been looking at religious terrorism through a pinhole because the data needed 
hasn’t been available. In this thesis I significantly broaden the scope in terms of time, as well 
as the number of groups and incidents covered to, address these problems and revisit the 
central tenants of new terrorism. 
I use the relatively new Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to investigate the questions 
asked earlier. Worldwide records of domestic and transnational incidents from 1985−2010 are 
used for the first time to investigate the development of religious terrorism for the last 26 
years. I have coded an ideological indicator for 1,140 terrorist groups, responsible for 35,860 
terrorist incidents to capture the trends and traits of religious terrorism. 
The findings provide mixed support for the central tenants of new terrorism. The 
evidence is supportive of a beginning, and subsequent increase, of religious terrorism. This is 
especially evident from 2002 and on. There is, however, little support for the notion that 
religious terrorism is very different from other forms of terrorism. Religious terrorism appears 
to cause many casualties due to an increase in activity, rather than a higher lethality rate for 
each incident. Although religious groups are currently perpetrating most of the suicide 
attacks, they are not especially likely to use the tactic. Religious incidents are also not 
particularly more likely to cross state borders than other forms of terrorism.  
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I will begin by discussing the definitions of terrorism. From then on, the thesis follows 
the traditional structure of presenting the relevant theory, introducing the methods and data 
sources used and then presenting and discussing the results. The final section offers 
concluding remarks regarding the findings, policy implications and future research. 
The Definitions and Types of Terrorism 
This section discusses some example definitions of terrorism and detail the definition used for 
this thesis. Following this, terrorism is further divided into commonly used typologies 
necessary for this thesis. 
Defining Terrorism 
For such a common word as terrorism the number of definitions and their range of variation 
are staggering. Despite decades of academic effort we have yet to properly nail down this 
nuance of human violent activity. The most widely used definition of terrorism will be 
presented first. Since this is a U.S. definition a recent Chinese definition will be presented for 
perspective, followed by a far more complex academic definition. Finally, since this thesis is 
bound to the definition that sets the inclusion criteria for the GTD dataset this definition will 
be presented in detail and discussed in relation to the other definitions putting this research 
into proper context. State terrorism is not part of this thesis and will not be part of the 
discussion. 
One place to start our discussion is in the United States. The 1986 US Department of 
State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism holds what Lia (2005:11) argues is the most widely used 
definition for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. According to that definition 
terrorism is … 
…premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (Lia, 
2005:11).  
This definition can be broken down into principal components, such as intent, 
motivation, violence, definitions of both actor and victim and finally communication. These 
are very common components of a definition of terrorism. The consequences of one of these 
being left out can be quite dire. The following definition was offered by the U.S. Vice 
President’s task force in 1986; 
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… the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or 
social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals 
or groups to modify their behavior or policies. (Merari, 2007:14).  
Here the violence component is put into the framework of U.S. law and the threat of 
violence is also specified and both political and social goals are considered. The differences 
are subtle apart from the fact that the perpetrators aren’t specified at all. Hence, by this 
definition the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an act of terrorism. Both of 
these definitions are presented by the United States. We can find something completely 
different in a Chinese definition from 2011; 
Activities that severely endanger society that have the goal of creating terror in society, 
endangering public security, or threatening state organs and international organizations 
and which, by the use of violence, sabotage, intimidation, and other methods, cause or are 
intended to cause human casualties, great loss to property, damage to public 
infrastructure, and chaos in the social order, as well as activities that incite, finance, or 
assist the implementation of the above activities through any other means. 
(The Law Library of Congress 2011) 
‘Society’ has a prominent role in this definition, both as victim and almost as a method 
of attack causing ‘chaos in the social order’. It is also, in contrast to all previously presented 
definitions, specific in labelling any collaborators terrorists as well. Though it is longer than 
the other definitions and might appear specific it is not so, and very open to interpretation. 
What constitutes for example ‘creating terror in society’, ‘and other methods’ and ‘chaos in 
the social order’? If you were to change a tire on the freeway and cause a traffic jam, would 
this be chaos in the social order? Is openly criticizing the government one of the ‘other 
methods’ of causing ‘chaos in the social order’? 
Evidently the problem here is that states, both democratic and autocratic, use the term 
‘terrorist’ as a political tool rather than as a universal phenomenon. Lia (2005:9) notes that 
labelling someone as terrorists is a way of delegitimizing them, which is why ‘terrorists 
usually avoid the terms to describe their activities, preferring other more positively-laden 
labels such as revolutionary cells, urban guerrillas, Islamic fighters or mujahidin’. States also 
use different labels for different groups. In President Ronald Reagan’s seventh State of the 
Union Address in January 1988 famously stated ‘In Afghanistan, the freedom fighters are key 
to peace. We support the Mujahadeen...’. (Reagan, 1988). This was during the end of the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan where they had supported the Marxist-regime against the 
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Mujahadeen. The difference between states was illustrated with a quote from Secretary-
General of the U.N. Kofi Annan in 2005. After several terrorist bombings had occurred he 
said ‘…gives us one more reason to press ahead and get a good definition that we can all live 
with’ (Emphasis added) (United Nations, 2005). A consensus definition does not yet exist, 
and terrorism remains in the eye of the beholder for as long as this is the case. Thackrah 
(2004:75) write;  
Terrorism is also a moral problem, and attempts at a definition are based on the 
assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable whereas others are not. 
For instance, students of terrorism find some difficulty in labelling an event as terrorist 
without making a moral judgment about the act. Governments and lawyers and politicians 
find themselves unable to take such a detached view. 
Academia has struggled with this problem for well over 40 years now (Badey, 
1998:90) and has produced numerous definitions of the phenomenon. So many in fact, that 
Dutch researchers Alex Schmid & Alberg Jongman in 1983 collected 109 of them and 
analysed their components instead of attempting to create one from scratch. This results in an 
analysis of what is commonly perceived as terrorism. 83.5 percent of these included a 
component of violence, 65 percent included political goals, 51 percent emphasized spreading 
fear and terror, and as Merari (2007:14) sums up; ‘Only 21 percent of the definitions 
mentioned arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting, and only 17.5 percent included the 
victimization of civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, or outsiders. In their work 22 different 
components were identified and 16 of these composed into yet another definition. This 
definition represents ‘probably the most rigorous effort there has been to define terrorism’ 
(Guelke, 1998:18). It reads… 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political 
reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the 
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication 
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used 
to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought. 
                    (from Guelke, 1998:18) 
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This definition has been criticized for being contradictory as a result of over-
specification and is also unlikely to be used by any governments (Badey, 1998:91). Merari 
(2007:14) also notes that this definition is by large the product of the western view and its 
consensus over the essence of terrorism and that it is ‘probably not shared by the majority of 
people on earth’. Several points can be seen as problematic here, first of all terrorism is 
contrasted to assassination. Many terrorist incidents are assassinations, and an incident can 
involve direct- and indirect targeting at the same time. An exponent for a terrorist group’s 
enemy can be assassinated both to get rid of that person and to communicate their overall 
message to the audience. Furthermore, the paragraph goes beyond the call of a definition and 
proceeds into the domain of a further description of the phenomenon. 
In an attempt at a similar definition, Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler (2010:780) 
examined all articles from the journals Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence and 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and found seventy-three definitions in fifty-five articles. 
Their consensus definition is abstract and general as well as similar to that used by states. The 
authors concluded that ‘unless we are willing to label terrorism as a very wide range of 
violent activities, we may be better off finding another governing concept or looking 
elsewhere for a definition’. Their definition read; ‘Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic 
involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a 
significant role’. (Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2010:787). These five different 
definitions illustrate some of the problems with defining terrorism and of reaching a 
consensus on what the phenomenon really is.  
The principal components of these definitions are easily recognizable in the GTD 
inclusion criteria. The GTD inclusion criteria consist of two main parts. In the first part there 
are three criteria which must all be satisfied for an incident to be included in the dataset. In the 
second part, only two out of three are necessary.
2
 
Part one reads… 
 ‘The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of 
the perpetrator.’ 
 ‘The incident must entail some level of violence or threat* of violence – including 
property violence as well as violence against people.’ 
                                                 
2
 It is, however, possible to drop all incidents which do not satisfy all criteria in the second part. However, this 
option is only available for incidents which took place in 1997 and onwards. This is discussed further in the 
method chapter. 
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 ‘The perpetrators of the incident must be sub-national actors. This database does not 
include acts of state terrorism.’3 
  (START, 2011:5) 
* ‘Threat’ here ‘refers to an indication of imminent danger and does not include verbal or written claims of 
violence or intent that do not coincide with kinetic action toward harm for which the perpetrator is physically 
present’ (START, 2011:5).  
The three main components; intent, use or threat of violence, and specification of 
actors are represented here. They are clearly defined, yet not over specified and are as such 
quite similar to the two U.S. definitions presented above.  
The second part reads.... 
 ‘The act must be aimed at attaining political, economic, religious, or social goal. In 
terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It 
must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.’ 
 ‘There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act 
taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying 
out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers 
behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is 
met.’ 
 ‘The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the 
act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law 
(particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).’ 
               (START, 2011:5) 
Motivation, communication and target selection are the three main components of this 
part. Note that only two out of three need be present for an incident to labelled terrorism and 
included in the GTD. The logic of splitting the criteria into two parts seem to reflect the fact 
that the criteria in part two are harder to define and are perhaps harder to measure. Point one 
clarifies motivation only to the point that it cannot be the sole pursuit of profit. Point two 
specifies that some form of communication is present to a third party not directly involved in 
the incident. The third point ties target selection to international humanitarian law, which is a 
good thing in the sense that it gives the definition an international moral anchoring point. It 
does mean, however, that the point is subject to changes in international humanitarian law 
(because no particular text or version of that text is specified). This means that the point may 
not be timeless such as all other points of the definition could be. It does, however, specify 
                                                 
3
 The codebook actually says “…must by sub-national actors” but I presume this is a typo. 
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that the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants is of particular importance and 
shows overall that the GTD is aware of the fluidity of the international humanitarian law. 
Overall this definition seems both effective in its operation and representative of the 
commonly accepted components of terrorism. 
Types of Terrorism 
Given any of the above definitions of the phenomenon itself, terrorism can be categorized 
even further. Terrorism is usually subdivided into three types; domestic, international and 
transnational. International terrorism is terrorism that ‘involves citizenry or territory of more 
than one country’ while domestic terrorism does not (Guelke, 1998:143). Badey (1998:92) 
defines international terrorism as ‘the repeated use of politically motivated violence with 
coercive intent, by non-state actors, that affects more than one state’. ‘Transnational 
terrorism’ is international terrorism that does not involve the state as an actor, while 
international terrorism does (Guelke, 1998:143; Lia, 2005:11). These terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably and some relate international terrorism directly to state sponsorship 
(Lia, 2005:11). However, Badey (1998:90) does not think the distinction between 
international and transnational is necessary as it has ‘no popular resonance’ and ‘have 
meaning only to an anointed few’. The research field is not entirely clear on the distinction 
between transnational and international. This thesis really has no need for the distinction 
because the data I use does not distinguish between incidents where the state was involved (in 
any way) and not. The inconsistencies may be present in the theory presented and is hard to 
control for.
4
 The only thing to keep in mind is that transnational and international terrorism 
involves two or more states (purely in terms of geography) while domestic does not. From the 
method section and out I’ll use the transnational term for any incident which involves two or 
more states because international implies the state has a role as an actor and we have no 
information to prove this. This also seems consistent with Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev 
(2011) who devised the method used for separating domestic and transnational attacks in the 
GTD dataset.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Ultimately, this is of little consequence. A central point of the theory of new terrorism hinges on the demise of 
state-sponsorship and that sponsoring state’s restrictions on violence put on the terrorist group. One could argue, 
and rightfully so, that some states may indeed have little restraints they wish to put on a terrorist group as well. 
Nevertheless, state-sponsorship is part of the theory and state sponsored groups are in the GTD data. Validity-
wise, the decision of using the term ‘transnational’ is arbitrary and based on the fact that it is impossible to 
distinguish transnational from international events in GTD at present. 
5
 In fact, the ITERATE dataset (which is widely used in previous research in the field) holds a quite lengthy 
definition of both transnational and international terrorism. In short, there international terrorism is an act of 
terrorism which is “carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state, whereas transnational 
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Furthermore, terrorist groups can be subdivided into ideological categories to reflect 
the theoretical worldview they are promoting in their activities, out of which religion is only 
one of several. Mengel (1977) separated between social-revolutionary, nationalist-separatist, 
religious-fundamentalist, new religious extremists (close cults), right-wing and single-issue 
extremeists. Piazza (2009) distinguishes between Islamist, leftist, rightist, national-separatist, 
and universal/abstract groups.  In this thesis 9 basic categories, and any combination of them, 
serve as the starting point for the analysis; anarchist, anti-globalization, communist / socialist, 
environmental, leftist, nationalist / separatist, racist, religious and right wing. These reflect the 
general ideas the group is promoting through their activities and is further discussed in the 
method chapter. All such terrorist categories will be referred to as ‘ideologies’ in this thesis.6  
The Theories of a New Terrorism 
This chapter will present the theory of new terrorism in three main sections; first, an 
introduction to the many nick-names and supposed start-dates for new terrorism; second, 
Rapoport’s wave concept is introduced along with the three first waves of international 
terrorism; third, Rapoport’s fourth wave and the general new terrorism literature is presented 
in greater detail. This third section is further divided into subsections dealing with the 
meaning of the word ‘religious’ in this context, the goals, target selection, weapons of choice, 
and the organizational structure of new terrorists. 
The Many Terms and Beginnings of New Terrorism 
One thing must be made abundantly clear; there is no unified or clearly defined theory called 
the theory of new terrorism. New Terrorism is more accurately a term referring to a series of 
theories on how terrorism has, or even will change substantially. The theories are highly 
similar and the core concept is the same but the authors seldom use the term ‘new terrorism’ 
to describe their new terrorism. This is effectively illustrated by giving the different names 
given to new terrorists. Here are some examples I’ve seen in my review of the literature; 
‘second generation terrorists’ and ‘neo-terrorists’ (Cilluffo & Tomarchio, 1998:441) and 
‘megaterrorism’, ‘superterrorism’ or ‘postmodern terrorism’ (Laqueur, 2004, 1996) and 
‘Catastrophic Terrorism’ (Carter, Deutch & Zelikow, 1998), and referencing the specific 
threat of WMDs to the rest of society in our ‘third wave of vulnerability’ (post 1995) (Gurr & 
                                                                                                                                                        
terrorism is carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of 
support from sympathetic states.’. (Mickolous, Sandler, Murdock & Flemming 2003:2). 
6
 This is simply a matter of workflow. The word ‘ideology’ itself stems from French enlightenment philosopher 
Destutt de Tracy and means the science of ideas (Østerud, Goldmann & Pedersen 2004:91). The word has since 
become closely tied to political ideologies. 
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Cole, 2002), ‘super terrorism’ & ‘hyper terrorism’ (Zimmermann, 2004:9), ‘holy terror’ or 
‘fourth wave of modern terrorism’ (Rapoport, 1988, 2004). There are probably more, 
especially if we broaden our horizons outside academia. Equally varying are the proclaimed 
advents of new terrorism, Rapoport’s (2004) so-called fourth wave of modern terrorism starts 
with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, other cite Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack in Tokyo 
1995, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 or the assassination of Meir Kahane in 1990 
(Crenshaw, 2009:119; Spencer, 2006:9). A rough generalization of the literature would be to 
say that there is a transitional period between the traditional and new terrorism, beginning 
somewhere in the early 1980s, and it becomes prominent in the 1990s. 
A new form of terrorism was heralded as early as the early twentieth century, referring 
to nationalist political violence, and several other times since then (Walter Laqueur, in: 
Duyvesteyn, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, new terrorism will refer to the literature 
that was written in the early 1990s and onwards. I will use the collective term, new terrorism, 
and treat them as one theory because they are very similar and the field is used to this. 
Rapoport’s wave concept will sometimes be referred to separately as ‘fourth wave terrorists’. 
This will be more obvious once the concept is explained, because no other theory of new 
terrorism offers such an elaborate explanation for the ideological trends of terrorism. The 
wave concept is quite simply qualitatively different from the rest of the new terrorism 
literature. 
Rapoport’s Wave Concept 
David C. Rapoport (2004) has a far more elaborate theory than any other authors in the field 
of new terrorism beginning his historical analysis in the late 1880s. He argues that a longer 
perspective of time will remedy ‘unduly focus on contemporary events’ within terrorism 
research, probably referring to the bulk of the new terrorism literature as well. He argues that 
the period of time from the late 1880s and up until the present can be divided into four distinct 
sections, termed waves. A wave is described by Rapoport (2004:47) as follows; 
 It is a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and 
contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur 
in several countries driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating 
group’s characteristics and mutual relationships. As their names – “Anarchist”, 
“anticolonial”, “New Left,” and “Religious” – suggest, a different energy drives each. 
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Each wave’s name reflects its dominant but not its only feature. Nationalist organizations 
in various numbers appear in all waves, for example, and each wave shaped its national 
elements differently. 
From these paragraphs we see that a wave is international in its nature, thus early Ku 
Klux Klan activities pre-dating the anarchist wave are not part of a wave because it had ‘no 
contemporary parallels or emulators.’ (Rapoport, 2004:47). A sole organization does not 
make for a wave. He is not suggesting that each and every terrorist organization existing 
within a wave must be anarchist, anticolonial, new left or religious but holds that this is the 
dominant group ideology of each wave. In the same manner, an argument could be made that 
not all wars from 1945−1990 were signified by the ideological showdown between 
communism and western democracies, however the distinctive feature of the conflicts of the 
era are indeed ideological. The wave-pattern also tells us that most terrorist organizations are 
both created and succumb during the course of one wave. If an organization survives the 
transitional period between two waves it will inevitably be influenced by the new wave 
coming in, and adopt its ideas in order to survive in the new environment. This is, in other 
words, a global feature that influences many groups. Simply put, organizations are likely to 
reflect the zeitgeist of the generation. The term wave also describe the process of ebb and 
flow between waves meaning that there is a transitional period where the two coexist, one 
wave fading out and another coming in. Though organizations seldom survive this transition 
the major goal of each wave is revolution in some form (Rapoport, 2004:47-48). 
The first wave was the Anarchist wave which originated from Russia, and lasted from 
the late 1880s up until the new colonial wave took over in the 1920s. The critical elements 
producing this wave was a ‘transformation in communication and transportation patterns’, 
along with the publication of the first significant works on the tactic of terrorism itself 
(Rapoport, 2004:48-49).
7
 The anarchists had grievances against ‘the conventions of society 
devised to muffle and diffuse antagonisms generated by guilt’ and against the channels 
provided ‘for settling grievances and securing personal amenities.’ (Rapoport, 2004:50). The 
highpoint of this wave is sometimes called ‘the “Golden Age of Assassination”’, reflecting 
the dominant strategy employed at the time against leaders around the world. The 
international seriousness of this wave was noted by President Theodore Roosevelt and 
actually spurred the first international counter-terrorism effort (Rapoport, 2004:52).   
                                                 
7
 Unlike the organizations themselves the technical works on the ‘”science” of terror’ are inherited and drawn 
upon in varying degree by each consecutive wave (Rapoport 2004:49). 
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The anticolonial wave began to assert itself after the Versailles treaty, which radically 
transformed the world by invoking the principle of national self-determination to break up the 
defeated states. States outside Europe were not treated with the same logic, ‘and terrorist 
groups developed in all empires except for the Soviet Union’…’ after World War II’ 
(Rapoport, 2004:53). This wave was, unlike the other waves, highly successful and ‘terrorist 
activity was crucial in establishing the new states of Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria’. This 
meant resolving the grievances - thus the second wave receded (Rapoport, 2004:53). Instead 
of using the word ‘Terrorist’ proudly, as the first wave had done, the second wave terrorist 
required terms that didn’t evoke the ‘negative connotations’ connected with the Anarchists. 
Interestingly, this led to a confounding of the term terrorist itself where terrorists began using 
‘freedom fighters’ to describe themselves, while governments labelled all rebel activity as 
‘terrorist’. Trying to escape obvious bias in their reports, the media resorted to calling the 
‘same individuals terrorists, guerrillas and soldiers in the same account.’ (Rapoport, 2004:54).  
The third wave of international terrorism is dubbed the ‘New Left’ wave. Rapoport 
(2004:55) holds the ‘major political event stimulating’ …this wave… ‘was the agonizing 
Vietnam War.’, and the Viet Cong (and later PLO) served as the main inspirational sources. 
Terrorist groups developed both in Third World countries and in the Western states where 
several ‘saw themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses.’ (Rapoport, 2004:55). 
Though several of the groups were fighting for self-determination the colonial empires had 
already crumbled thus the legitimacy found in the second wave’s struggle was not present in 
the third wave – and the opportunity for success was not present (Rapoport, 2004:55).  
The ideology, so to speak, of each wave was not the only thing that changed. The 
weapons of choice and target selection changed between waves. Assassination was popular 
among the first wave terrorists, the Anarchists. The tactic had, however, proved 
counterproductive thus (with the exception of the Balkans) assassination was not much used 
by anticolonial terrorists. Where Anarchists had chosen high profile leaders and proponents of 
the system they opposed, the second wave focused on eliminating the police by targeting their 
officers and/or their families and on guerrilla strikes on troops
8
 (Rapoport, 2004:54-55). The 
third wave found airports vulnerable and instigated seven hundred hijackings over 30 years 
and later increasingly turned to another characteristic of the third wave; hostage taking. 
Assassination was also revived, now used as punishments for actions against the 
organizations interests instead of the more selective exponent targeting of the first wave. The 
                                                 
8
 Often without warning the civilian population prior to the incident, and using both concealed weapons and no 
identifying insignia. (Rapoport, 2004:55) 
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U.S. and their citizens also emerged as a prime target, particularly in South America 
(Rapoport, 2004:56-58). Diaspora communities and sympathetic states started contributing to 
terrorist organizations in their homeland during the second wave. Both the League of Nations 
and the U.N. also played a role in legitimizing some terrorist efforts during this wave. State-
sponsorship became prominent during the third wave, which is also when many organizations 
lost the diaspora support (Rapoport, 2004:55-59). 
The third wave began to ebb in the 1980s, while the fourth (and current) religious 
wave of terrorism began with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 (Rapoport 2004:60-61). For 
all intents and purposes Rapoport’s fourth wave of modern terrorism is the new terrorism, and 
the fourth wave is therefore presented alongside the new terrorism literature in general. No 
other new terrorism proponents present such a detailed picture of ideological trends in 
terrorism for the past 130 years, although Laqueur (2004:54) notes that ‘fanaticism doesn’t 
easily transfer from one generation to the next’, and expects the religious fanaticism to be 
replaced with something else entirely. 
The Fourth Wave and the New Terrorism 
In short, the fourth wave and new terrorists are religious. The term ‘religious’ has a different 
meaning in the context of new terrorism and requires a definition before I proceed. 
The Definition of ‘Religious’ in the Context of New Terrorism 
There is one major difference between old and new terrorist organizations from which all 
other differences can be derived, and on which all new terrorism authors agree: Gone are the 
days of secular and politically motivated terrorism. There are somewhat different takes on 
what it has been replaced with, but new terrorists are generally said to be religiously 
motivated. Some authors, however, apply significantly broader definitions of ‘religious’ than 
others seem to do. In his earliest papers on postmodern terrorism Laqueur (1996, 1998) 
focuses on sectarian fanaticism and millenarian movements poised on giving history a helping 
hand in bringing about an apocalyptic end-of-days scenario. Hoffman (1996) wrote that none 
of the active terrorists groups in 1968
9
 could be classified as religious and that in the 1990s 
this had changed radically. In 1994 a sixteen out of forty nine international terrorist groups 
were religious, in 1995 nearly half of the groups were religious (Hoffman, 2006:86). Rapoport 
(2004:61) holds the goals of fourth wave terrorists are inextricably bound to religion, and 
                                                 
9
 Hoffman (2006:63) holds the advent of modern international terrorism is 22
nd
 of July 1968 when The Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight from Rome to Tel Aviv 
with the goal of trading the passengers for Palestinian terrorists held captive by Israel.  
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Islam is at the heart of the wave. Simon & Benjamin (2000:59) focus most their attention on 
Islam, writing ‘although the new terrorism stems from a welter of causes, and cannot be 
considered the invention of any one individual, the face of this phenomenon belongs to 
Osama bin Laden.’. Kurtulus (2011: 478) claims new terrorism is all about ‘…religious or 
mystical motivation.’. Jürgensmeyer (2003) devotes his book Terror in the Mind of God to the 
relationship between many religions and terrorism. Ciluffo & Tomarchio (1998:440-441) 
wrote ‘the terrorist brew has been fortified by single-issue extremists, cults, religious fanatics, 
and insurgent reactionaries.’. 
Although Islam in particular has received a lot of attentionm the scope of new 
terrorism is significantly broader. Laqueur (1998) and Jürgensmeyer (2003) both add other 
religions to the list, such as Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism. Morgan 
(2004:32) notes that even though much of the research and many of the incidents are 
attributed to religious groups, and to Islam, ‘Islamic radicalism is not the only form of 
apocalyptic, catastrophic terrorism’. Along with al-Qaida, Aum Shinrikyo is often cited as 
such a new terrorist group. Aum Shinrikyo’s former leader, Shoko Asahara, taught ‘a unique 
amalgam of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and New Age thought, with some elements 
also taken from Nostradamus’ prophecies and even science fiction.’ (TKB, 2008). Laqueur 
(1998:175) even holds that ‘In the case of certain militant Christian sects and the Japanese 
Aum [Shinrikyo], it can be shown that science fiction has provided as much inspiration as 
sacred religious texts.’ (Emphasis added). Thus, religious in the context of new terrorism 
refers to the relationship between terrorism and a spiritual world view. Whether the religion is 
age old, such as the major religions of the world, or newly invented such as New Age-
philosophies or the Church of Scientology, whether they are small cults or large organizations 
– they all fall under the term ‘religious’ in the context of this thesis. The meaning of the term 
religious is thus wider than what is commonly associated with the word ‘religion’ – it spans a 
broader realm of fiction. 
The reason defining religion is important is that distinguishing between ideology and 
religion is very hard, yet it is essential to the difference between new and traditional terrorists. 
Both religion and ideology can be used as guides for how a society should be structured and 
as such they supply similar functions to the believer. However, religion (in all its breadth 
described above) touches people on a more fundamental level than ideology does. Religion is 
an integral part of an individual’s identity on a more basic level than ideology. In his well-
known paper on the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel S. Huntington (1993:25) divided the world 
into 7(8) distinct civilizations he considered ‘history, language, culture, tradition and, most 
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important, religion.’ as the differentiating factors. These factors are the ‘product of centuries’ 
and ‘far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.’ 
(Huntington, 1993:25). You are your ethnicity and your religion, but you are convinced of an 
ideology. Furthermore, religion creates a black and white divide between us and them and – 
you cannot follow two religions at the same time (Huntington, 1993:27). Evidence suggests 
that many civil wars are related to ethnic and religious identities, either directly or as an 
instrument of agitator(s)
10
 (see Buhaug & Gates, 2002, Fox & Sandler, 2006, 2006a). A 
terrorist group is not religious solely on the grounds that some, if not all, of their members 
have a spiritual life. The true change in the new terrorists falls from the fact that religion now 
plays an active role in many, if not all, aspects of a group’s activities. This means that unlike a 
political group, identity has now become part of terrorist group’s agenda. This leads us on to 
how the goals of new terrorists differ from those of traditional terrorists. 
The Goals of New Terrorists 
An excellent presentation of new terrorism is given by Martha Crenshaw (2009). On the 
subject of goals, she is very specific; The ‘goals of ‘new’ terrorists are derived exclusively 
from religious doctrines that emphasize transformational and apocalyptical beliefs.’ 
(Crenshaw 2009, 144). This is the key point that separates new terrorists from old terrorists. 
Even though traditional terrorist groups also had religious members, they differ from new 
terrorists because their goals were often secular, such as the creation of a secular state. This 
means, in essence, that a group comprised only of Catholics is not a new terrorism group if 
their goals are the creation of a secular state. The new terrorists are engaging in terrorist 
activities because it is according to their beliefs. They are not terrorists who happen to be 
religious as well – they are terrorists because they are religious. For new terrorists, religion 
defines the goals. In the fourth wave the religious component is ‘supplying justifications and 
organizing principles for a state’, and this is new (Rapoport, 2004:61). Religion has the 
dominant role in new terrorist organizations, and their goals are derived from that doctrine. 
Where a traditional group would attempt to further support for communism by striking at 
capitalist figures, or seek secession from the state in a nationalist separatist struggle religious 
groups find their goals in their sacred texts. New terrorists ‘seek the restoration of a golden 
age of religious belief and practices, whose passing left the community vulnerable to the 
depredations of the enemy. The essentially religious goal of moral restoration becomes the 
                                                 
10
 There is an ongoing debate on the role of identity in conflict eruption and perpetuation. ‘Primordialists’ argue 
that state institutions keep identities in check, thus avoiding conflict, while ‘Instrumentalists’ argue that there is 
need for agitator(s) using identities strategically to create conflict. (see for example Pearce, 2006:41) 
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basis of a political response in the form of a confrontation with the enemy within and 
without.’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:66). Furthermore, Simon & Benjamin (2000) holds that 
the ‘jihadists’ seek the restoration of ‘the early seventh-eight century Caliphate when, in their 
understanding of Islamic history, a righteous leader ruled over an undivided umma 
(community of believers), achieving a perfect unity of religious and political authority over 
the lands of Islam’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:67). 
Al-Qaida, probably the prime example of such a group, seek the creation of an Islamic 
state under the laws of sharia (Rapoport, 2004:64). Of course different groups have different 
takes on religion, and different religions produce different goals. Aum Shinrikyo, now 
‘Aleph’, had bases of operations in Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Taiwan and 
the United States and believed in a coming apocalyptic war between Japan and the United 
States. One of their goals was to bring about this war (TKB, 2008). The ‘Christian Identity’ 
movement in the United States employed racist interpretations of the Bible and longed for the 
Second Coming of Christ and ‘the great racial war’ (Rapoport, 2004:61). According to 
Crenshaw (1999:122) this types of grand goals are assumed to exist in all monotheistic 
religions by the new terrorism literature. 
 The goals can have direct consequences. According to Rapoport (2004:65) fourth 
wave terrorist groups are inherently anti-democratic because democracy is ‘inconceivable 
without a significant measure of secularism’. All political issues are seen and interpreted in 
light of belief and actions undertaken to fulfil their goals are sanctioned by God. This also has 
consequences for how we can relate to these new terrorists. Cilluffo & Tomarchio (1998:441) 
said that new terrorists are motivated by ‘vengeance, rage, racial or religious hatred, intense 
anti-government feelings or extreme nationalism. Their agendas differ markedly from their 
classical terrorist counterparts in that they are not seeking a seat at the negotiating table. They 
want to blow up the table altogether and build a new one in its place’11. Crenshaw (2009:122) 
writes ‘…the ends of the ‘new’ terrorism are presumed to be both unlimited and non-
negotiable. These aims are also considered largely incomprehensible and amorphous.’.  
From this we can also see that distinguishing between transnational and domestic 
groups can be very difficult. Their goals do not directly relate to the existing state structure 
and is therefore hard to position within that framework. The new terrorists defy ‘ready 
classification as solely foreign or domestic’ (Carter, Deutch & Zelikow, 1998:82). New 
terrorism groups can work towards global goals on the transnational level but just as well 
                                                 
11
 The authors are actually paraphrasing former CIA Chief R. James Woolsey, who said; “Today’s terrorists 
don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (Lia, 2005:14). 
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exist as a cult-phenomenon on the domestic level or perhaps even sub-national level. There is 
no telling what shape an organization based on fictional beliefs will take. 
The most comprehensive test of the ideological trends across time is found in Rasler & 
Thompson (2000). They use the ITERATE dataset to test 8 hypotheses indicative of 
Rapoport’s (2004) wave-concept. They find support for seven of the hypotheses, beginning 
their analysis in 1968. There is nearly no anarchism, little nationalist, and they observe the 
ebb and flow of leftism as well as the increase of religious terrorism. They find that the 
evidence is ‘highly supportive of the wave approach to conceptualizing terrorism’.12 
However, the ITERATE dataset holds only transnational incidents. Can the same be said to be 
true for domestic incidents, which after all make up the better part of all terrorist incidents? 
There are good reasons to revisit these questions, using the domestic and transnational data 
which is available now. 
If there has been a rise in the number of religious terrorist groups engaging in 
terrorism activity since the early 1980s, and this form of terrorism hasn’t been seen before, 
then there should be a significant increase in the number of religious terrorist incidents within 
the same timeframe. This fact has to be true if the theory of new terrorism is to justify new 
conceptions and definitions of terrorism in the modern counter terrorism policies. 
H1 The numbers of religiously motivated terrorist incident has risen significantly since 1979. 
 In fact, an increase in religious terrorism over time produces two hypotheses. First of 
all, the number of religious terrorist incidents has to rise in proportion to the number of other 
terrorist incidents. This is to account for shifts in the number of incidents each year over time. 
The number of incidents can go up and down each year in a cyclical pattern (cycles are 
observed by Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011)), thus an observed rise in religious 
terrorism may in fact not be a proportional change but simply a change in the total number of 
incidents.  
H2 The proportion of all terrorist incidents that are religiously motivated has risen 
significantly over time since 1979. 
                                                 
12
 Also worth noting, Enders & Sandler (1999) argue that we may perceive an increase of terrorist activity 
because there are cycles of activity within terrorism. These cycles are also further investigated in their 2002 
paper, where terrorist activity is set into context across time with counter-measures – such as metal detectors on 
airports – to see how new security measures impact terrorist activity. Their findings show that terrorists adapt to 
the new regimes, and find alternate ways of attacking instead. 
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If the analysis shows that the proportion of religiously motivated incidents have gone 
up and the number of incident analysis shows that the overall risk remains unchanged – then 
the overall conclusion must be that other forms of motivations are phased out while religious 
terrorism remain at a constant level. If no significant changes in proportion are found, and no 
significant change in risk is found, then the phenomenon as a whole remains unchanged 
across time. If no significant change in proportions is found but an increased risk is found 
then the overall number of terrorist incidents have increased. Therefore, both the proportion 
and risk of a religiously motivated terrorist incident should become significantly higher over 
time to substantiate the claims of the new terrorism literature. 
Finally, new terrorism should be spread across the regions of the world. The wave 
concept holds that a wave has international features where similar actors pop up across the 
globe and engage in transnational activities. This means that these patterns should be more 
pronounced among the transnational incidents than the domestic incidents of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, it should be present in both if this is the kind of group the current zeitgeist 
produces. Additionally, new terrorism should exist across the globe and not be confined to 
smaller regions of the world although it may very well vary in frequency between regions. 
H3 Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold for both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents. 
The criticism of new terrorism focuses on the resurgence of religious motivations and 
goals are levied by expanding the time frame of the analysis. To a western analyst born after 
the cold war began, religious violence may indeed seem foreign, but historical perspective 
paints a different picture. Copeland notes that ‘most authoritarian and totalitarian 
governments in the twentieth century were ruthless in their persecution of religion, forcing it 
underground although not eliminating it successfully’ (Copeland, 2001:9). Thus, the recent 
rise of religious violence may seem new to western analysts but is in fact a reassertion of age 
old motivations subdued by the Cold War. In fact, Copeland (2001:9) also notes that the 
Marxist designations of many cold war terrorist groups were generally superficial, thus 
simply masking ‘their true underlying ethno-nationalist or religious motivations’. A perceived 
rise in religious motivations may, in this light, simply be the downfall of Marxism as an 
ideological cover for religiously motivated terrorism.
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Examples of ancient religious terrorism, also with transnational traits, are also given 
by opponents of the new paradigm, such as the Jewish Zealots, the Sicarii Assassins and the 
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 The ideological indicator coded for this thesis does not track changes in ideological alignment for the groups 
throughout the time period. Therefore, I am unable to test whether groups drop their leftist ideological cover.  
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Thugs. It is pointed out that the traditional terrorists also operated transnationally and that this 
fact also stretches back to antiquity (Copeland, 2001, Duyvesteyn, 2011:444). Religion is also 
shown to have played a role for the members of recent groups that are considered traditional. 
Duyvesteyn (2011:445-447) holds that the IRA ‘…had almost exclusive Catholic 
membership.’ and believed that their cause had a religious quality. In short, the division 
between the motivations and goals of a new and old terrorist becomes artificial where politics 
and religion overlap for both types of groups (Duyvesteyn, 2011:447). There are several 
similar examples to be found throughout history.
14
 The proponents of new terrorism clearly 
state, that the relationship between violence and religion is not a new one. Rapoport (2004:61) 
holds that religious and ethnic identities ‘often overlap’ and that religious terrorism precedes 
the fourth wave in this regard. 16 years earlier he also noted that ‘”Holy Terror” seems new to 
us, but prior to the French Revolution it was the dominant, perhaps only form of terror.’ 
(Rapoport, 1988:195). Hoffman also goes into detail on religious terrorists far pre-dating the 
ones we are witnessing now, noting ‘two thousand years ago the first acts of what we now 
describe as “terrorism” were perpetrated by religious fanatics’ (Hoffman, 2006:83). 
Therefore, it is hard to pin down just what blend of religious terrorism the new terrorism 
proponents are speaking of and what blend they are not. If religious terrorism is not new, then 
Rapoport (2004:65) is the author who most clearly distinguish what exactly is new; ‘unlike 
crime or poverty, international terrorism is a recent phenomenon.’.  
The fact that groups and not individuals are the units of analysis is also seen as 
problematic. Some stress the fact that the motivations of an individual in a terrorist group may 
be different from the terrorist group’s motivations. The fact that not all religious terrorists 
seem to be willing to die in the act for their God, or sect-leader, also indicate that their 
motivations may not be as true as the new terrorism postulates (Duyvesteyn, 2011:445-446). 
It is also noted that the large, seemingly unobtainable goals of new terrorists are also found in 
traditional groups such as the anarchist movement or the Rote Armee Fraktion and that the 
recreating the Caliphate can be seen as political (Duyvesteyn, 2011:446-447).  
Finally, the ebb of the third wave should show up clearly throughout the 1980s. Thus, 
leftist ideologies would be expected to decline sharply after the cold war and religious 
terrorism would present an incline.  
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 At times the debate has gotten side-tracked into arguments starting with definitions of the word ‘new’, and 
attempting to define some arbitrary measure of change which has to occur in order to call a phenomenon new. I 
have already given examples of alternate names, and such arguments could be circumvented altogether by using 
one of these names instead. The meaning of the new terrorism literature would not change if it was called 
Postmodern Terrorism instead. Kurtulus (2011) offers a summary of the valid and invalid points of the critique 
against new terrorism which addresses this problem. 
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H4 The number of incidents motivated by a leftist ideology have declined significantly after 
the Cold War. 
The Target Selection of New Terrorists 
According to Drake (1998) the role of ideology in target selection and is highly relevant to 
understanding of new terrorists. First of all, there is no ‘single cause which can adequately 
explain terrorist’ target selection’ (Drake, 1998:54). A group has to target according to the 
resources at their disposal, the reactions from society in general. The security environment 
they exist within is also an important factor (Drake, 1998; Mareš, 2011). However ideology 
plays a vital role because it is the ‘prism through which [terrorists] view events and the 
actions of other people’, and legitimate targets are those who transgress upon that ideology’s 
tenants. Ideology provides a ‘measure against which to assess the ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ of 
people and institutions.’ (Drake, 1998:53-58). Ideology helps de-humanize persons and 
persons within institutions which are portrayed as the ideological arch-enemy. This means 
that ‘Just being who, what, or where one is may be enough’ (Drake, 1998:60). Finally, 
ideology also displaces the blame from the perpetrator to the victims or even to the audience, 
or what Drake (1998:61) calls the ‘psychological target’. 
So what kind of target selection follows from the new terrorists with their religious 
ideology? There are a number of prisms available, since there are many religions (and other 
ideologies) as well as many doctrines (and interpretations of other ideologies). While the 
target selection of the Anarchists, as I’ve previously shown, could be highly discriminate, the 
new terrorists use far more indiscriminate targeting. This can be seen as a logical step because 
the operating ideology determines who are the transgressors and are legitimate targets. In the 
extreme, a cult with 10 members could see the rest of the world as transgressors. Morgan 
(2004:32) puts it this way; ‘Secular terrorists seek to defend or promote some disenfranchised 
population and to appeal to sympathizers or prospective sympathizers. Religious terrorists are 
often their own constituency, having no external audience for their acts of destruction’. 
Religious terrorists have declared war ‘on entire societies, cultures and political status quos, 
not just on individual governments as is the cause with secular terrorist groups.’ (Piazza, 
2009:64). Simply put, the size of the out-group, derived from a religious doctrine can be 
immense. If new terrorist groups have long term objectives derived from an ideology that 
divides the world into such a black and white picture then then the palette of tactical options 
is widened radically. Islam has received a large portion of the attention and al-Qaeda is an oft 
cited new terrorist group. Having declared war on the United States in 1996, Osama bin 
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Laden sought to create a unified Islamic state under the laws of Sharia. The Salafi Jihad 
doctrine offers an interpretation of the Quran where all human laws are rejected in favour of 
the laws of Allah. Through their prism all non-Muslims (‘infidels’) and ‘nominally Muslim 
“traitors”’ or ‘apostates’ are legitimate targets (Moghadam, 2009:60-62). Put to a point, using 
this logic billions of people are legitimate targets in contrast to the leader figures the 
Anarchists sought to eliminate. This is one of the reasons why new terrorists are said to case 
far higher lethality rates than secular groups. Furthermore, the groups are said to care less in 
general about civilian casualties. Simon & Benjamin (2000:65) write that traditional groups 
target selection were discriminate “and proportionate in scope and intensity to the practical 
political objectives being pursued”. The traditional groups did not want to alienate the public 
or other actors in society because they would rely on their support further down the road. The 
new terrorist groups have no need to this because they do not promote ‘clearly defined 
political demands’ but rather seek the ‘destruction of society and the elimination of large 
sections of the population’ (Walter Laqueur, in Spencer, 2006:9). 
Another reason for higher casualties is that new terrorists have a different system of 
morale derived from the interpretations of religious texts. The religious component of new 
terrorism has produced ‘radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and 
justification, concepts of morality and, world view.’ (Hoffman, 2006:88). They see 
themselves as ‘outsiders from the society they both abhor and reject, and this sense of 
alienation enables them to contemplate – and undertake – far more destructive and much 
bloodier types of terrorist operations than their secular counterparts.’ (Hoffman, 1996:80). 
This in itself may not be too different from a communist group, viewing acts of violence as an 
ideological demand in a society they reject. Secular groups will not, however, go to the same 
lengths as religious groups in their attacks because they rely on the support of the public. 
Secular groups will refrain from large scale killings because they are politically 
counterproductive; their long term goal is to reform the system and society – not shatter it 
altogether. (Morgan, 2004:32). Their actions are anchored in this fact, while religious groups 
are not. They substitute it with a religious set of morale in which large scale killings are not 
only allowed for but encouraged. So the religious ideology provides target selection and a 
system of morale in which such attacks can be justified. The final component to this 
discussion is how this will play out on the individual level. 
There is also an attraction between extreme acts of violence and religion which 
Rapoport (1988:210) sums up, already in 1988, concluding; ‘… and I cannot emphasize the 
point enough, terror is attractive in itself to messianists just because it is outside the normal 
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range of violence and for this reason represents a break with the past, epitomizing the 
antinomianism or complete liberation which is the essence of the messianic expectation’. Acts 
of violence, even far outside the ‘norm’, can be the truest sign of a complete devotee and as 
such something to strive for. Faith, in short, frees the believer from other moral constraints. 
Hoffman (2006:88) echoes this when he iterates that violence, for a religious terrorist, ‘is first 
and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological 
demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its 
perpetrators therefore often disregard political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect 
other terrorists.’. Cults, in particular, can be very dangerous in this sense because they are 
personality driven with a constituency devoted to one leader. ‘… if that leader is emotionally 
or mentally unstable, the ramifications can be catastrophic’ (Morgan, 2004:32-33). Once these 
groups adopt goals that include the fate of the outside world, and not just the in-group, they 
become a particularly dangerous breed of terrorists (Morgan, 2004:33-34). In short, where 
secular groups may rationalize and justify violence as a necessity, as a means to an end, 
religious groups glorify and encourage violence, and view it as an ends in itself. Simon & 
Benjamin (2000:59) also add that the change in morale, and subsequent increase in lethality, 
is also due to lack of state sponsorship. New terrorists neither rely ‘on the support of 
sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed 
themselves or place no their proxies’.15 Hoffman (1996:81) also mentions that the methods to 
inflict mass casualties are more readily available to anyone with a grievance in ‘bookshops, 
from mail order publishers or even over the internet’.16  
To recap; new terrorists want high casualties. They have a different set of morale and 
beliefs which encourage and reward taking as many lives as possible whenever possible. They 
have no use for public support and have no political demands behind their killings; mass-
murder is not a necessary means to provoke interest in their long term goal - it is their long 
term goal. New terrorist groups should hence not only be the current dominant form of 
terrorism, as per the first batch of hypotheses, but also kill more people in their attacks than 
other ideologies do. 
                                                 
15
 State sponsorship may also relate to training and equipment given to the organization effectively transforming 
them into ‘entities more akin to elite commando units than stereotypical Molotov-cocktail wielding or crude 
pipe-bomb manufacturing anarchist or radical leftist’ (Hoffman 1999:14). 
16
 Later, Hoffman (2006: Chapter 7) wrote extensively on the role of the new media opportunities in terrorism 
also describing how the internet has spread within terrorist groups and is now used as an important tool of the 
trade. 
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H5 Religiously motivated terrorist incidents cause significantly higher casualties than 
incidents motivated by any other ideology. 
However, this also has to be considered in relation to the argument of public support. 
What if a group were to combine one or more secular ideologies with a religious ideology? 
Would this group be interested in seeking public support, and thus be less likely to engage in 
high casualty attacks? It is hard to specify a direction of this hypothesis. The perpetrator 
group could be seeking public support and the perpetrator group could be their own 
constituency and not care about public support. The perpetrator group could also have varying 
mixes of religious and secular ideologies. The hypothesis is therefore as much exploratory as 
it is confirmatory. The important part is that there are, according to theory, reasons to suspect 
this type of incident to be different from purely religiously motivated groups. The theory 
demands that both be investigated separately before they can be put into the same category. 
The hypothesis of increased lethality is the one that has shown the most promise from 
the literature. Duyvesteyn (2010:448) notes in a critique of new terrorism that ‘It cannot be 
denied that there is a statistical link between Islamic groups and a high number of fatalities in 
their terrorist attacks.’. However, Field (2009:203) for example notes that secular groups have 
also shown little regard for civilian casualties and that even though there are signs of 
increased lethality in recent history, the picture is ‘far from clear’. Spencer (2006:15) holds 
that ‘indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks have long been a characteristic of terrorism.’ and 
cite examples of this.
17
 He also shows that the number of fatalities per incidents has been on 
the rise since the 1980s, which does not fit ‘new terrorism’ because it’s too early in history, 
and that attacks by religious groups indeed does have consequences for the public support for 
the Islamic state they seek to establish (Spencer. 2006:15-17). In short, there is definitely 
doubt as to the causal connection between new terrorist groups and the entire increase in 
lethality. Duyvesteyn (2010:448) holds that the new terrorism theories of target selection 
cannot explain this because their targets are still highly symbolic (such as the World Trade 
Center), nor can technological progress automatically account for increased lethality. Lack of 
state sponsorship (and restraints laid upon groups by their sponsors) is presented as an 
alternate explanation, as well as technological innovations (Kurtulus, 2011:480) along with 
increased competition for wanted space in the media (see Wilkinson 1997). Piazza (2009:72-
                                                 
17
 ‘…the simultaneaous truck bombings of US and French barracks in Lebanon 1983, which took the life of 270, 
and the bombing of an Air India Flight in 1985 by Sikh Terrorists with 329 fatalities’ (Spencer, 2006:15). 
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73) find Islamist groups are more deadly than other groups in his empirical analysis, but when 
controlling for al-Qaeda affiliation this relationship is no longer present. 
If the increase in lethality is due to universal factors which apply to all terrorist groups 
(such as technological innovations, competition in the media, and lack of state sponsorship) 
then religious groups should not stand out significantly as more lethal than other terrorist 
groups over time. The argument on the increased lethality of religious groups also hinge on 
the moral argument, stating that it is the non-secular moral of religious groups that cause the 
increased lethality. If this is true, then religious terrorist incidents should be more lethal than 
all other types of incidents throughout the time period – and remain at very much the same 
levels. It could be a combination of the two, resulting in religious terrorism being on average 
more lethal than all other forms of terrorism throughout the time period, and increasing 
somewhat over time in the same way as other incidents do. Nevertheless, the moral argument 
should be a timeless one. Also, if the religious ideology is a late arrival in the terrorist scene 
then their average lethality rate may be higher simply because they arrived at a later stage 
where the universal factors had already heightened the lethality. In essence, for example 
leftists could have perpetrated many incidents in the past when the universal factors did not 
drive the lethality rates up to the same extent as they do today. This would drag the average 
incident lethality of leftists down, unless time is considered. There are many good reasons for 
not drawing conclusions based on average incident lethality alone, but including a time factor. 
This hypothesis could take the shape of both the new terrorism argument and the universal 
factor argument - I chose to use the universal factor argument to provide an alternative 
hypothesis on lethality. 
There are several quantitative works on increased lethality, not all directly related to 
religious terrorism in particular. Bellany (2007) for example finds that the number of 
international incidents that lead to fatalities has gone up. However, the average lethality of the 
incidents that do lead to fatalities hasn’t changed.18 These analyses were carried out with the 
RAND-MIPT data stretching from 1968−2006. Enders & Sandler (2000, 2002) hold that there 
has been a decline of incidents but that the incidents are far more likely to result in death or 
injury. These authors have written extensively on terrorism, using the ITERATE dataset. 
Piazza (2009) shows that incidents perpetrated by Islamic groups are more likely to cause 
high casualties, however this effect is no longer present once al-Qaeda affiliation is controlled 
                                                 
18
 There could be several reasons for this; i) terrorists could have gotten better at killing and carry out more 
successful incidents, ii) terrorists need fatalities to compete for media attention, iii) terrorists care less about 
whether they have fatalities or not, and iii) terrorists want fatalities.  
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for with a dummy-variable. Thus, the general trend seems not to be increased lethality in 
religious groups. Masters (2008), (like Bellany, 2007 & Enders & Sandler, 2000) remove 
non-fatal incidents from the pool and specifies mass casualty incidents as those with more 
than 32 dead. This leaves 1 308 incidents with fatalities, and 165 with mass casualties. His 
findings indicate that ethno-nationalist groups are responsible for most incidents with 
casualties, and once combined with religious groups this category is responsible for the 
highest average casualty rate and the highest mass casualty rate. Additionally, these increase 
over time. Thus, the evidence points in several directions depending on the data used. 
In this section we have seen that the new terrorists employ indiscriminate targeting for 
non-political goals and employ gratuitous violence while doing so.
19
 This has, however, not 
been tested in relation to religious terrorism in the domestic domain. This is in itself a good 
reason to revisit the hypothesis with both domestic and transnational incidents in the analysis. 
Also, if other groups are considered contingent on public support and employ a morale 
thereafter, while the religious groups do not, then transnational incidents may be more lethal 
all over. Attacking the people around you may hamper public support in a larger degree than 
attacking people further away, as transnational incidents do. 
H6 All ideological strains of terrorism have become more lethal with time. 
The New Terrorists Weapons of Choice 
The new terrorist’s religious goals, target selections and system of moral also have 
consequences for their weapons of choice. Cilluffo & Tomarchio (1998:440-441) wrote ‘a 
new breed of terrorists seeking out and using weapons of greater lethality that can affect 
scores of victims over large areas’. This seems logical in the paradigm described so far with 
grand universal goals, a large population of legitimate targets, no need for public support and 
a system of morale which allows for significantly more lethal attacks. Two types of weapons 
have been devoted attention in particular; the tactic of suicide bombing and the potential use 
                                                 
19
 A highly similar notion swept the field of civil war studies during the 1990s where a concept of old and new 
civil wars developed. The line of reasoning within new civil wars is strikingly similar to that of new terrorism. 
According to Kalyvas (2001:99) the civil wars of the 1990s were said to be ‘distinguished as criminal, rather 
than political, phenomena’. The old civil wars had been caused and motivated by, collective grievances, enjoyed 
broad public support and employed a controlled form of violence – which is very similar to the lines of reasoning 
on traditional terrorism. The new civil wars, on the other hand, are caused and motivated by; private loot, lack 
public support, and employ gratuitous violence (Kalyvas, 2001:102). The old civil wars were considered 
‘ideological, political, and even noble’ while the new civil wars are ‘characteristically criminal, depolitical, 
private, and predatory’ (Kalyvas, 2001:111). The perception that violence had become depoliticized, 
indiscriminate and in essence more brutal is not limited to the field of terrorism research. 
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of WMDs.
20
 This tactic has, since the Iraq war in particular, become an associated trait of 
religious fundamentalism and therefor fit the modus operandi of the new terrorism.  
Suicide Terrorism 
The true advent of modern suicide bombing was the bombing of the Iraqi embassy in 
Lebanon in December 1981 (Moghadam, 2008:48). Rapoport (2004:62) notes that suicide 
bombings are the most deadly tactical innovation of the fourth wave terrorists. However, the 
secular Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka used it, often with women as the perpetrators, more than all 
Islamic groups combined from 1983−2000. Rapoport (2004:63) views this as ‘a very unusual 
event in the fourth wave’, also noting that it is ‘reminiscent of anarchist bomb-throwing 
efforts’. Religion is not the only ideology capable of provoking the will to sacrifice one-self. 
Laqueur (1996:26) notes that ‘The bomber willing and indeed eager to blow himself up has 
appeared in all eras and cultural traditions, espousing politics ranging from the leftism of the 
Baader-Meinhof Gang in the 1970s Germany to rightist extremism’. Suicidal attacks or ‘self-
sacrifice/homicide’, is indeed a feature of human history, but modern explosives solved a 
technical problem with the strategy; it guarantees you die in the process. Before easy access to 
explosives the terrorist risked getting ‘wounded, tortured, manipulated, exchanged, or turned.’ 
by the enemy after the attack (Géré, 2007:365). However, it also figures heavily in the new 
terrorism. Bruce Hoffman (2005:131) wrote ‘In no area of contemporary terrorism has 
religion had a greater impact than propelling the vast increase of suicide attacks that have 
occurred since 9/11’. 78 percent of all suicide attacks perpetrated between 1968 and 2005 
took place between 2001 and 2005, and 31 out of the 35 groups responsible were Islamic.
21
  
So far, the role of religion as an ideology supplying targets and justifying attacks on 
the target population has been discussed. Attempting to explain the motivations behind a 
suicidal act can be difficult, so why should this be ‘popular’ with religious groups in 
particular? One link between religion and motivation can be found in the word ‘martyrdom’.22 
                                                 
20
 I will rely heavily on Assaf Moghadam (2006) for this discussion. Robert A Pape (2005) a highly regarded 
source on suicide terrorism, but he not as relevant to the theory of new terrorism. The main reason for this is the 
fact that Moghadam (2006) is published after the major eruption of suicide terrorism in Iraq and is written as a 
critique of Pape (2005). His critique is not directly linked to new terrorism, but the information is highly 
relevant. 
21
 Another interesting point is that this may in fact be changing today. According to Ashour (2011) there is yet 
another global transformation going on within current jihadist movements where political violence, especially 
terrorism, is delegitimized. If true we could be witnessing not only the peak of this tactic, but the peak of 
Rapoport’s fourth wave and new terrorism (given that the theory holds). 
22
 This is not the first time systematic suicide has been put in connection with martyrdom. Géré (2007:375) links 
modern suicide and martyrdom to Islam from 1979 when Iran started using 15 year old volunteers, called 
bassidje, for suicide in both regular warfare and more isolated operations in Lebanon and Palestine. They were 
suicide volunteers for operations of ‘extreme military peril’. Though this may have been a starting-point for the 
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Before joining al-Qaida now al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that the martyrs 
represented a ‘generation of mujahideen that has decided to sacrifice itself and its property in 
the cause of God. That is because the way of death and martyrdom is a weapon that tyrants 
and their helpers, who worship their salaries instead of God, do not have.’ (Moghadam, 
2008:60).
23
 From 2004−2008 more suicide bombings took place in Iraq than the rest of the 
world combined the preceding 25 years. These attacks were predominantly carried out by 
Salafi-Jihadist groups (Moghadam, 2008:46). The number of suicide attacks has increased by 
a staggering amount in the 2000s. In his study of suicide attacks from 1981−2007 the number 
of yearly attacks rarely approaches 25, and doesn’t cross 50 before 2001, at which point it 
rises steadily to over 100 in 2004 before skyrocketing to 350 in in 2005 and over 500 in 2007 
(Moghadam, 2008:49).  
Furthermore, Moghadam (2006:720) argues that there must be made a distinction 
between localized and globalized terrorist attacks. Localized attacks are planned and executed 
by sub-national actors, ‘such as Hizballah, the LTTE, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
or the PKK’, and are geographically concentrated in a clearly definable conflict area 
(Moghadam, 2006:720). Globalized attacks on the other hand are ‘transnational in nature’. 
The ‘globalized martyrs’ can sacrifice themselves outside what is traditionally seen as the 
conflict area, such as the 9/11 attacks, thus the act is transnational. An estimated 90 percent of 
suicide attacks in Iraq were conducted by non-Iraqis (Moghadam, 2006:721). Indeed the 
internet seems to work as an educational institution and recruitment facility for such 
globalized suicide terrorists (Moghadam, 2006:722). In a later paper Moghadam (2008) goes 
on to describe the proliferation of suicide attacks in the world, or the ‘globalization of 
martyrdom’ as a function of al-Qaida’s evolution into a global actor and the growing appeal 
of the Salafi jihad ideology. The presence of the Salafi-jihad ideology is tested empirically by 
Moghadam (2008:64) and shows that this ideological strain carried out 37.7 percent of all 
suicide attacks from December 1981 to March 2008. In the end, the picture painted by 
Moghadam’s articles is very much the same as that the theory of new terrorism predicts; the 
attacks are religiously motivated, and the suicide attack is definitely a recognizable feature of 
                                                                                                                                                        
trend the Lebanese Hezbollah does indeed seem to be the group first associated with using the tactic successfully 
to force Israeli withdrawal, and was an inspiration for other groups  (Géré, 2007:375-379). 
23
 This is not a unique quote. Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi said the following in the Gaza City Mosque in 2001; 
‘Anyone who does not attain martyrdom in these days’…’should wake in the middle of the night and say: “My 
God, why have you deprived me of martyrdom for your sake? For the martyr lives next to Allah’” followed by a 
call to Allah to ‘accept our martyrs in the highest heavens … show the Jews a black day … annihilate the Jews 
and their supporters … [and] raise the flag of Jihad across the land.’ (Hoffman, 2006:158). 
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religious terrorism and Islam in particular. Finally, the will to commit suicide can also be seen 
as an expression of antinomianism as mentioned earlier. 
The connection between religion, and Islam in particular, and suicide terrorism has 
been criticized. Pape’s (2005) book on the strategic logic of suicide terrorism explores the 
tactical usefulness of suicide terrorism, arguing that it is used for ousting foreign occupants 
rather than directly linked to Islam. This book represents a substantial data collection and 
analysis effort and presents strong evidence for the case of suicide terrorism as an anti-
occupation tactic. However, Moghaddam’s articles presented above also score valid points 
criticising some of the measures and methods employed by Robert Pape (2005). The main 
reason to distrust any particular causal link between religious groups and suicide terrorism is 
that the main wave of suicide terrorism in Iraq had not yet happened at the time of Pape’s 
(2005) book. Hoffman (2006:132) support both views, acknowledging the strategic worth of 
suicide terrorism while also noting the importance of religious and theological justification in 
ensuring a steady flow of new recruits for suicide attacks. Finally, we cannot overlook a third 
explanation; some suicide attackers may indeed be suicidal (see Lankford, 2011). Laqueur 
(1998:170) notes that as far back as in 1904 to 1907 a high percentage of Russian terrorists 
had in fact already attempted to commit suicide, and that more examples of this can easily be 
provided. Thus, the link between religion and suicide terrorism is plausible, and in part 
substantiated, but likely highly localized - and the tactic has also shown strategic worth as the 
‘ultimate smart bomb’ (Hoffman, 2006:132).  
H7 A terrorist incident perpetrated by a religious group is significantly more likely to employ 
suicide terrorism. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Finally, new terrorist groups are considered more likely to use WMDs. Laqueur (1996, 1998, 
2004) predicts an even more lethal form of terrorism, especially in the earlier writings. 
Laqueur’s new terrorists will only be satisfied with the complete annihilation of their enemies 
and the moral revolution mentioned earlier means that these groups are far more likely to use 
WMDs. He indicates that Aim Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack was just a step on the way, and 
that we (as per 2004) have yet to see the true advent of this form of megaterrorism. He is 
definitely not alone in the assertion that new terrorist groups are more likely to use WMDs. 
Cilluffo & Tomarchio’s (1998) ‘Responding to New Terrorist Threats’ start out with a 
fictional worst-case-scenario in which a mid-sized American city of just over 200 000 people 
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are attacked with computer viruses as well as biological and chemical weapons. The city is 
decimated while ‘America is exposed as defenceless. It cannot even retaliate.’ (Cilluffo & 
Tomarchio, 1998:439-440). Mayhem of this scale is considered a successful attack by new 
terrorists. Carter, Deutch & Zelikow (1998:81) go as far as to say ‘the danger of weapons of 
mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time 
since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’, and propose policy measures to respond to this new 
type of terrorist threat. Simon & Benjamin (2000:71) write, ‘these terrorists want a lot of 
people watching and a lot of people dead.’ and therefore WMD attacks are the ‘next natural 
step’. Gurr & Cole (2002) devote an entire book to terrorists and WMDs, titled The New Face 
of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction. In their book they hold that the 
currently ‘embryonic regime is forming’ to hinder the proliferation of WMDs in relation to 
terrorism (Gurr & Cole, 2002:247) and that better policies are needed. They deal not only 
with religious terrorists, but all types of groups. Still, they hold that religious groups are more 
likely to use WMDs because of their ‘all-encompassing objectives’ and who’s rhetoric at 
times can be described as ‘genocidal’ (Gurr & Cole, 2002:251). One restraint these groups are 
concerned with is simply the contamination of areas WMD attacks cause, with the exception 
of ‘religious cults, which if they do not decide to lash out violently against society operate 
under no political or ideological constraints.’ (Gurr & Cole, 2002:252).  
Enders & Sandler (1999) find that little changed within terrorist tactics in the post-cold 
war years, save a small increase in hostage incidents. Still, the eerie absence of an increase in 
WMD attacks since the Tokyo Subway gas attack has spawned both critique and some 
moderation on part of new terrorism proponents. Hoffman (2001:417) observes that the new 
terrorists have ‘remained remarkably conservative operationally’ and that future use of 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons ‘…may be far less certain than is now 
commonly assumed…’. Laqueur (2004:63) simply postpone the inevitable WMD use. Experts 
also seem to agree, although their predictions have yet to come true. In 2008 the Commision 
on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism predicted ‘it is 
more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack 
somewhere in the world by the end of 2013’, and it is not unique in its assessment (Koblentz, 
2011:501). The aspect of WMD use is not investigated further in this thesis because the data 
available is not suited for such an analysis. 
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The Organization and Resources of New Terrorism 
The last major difference between new and old organizations are said to be their different 
organizational structure. Crenshaw (2009:132) writes ‘The ‘new’ terrorists are said to be 
decentralized, with a ‘flat’ networked apparatus rather than a hierarchical or cellular 
structure’. Simon & Benjamin (2000:69) hold that ‘the jihad camp’ can, in organizational 
terms, be called ‘non-group groups’, meaning that there is little hierarchy and people know 
each other personally only from the training camps. Al-Qaida is mentioned specifically to 
communicate not only between cell and leadership, but also between cells without leadership 
involved at all. They ‘…combine elements of a ‘hub and spoke’ structure (where nodes 
communicate with the centre) and with a ‘wheel’ structure (where nodes in the network 
communicate with each other without reference to the center)’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:70). 
This means they are also more likely to employ amateur part-time terrorists (Copeland 
2001:7).
 
This makes the networks, in contrast to traditional groups, hard to identify, infiltrate 
and disrupt.  
Hoffman (2001:418) claims the ‘new generation of terrorists evidence several 
important organizational changes that in turn have affected their operations, decision making, 
and targeting.’. The new organizations are comprised of loosely linked individuals ranging 
from amateurs to professionals. Hoffman (2001) also supports the notion that the typical 
hierarchical structure is gone and replaced by ‘far more amorphous, indistinct, and broader 
movements’. He echoes Simon & Benjamin’s (2000) assessment from the year before, and 
adds that this ‘particular trend in terrorism may represent a very different and potentially far 
more lethal one than that posed by more familiar, traditional, terrorist adversaries.’ (Hoffman, 
2001:418). A combination of this loose cell structure and a vague ideology also means that 
these new groups are less likely to claim responsibility for an attack against civilians 
(Hoffman, 2001:418).  
In Rapoport’s fourth wave the number of groups have declined dramatically, and their 
size grown. He sees this as related to the shift from local to international groups, from a 
national audience to an audience of an entire religion (Rapoport, 2004:63). Rapoport also 
goes into al-Qaida specifics when he writes on how the disruption of their training grounds 
with the invasion of Afghanistan changed their organizational structure. Al-Qaida’s pre-war 
structure was one of sleeper cells, where a cell would await orders to strike from the 
leadership – which is an ‘unusual pattern in terrorist history’ (Rapoport, 2004:65). Because of 
the disruption the cells will have to increase their own autonomy, acting when they see fit and 
are able to. This would, according to Rapoport (2004:65) result in a shift in targets to ‘softer, 
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largely unprotected civilian targets’. However, the organization seems to continue displaying 
their ‘trademark by maximizing casualties’. (Rapoport, 2004:65).  
Helfstein, Scorr & Dominic Wright (2011) is the best example I have found of an 
attempt at mapping the structure of new terrorists. However, the links between cells and 
organizations cannot be tested in this thesis because the data doesn’t hold any relevant 
information. However, there is one potential aspect of the organizational structure which can 
be tested. Carter, Deutch and Zelikow (1998:82) also note how this new international 
organizational structure makes state sanctions harder and the danger greater. ‘… the threat 
falls into one of the crevasses in government’s overlapping jurisdictions, such as the divide 
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ terrorism or ‘law enforcement’ versus ‘national security’. 
Simon & Benjamin (2000; Simon, 2003) also focus on how the United States have, and 
should, changed their counter terrorism policies in order to cope with this new jurisdictional 
complexity, especially during the Clinton administrations. The data available does not allow 
for placing each incident in an overall organizational structure. However, the inherent 
transnational feature of new terrorism is part of the new organizational structure. Thus, a 
limited portion of the organizational structure of new terrorists can be addressed with a 
hypothesis on the transnational nature of their organizations and incidents; 
H8 Transnational incidents are significantly more likely to be motivated by a religious 
ideology than any other ideology. 
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Method for Data Collection and Analysis 
This chapter will present the reasons for using the Global Terrorism Database, out of all the 
other databases available, and evaluate it thoroughly. The hypotheses require a measure of the 
perpetrator group’s ideology for testing. I will detail how this indicator coded into the GTD to 
enable testing of the hypotheses. I regard these two as separate datasets used for this thesis. 
Therefore both are presented, and further variable operationalization of the two datasets is 
treated separately. Following this I will present descriptive statistics, and an introduction into 
the graphs and statistical models used for the analysis. The final section provide regression 
model specifications for my 8 hypotheses. 
Selecting a Data Source 
Most statistical information on terrorism is found in event-history datasets listing terrorist 
incidents chronologically. These databases are typically based on information available in the 
news media, or ‘Open Source Databases’, and began to appear in the early 1970s numbering 
over a dozen by the late 1990s (LaFree, 2010:24). He defends this type of data collection 
method by contrasting terrorism to traditional criminology databases registering incidents of 
burglary or car theft. The relationship between terrorism and the media is active (this is of 
course also relevant to the definitions discussed previously), whereas the relationship between 
crime and the media is not. Terrorists require the media to spread the word of the deeds, 
‘Thus, while no serious researcher would suggest that we track burglary or car theft rates by 
relying solely on media sources such a strategy is much more defensible in the case of 
terrorist attacks.” (LaFree, 2010:24).  
Before reviewing the alternatives within open source datasets it is necessary to discuss 
about the overall reliability issues following such a data collection methodology. The main 
issues, and also some of the perks, stem from the fact that the media dominate as a source. 
The perk is that terrorist groups seek publicity to communicate their agenda and therefore 
compete for attention in the media (see Wilkinson, 1997). The problem is that the media can 
be inaccurate, wrong, and potentially outright lie. Government control and censorship can 
also be a source of both disinformation and bias in reports (LaFree, 2010:24). A news article 
is influenced at several pit stops on the road from the incident itself to published news article. 
The journalist may or may not have been witness to the incident (more likely not) and thus 
rely on accounts from other people which may not be accurate. A press wire or an article is 
then written by that journalist, possibly reflecting (however inadvertently) both inaccuracies 
and bias. The news item could travel through additional news agencies before it is finally 
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bought, framed and reformulated by the publisher before it is finally printed, reported in a 
news cast or published electronically. The final leg on this journey is of course the reader him 
or herself and their individual preconceptions about the world (see Strömbeck, 2004).
24
 
LaFree et.al. (2006:24) note that the available information will be biased on the side of what 
is deemed news-worthy by the media actors themselves. This also spins into the fact that 
terrorist attacks are not always successful or are averted by other actors – and some of these 
will never reach the media at all. Both these factors are selection biases over which I have 
little control. Of the incidents reported, some may have unknown perpetrators (as do 40 872 
in the GTD (START, 2011a)) (LaFree et.al., 2006:24). This means that there could be 
uncertainty as to whether the act was indeed terrorism at all. Of course the information of 
interest to researchers are limited to the simpler facts, such as how many were killed, weapons 
used, name of the group responsible and so on. The point is that there need not be a 
motivation for misrepresentation of the facts for there to be some. There can be no doubt that 
several sources for errors exist in open source material. Nevertheless, the open source incident 
databases available commonly used and are the best available option to investigate terrorism 
quantitatively. 
There are several large, open source datasets containing information on terrorist 
incidents over extended periods of time.
25
 The World Incident Tracking System (WITS) 
covers events after 2004 and is ill suited for the task at hand. Terrorism in Western Europe: 
Events Data (TWEED) covers domestic terrorism from 1950−2004, and the database is 
limited to 18 countries in Western Europe. It is also based on one source alone. (Konstantinos, 
2011:150). A similar set is the Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) set, which details fatalities 
in domestic terrorism in Western Europe from 1965-2005 (see Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 
2011). Edward Mickolus, Todd Sandler, Jean Murdock and Peter Flemming developed the 
widely used ITERATE set covering the entire world from 1968 to 2008, however these are 
exclusively transnational and international incidents (Konstantinos, 2011:150). Since this 
analysis requires both worldwide incident coverage and ideally both domestic and 
transnational incidents there are two major contenders left; the Rand Database of Worldwide 
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and newcomer, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). ‘With 
over 36 000 incidents of terrorism coded and detailed, the quality and completeness of the 
RDWTI is unparalleled’ (RAND, 2012). This dataset is a merge between the RAND 
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 This is a crude summary of quite complex, and well documented processes. See Strömbeck (2004) for an 
introduction to these processes in the media of a democracy. 
25
 A quick introduction to available resources on terrorism is found on Assistant Professor of Political Science 
Barak Mendelsohn’s online space at Haverford College. (http://people.haverford.edu/bmendels/) 
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Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. It holds worldwide 
event accounts from 1972−2008 is freely available for download to researchers. According to 
RAND this dataset is ‘widely regarded as the gold standard for comprehensive information on 
international and domestic terrorism’ (RAND, 2012). However, the dataset contains domestic 
incidents only after 1998 (RAND, 2012). Although both RAND and ITERATE could be used 
to investigate the hypotheses put forth in the new terrorism literature, most of the terrorist 
incidents that occur in the world are domestic (START, 2011a). Only the GTD has domestic 
and transnational incident coverage stretching back well beyond the 1990s. In relation to the 
definition presented earlier it is also important to note that the GTD is not only the sole 
dataset which supplies both domestic and transnational incidents for a prolonged period of 
time – but is also the only one applying a wide enough definition to include ‘political, as well 
as religious, economic, and social acts’ throughout that period (Lafree et.al., 2006:7). As such, 
it is uniquely suited to answer the questions raised in this thesis.  
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
Compilation 
The current GTD (START, 2011a) dataset contains information on 92 112 terrorist incidents 
from 1970-2010, and is updated yearly. It was created at the University of Maryland in 2001 
after researchers received a PGIS database of terrorist incidents from 1970−1997, coded 
primarily by retired Air Force personnel. START took over management of this database in 
2006 and at present it is a compilation of several databases (START, 2012a, 2012b). 
The work on extending GTD past PGIS’ 1997 end-date has been a joint effort between 
START and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS). This effort has also 
been supplemented by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), working for 
START registering incidents in the period from April 2008 and onwards (START, 2012b). 25 
to 35 data collectors fluent in six language groups
26
 have worked using Lexis-Nexis and 
Opensource.gov in their research, typically finding 10,000 potential incidents each day. 
(LaFree 2010:26). Due to this history, the GTD data is a Frankenstein-monster compiled from 
21 different databases
27
. The three main contributors are PGIS (65.1 percent), CETIS (16.5 
percent), and ISVG (13.5 percent), accounting for 95.1 percent of the incidents in total. CAIN 
and Hewitt are the only two other sources accounting for more than one percent of the total 
                                                 
26
 English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Mandarin (Lafree, 2010:26) 
27
 A complete list of sources and their respective number of added incidents can be found in the appendix. 
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(START, 2011a). The GTD is growing in popularity among researchers, but according to 
Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011:32) researchers have yet to address the reliability of the 
data in depth. 
Evaluation of the GTD 
The GTD Codebook (START, 2011c), along with additional documentation on data 
collection methodology (START, 2012a) are freely available on the START websites 
themselves along with the dataset. The data collection methodology page (START, 2012a) 
reveals that the original PGIS data were compiled into a dataset titled GTD1 while the 
continued effort of cataloguing incidents from 1998 and onwards were compiled in a dataset 
titled GTD2. GTD1 and GTD2 were synthesized into what is now known as GTD in 2008. 
The reason the two sets were kept apart until 2008 was that some incidents in GTD1 (the 
PGIS years) did not meet the inclusion criteria in GTD2 (the post-PGIS years) - for example, 
incidents ‘better described as guerrilla warfare’. GTD1 also contained 44 variables while 
GTD2 contained an additional 84 variables (making the total count 128). The GTD1 set was 
supplemented with information on the additional variables ‘where possible’ according to 
START (2012a). The GTD is also the only dataset that currently offers text-citations from the 
sources used to code the incident (Sheehan, 2012:33).  
The fact that the GTD1 set did not meet the inclusion criteria of GTD2 means the 
definition of terrorism was narrower in GTD2 than in GTD1. The GTD1 definition was of 
course that used by PGIS, which is; ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence 
by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.’ (START, 2012a). The GTD2 definition adds that the use or threat 
of use of violence had to be intended as well as the three additional criteria in the second part 
of the GTD definition.
28
 The three new criteria from the GTD2 years are registered as three 
dummy variables, crit1, crit2, and crit3 and these are the three points seen in part two of the 
definition introduced in the beginning of this thesis. Thus, researchers are able to narrow the 
definition further by demanding all three inclusion criteria in the second part of the definition 
to be satisfied. Additionally, a variable indicating if there was ‘doubt as to whether the 
incident was truly a terrorist act’ was introduced, called doubtterr. These four variables are 
only available for the GTD2 data. (START, 2011c, 2012a). 
Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) note that a broader definition was indeed used 
during the PGIS years, and that there is no documentation on how this definition was broader. 
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 See the previous chapter on the GTD definition. 
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However, Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) used the first synthesized version of GTD 
while this thesis uses the second version. As far as I can see, these problems are now 
remedied or perhaps clarified, as this information is only available on the START websites. 
Thus the consequences of the synthesis of GTD1 and GTD2 are not so dire. The GTD staff 
appear to have reviewed the GTD1 incidents and made sure these satisfy the inclusion criteria 
of GTD2 (START, 2012a). The fact that we lack the variables crit1, crit2 and crit3 for these 
incidents only has consequences only if a researcher applies a more narrow definition using 
these variables, thus narrowing the post-1997 definition in relation to the pre-1997 years. 
Seventeen coders were trained for this process which took place from April 2008 until 
December 2008. ‘Incidents that failed to meet two of the three criteria developed for GTD2 
were removed from the new synthesized GTD’ (START, 2012a). Thus, to be absolutely clear; 
in its original, unaltered form the 2010 GTD version now appears to apply the same definition 
for all incidents. Only when the researcher demands all three additional criteria to be satisfied 
will the GTD present serious issues on using data from both before and after 1997 
simultaneously. The fact that the PGIS definition was wider is in fact positive because this 
means only a selection of the PGIS population were included in the synthesized version of 
GTD. If the transition was from a narrow definition towards a wider one there would be 
significantly more reason to worry about systematic inconsistencies between the two main 
periods of data collection. 
The GTD has a complete data loss for the year 1993. “… be aware that prior to the 
transfer of the original GTD data from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) to 
START, all records of terrorist attacks during 1993 were lost.”29 (START, 2011b).  Based on 
country level statistics from PGIS indicating the total number of incidents in each country that 
year a total of fifteen percent have been recovered by the GTD team. (START, 2011b)
30
. 
These are available for download as a separate file together with the main GTD data file, and 
were appended to the file used for analysis in this thesis using STATA 11.2.  
Finally, users are cautioned about data inconsistency. ‘Even though efforts have been 
made to assure the continuity of the data from 1970 to the present, users should keep in mind 
that the collection was done in real time for cases between 1970 and 1997, was retrospective 
between 1998 and 2007, and is again in real time after 2007.’ (START, 2012a). This 
temporary change from real time to retrospective can ‘at least partially’ explain the 
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 Apparently, the box of data fell off a truck during transit (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:322). 
30
 These country statistics are also available in the GTD Codebook (START 2011). 
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differences in levels of attack ‘after January 1, 1998 and before and after April 1, 2008’ 
(START, 2012a). 
These are the main points of criticism that are found after consulting the 
documentation available from START as well as Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011). 
However, the process of converting the original PGIS data to the GTD1 dataset form is 
thoroughly documented in a 205 page report to the U.S. Department of Justice, received in 
May 2006.
31
 The report is filed by Professor, and current director of START, Gary LaFree as 
well as three other key personnel at the GTD, and opens the black box of the pre-1998 years 
in the GTD. It is of crucial importance to any researcher using the GTD because it is 
responsible for over half its contents. First of all, it is clear that the PGIS project ‘aimed to 
record every major known terrorist event across nations and over time.’. Furthermore, the 
information was collected with the purpose of performing risk analyses for U.S. businesses 
and seems well planned. Seven of the nine different event types (for example hijacking, 
assault or assassination) were defined before their data gathering began - and the collection 
and coding scheme, planned out in beforehand, remained similar for 28 years. (LaFree et.al., 
2006:6-7). The following paragraph is of vital importance… 
PGIS trained their employees to identify and code all terrorism incidents they could 
identify from a variety of multi-lingual sources, including: wire services, such as 
Reuters and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, U.S. State Department 
reports, other U.S. and foreign government reporting, U.S. and foreign newspapers, 
information provided by PGIS offices throughout the world, occasional inputs from 
such special interests as organized political opposition groups, and data furnished 
by PGIS clients and other individuals in both official and private capacities. 
Although about two dozen persons were responsible for collecting information over 
the years the data were recorded, only two individuals were in charge of supervising 
data collection and the same basic coding structure was used throughout the entire 
data collection period. The most recent project manager of the PGIS database was 
retained as a consultant on the NIJ project and assisted with development of the 
database interface and codebook and served as a consultant on data entry questions 
as they arose. 
       LaFree et.al., 2006:8 
Several pieces of good news are presented in this paragraph. First of all, consistency in 
coding over time; second, trained personnel; third, a multitude of sources; and fourth, the 
presence of the project manager from PGIS to answer questions when the database was 
converted to its current format. The PGIS terrorism project saw only 2 supervisors over the 27 
years of data collection which contributes to the reliability and consistency of the data 
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 The report was filed because the team received federal funding for the project. The report is not publicised by 
the U.S. Department of Justice but has been made available on their website ‘to provide better customer service’. 
(Lafee et.al. 2006). A printed version is also available, which is published by the U.S. Department of Justice that 
same year, ASIN: B005IIAC0W. This printed version was not acquired for this thesis, however the report 
numbers are the same (214260).  
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(LaFree et.al., 2006:20). The conversion process from PGIS to GTD itself was carried out by 
more than 70 trained undergraduate students over six months, using an interface especially 
designed for the job and with good opportunities for supervision. Pre-tests of both the 
codebook and interface were carried out before coding commenced, using two batches of 
randomly sampled incidents from the PGIS database cards (LaFree et.al., 2006:2-11). All in 
all, the digitization process appears both well documented and of high quality. 
This process produced what is now known as the GTD1 which is then compared to 
ITERATE and RDWTI, the two other major, publicly available contenders on incident level 
terrorism statistics at the time. As already discussed, this comparison is of limited use because 
no other database has a comprehensive list of domestic terrorism. At the time, the authors of 
the report did not have the means to separate domestic incidents from transnational incidents 
thus making a quantitative comparison impossible. Their comparison is left out of this 
discussion in favour of Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011) who separate transnational and 
domestic incidents in GTD and compare this to the ITERATE dataset. However, note that 
these authors use the 2008 version of GTD (the first synthesized version) and level criticisms 
against definition and information shortcomings which seem rectified in the current 2010 
version.  
Comparing quarterly numbers of transnational incidents in GTD and ITERATE from 
1970 until the second quarter of 1977 shows ITERATE consistently holds more incidents than 
the GTD. The mean number of incidents are 94,67 in ITERATE and 45,93 IN GTD (Enders, 
Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:324). This is a substantial difference, with the number of 
ITERATE incidents at twice the rate of the GTD. The two sets are quite similar from then on 
until the second quarter of 1991 when the GTD greatly exceeds those of ITERATE. This 
pattern holds until the first quarter of 1998 when there is a sharp decline in the GTD, due to 
the new inclusion criteria already discussed. From there on the two sets actually seem to 
‘track one another quite nicely’ up until the fourth quarter of 2004 when the GTD starts 
reporting more transnational incidents than ITERATE (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 
2011:324).
32
 Several reasons are suggested for these developments; first of all, Enders, 
Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011:324) note that neither dataset is perfect and that the differences 
in estimation from 2004 and onwards are largely a result of incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq 
where ITERATE excludes attacks on combatants. GTD includes these attacks, both pre- and 
post-PGIS. Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011:322) also suggest that the rapid increase in 
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 A recommend reading their article because their analysis is thorough, and shows patterns in much greater 
detail- 
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registered incidents in the GTD during the 1980s ‘may be due to PGIS acquiring a larger 
coding staff as the project ensued’ or that they worked retrospectively. Like Enders, Sandler 
& Gaibulloev (2011) I haven’t found any information to either prove or disprove this. Lafree 
(2010:45) notes that the number of sources used by PGIS increased over time, as did their 
registering of a source for their incidents.  The fact remains, the dataset underestimates the 
number of transnational incidents (and likely domestic) in the better part of the 1970s.
33
  
An alternate explanation for the decline of incidents after 1998 is that the incidents in 
this period are registered retrospectively. This data collection method entails that some media 
sources may have become unavailable thus leading incidents to go unregistered (GTD, 
2011c). This explanation may indeed have value because the GTD now employs the same 
inclusion criteria for all incidents. The results could therefore very well be different if the 
comparison was run using the 2010 version of GTD against ITERATE. The presented 
comparison should be treated with some care because the two datasets are not identical in 
method and definitions which should lead to different estimates.
34
 
There are 41 236 incidents with an ‘Unknown’ perpetrator group in the GTD, or 41.7 
percent of the total number of incidents. Some people may be put off by the large amount of 
‘Unknown’ perpetrator groups. However, this is definitely not an uncommon feature for 
terrorism datasets at all. The ITERATE dataset has 39.5 percent ‘Unknown’ incidents from 
1968 until 1991, and 36.4 percent from 1991−2010. It, like the GTD, has a higher percentage 
of ‘Unknown’ incidents in the 2000s (41.1 percent unknown from 2001-2010 in ITERATE) 
(Stohl, 2012:40). 26 190 out of the 40 129 registered incidents in the RDWTI have unknown 
perpetrators (or 65 percent). All in all, the GTD offers unique opportunities at much the same 
costs as any other terrorism database, especially in relation to research questions depending 
on perpetrator names such as this.  
In conclusion, the GTD represents the most comprehensive database of terrorism 
available today. The data is collected from the same sources as other terrorism databases, but 
using two distinct and different definitions. It is built from several parts and it would appear 
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 Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) also go on to suggest methods for compensating the discrepancy in 
number of incidents in the GTD as compared to ITERATE. This approach is not applicable to this thesis as we 
are dealing with specifics related to each incident and not an overall incident count. It also presumes that the 
PGIS crew under / overestimated both transnational and domestic incidents evenly. 
34
 Sheehan (2012) concludes the presentation of current terrorism databases stating; ‘Finally, the near canonical 
reputation of datasets such as ITERATE needs to be reevaluated in light of the valuable contributions of 
newcomers to the field. Over the years ITERATE data has been used so often in academic publications that it 
has come to be seen by some as the only authoritative database on terrorism. But ITERATE is confined to 
international and transnational events and it is becoming much more obvious that the distinctions between 
international and domestic terrorist events are not as clear-cut as previously thought. Moreover, ITERATE data 
is only available to subscribing universities and is not otherwise accessible on the web.’ 
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the 2010 version represents a significant raise in overall quality, especially in relation to the 
new uniformity of the inclusion criteria. The database is definitely not a complete list of all 
domestic and transnational terrorist incidents from 1970 until 2010, but it is as close to one as 
anyone has been able to get. This is also substantiated by its use in several publicized works 
in journals such as the Journal of Peace Research and Terrorism and Political Violence. (See 
for example Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev 2011; Lafree & Dugan, 2007)
35
 The GTD no 
doubt lack (at least transnational) coverage from 1970−1977 – for whatever reason. Though 
the inclusion criteria between ITERATE and PGIS may have been different at the time the 
difference in levels form the 70s to the 80s in the GTD compared to the levels of ITERATE 
definitely speaks to this point. The period of decline in the number of incidents after 1998 
likely stems the research methodology, but it is also interesting to note that this is the period 
which most corresponds to the ITERATE dataset. This has to be considered in relation to the 
hypotheses tested using the data when representing time in the regression model and when 
interpreting the results. The dataset, with the 1993 data appended, is considered a reliable 
representation of domestic and transnational terrorism from 1970 until 2010 as defined in its 
inclusion criteria.
36
  
Indicator for Ideology 
Neither the GTD nor any other dataset discussed have an indicator of the perpetrator group’s 
ideology. Therefore, this indicator had to be researched and coded for every incident in the 
GTD dataset for the purposes of this analysis. Searching for, and classifying, the ideology for 
every group in the GTD took me roughly 7 months, starting in September of 2011 and 
finishing in late March 2012. A total of 6 variables indicate the perpetrator group name in the 
GTD, most of the time there is only one name listed and it is found in the first variable 
(gname). Due to time constraints, secondary and tertiary group names have yet to be 
researched along with most group names from before 1985. Furthermore, a lot of incidents 
have an ‘unknown’ perpetrator which means that there is a difference between the total 
number of incidents listed and the number of incidents that are possible to give an ideological 
profile. I will get back to these points later on. The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) and 
Open Source information from Dow Jones Factiva search engine was used to acquire the 
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 There are several other journals and many articles. START lists several of these on their own websites. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/GTDinResearch.aspx 
36
 LaFree et.al. (2006) contains much more information that can be of interest to researchers evaluating the PGIS 
years, such as pictures of coding cards as well as the descriptions of what acts constitutes assassinations, assault 
and so on. See also Lafree (2010) for the most recent look at the GTD. Sheehan (2012) offers an excellent 
introduction into the current major terrorism databases. 
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information for each group’s ideological profile. The coding I have done is further detailed in 
the codebook located at the very end of this thesis. 
Table I. Summary of Ideological Coverage 
 GTD Statistics Ideological Coverage 
 
Complete 
GTD 
Known 
Groups 
TKB 
Coded 
My Own 
Coding 
Total 
Coded 
Known 
Group, No 
Ideology 
Percent 
of 
Known 
Groups 2,871 2,870 490 738 1 228 1,642 43 % 
Incidents 98,848 57,612 39,399 8,206 47,607 10,369 83 % 
Table I summarizes how many terrorist groups have been assigned an ideological 
profile, and how many incidents these groups are responsible for. The complete GTD column 
show how many groups and incidents there are originally in the GTD. This number is created 
by dropping the duplicate names form the GTD, one of these names are ‘Unknown’ and 
therefore the number of known groups are 2,870. This number may in fact be a little lower, 
because group names such as “U/I Gunmen” and “Terrorists” are also counted as unique 
group names. After researching all the group names of the GTD I have no doubt that a 
terrorist group could call themselves “The Terrorists” and the like, therefore I have not 
removed such suspect names from the total list at all. The number of incidents with known 
perpetrator groups is significantly lower than the total number (from 98,848 to 57,612), as 
indicated by the known groups column. The TKB column show the number of groups and 
incidents that were assigned an ideological profile using information from the TKB, while the 
‘my own coding’-column show the number I have coded myself. The total-column shows the 
total number of groups and incidents that have been assigned an ideological profile, and the 
‘known group, no ideology’ column show the number of known groups and incidents that are 
missing an ideological profile, but could potentially be assigned one in the future. This term 
will be used several times in this thesis. The percent of known column show how many 
percent of the known groups and incidents that have been assigned an ideological profile. As 
such, it is the truest representation of what I have achieved of ideological coverage out of 
what is possible. 
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The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) 
The TKB database itself was found to be unavailable and had ceased operations on the 31
st
 of 
March 2008 (START, 2011c).
37
 The remains are available in the form of Terrorist 
Organization Profiles (TOPs) on the START websites (START, 2012c).  
The TKB was developed and sponsored by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention 
of Terrorism (MIPT) based in Oklahoma. The project ran from an unknown date in 2004 until 
the final update on 1
st
 of March 2008 before the project shut down on the 31
st
 of March 2008. 
MIPT was provided support for both the creation and maintenance of the TKB by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. MIPT was also 
partnered with another company called Detica on this project.
38
 The TKB data are also widely 
used and accepted in terrorism research.
39
 The main objective of the project was to collect 
information on ‘terrorist groups and key leaders of terrorist groups’ (START, 2011c). The 
resulting Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) include information such as mother tongue 
name, aliases, bases of operation, date formed, strength, ideology (referred to as 
‘classifications’), financial sources, founding philosophy and current goals in text format. 
These TOPs profiles are currently hosted by START and contain information on 856 different 
terrorist organizations. Not all fields of information are available on all groups, and not all 
groups are covered as extensively as the next.  
No original project documentation was available to the me on the TKB. However, 
former MIPT employee James O. Ellis describe state the TKB was in essence a combination 
of their databases, library materials, and other resources putting ‘the facts concerning global 
terrorism at the fingertips of policymakers, professionals, and the public’ (Ellis, 2008). As 
mentioned previously, the MIPT data were merged with the RAND data and is as such 
considered a reliable source of information. 
                                                 
37
 Former Director of Research at MIPT, Brian K. Houghton, actually wrote a eulogy for the TKB underlining 
the magnitude of the loss this is to the terrorism research community. 
(http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/43/html) 
38
 Detica was founded by Bruce Smith and started out as Smith Associates in the 1970s working on research and 
development projects for the UK defence industry. The company was renamed Detica in 2001 when national 
security had taken over as ‘the growth engine of the firm’. (See http://www.baesystemsdetica.com/about-us/our-
history/ ) 
39
MIPT defined terrorism as; ‘…terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the 
perpetrators. Terrorism is violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to coerce others into 
actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are 
generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are 
generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity . . . International terrorism includes incidents 
in which the perpetrators go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, 
or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers or equipment.’ Goldman (2010:36). 
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Over the course of 3 months, the 2,870 known perpetrator group names in GTD were 
searched for in these profiles on the START website. The ‘Classification’ field, indicating the 
group ideology, was coded into the GTD as a numerical variable. A total of 490 groups, 
responsible for 39 399 incidents, received a value indicating the ideology fronted by the 
group. The following 11 base ideological categories, used by the TKB, were encountered 
during this process; ‘Anarchist’, ‘Anti-Globalization’, ‘Communist/Socialist’, 
‘Environmental’, ‘Leftist’, ‘Nationalist/Separatist’, ‘Racist’, ‘Religious’, ‘Right Wing 
Conservative’, ‘Right Wing Reactionary’, and ‘Other’. Many groups combine ideologies, for 
example ‘Nationalist / Separatist and Religious’. In the end, a total of 27 distinct 
combinations were encountered in addition to the base categories. (See the codebook for more 
information on these). 
My Own Data Gathering 
After gathering data on the ideological profiles from the remains of the TKB, I searched for a 
further 1,272 group names on Dow Jones Factiva, which resulted in 738 new ideological 
group profiles, responsible for 8,206 incidents in the GTD. Roughly 3000 news articles and 
press wires were downloaded to provide information on the groups so that ideological profiles 
could be coded for each of them.
40
 The categories available for classification are the same as 
those used in the TKB with the exception of ‘Right Wing Reactionary’ and ‘Right Wing 
Conservative’. These were combined into one ‘Right Wing’ category. This decision was made 
with the knowledge that these base categories would be combined into broader categories at a 
later time anyway. Also, achieving a reliable and valid distinction between the two was found 
unrealistic at an early stage of the research. This is especially true when considering the 
classifications have to match the TKB data as best as possible. Nevertheless, I kept as many 
as possible of the original categories to ensure a similar framework for my own and the TKB 
profiles. 
There are essentially two possible approaches to classifying a group within the 
categories given by the TKB. One alternative would be to define each and every category, 
gather all possible information on the group’s activities and make an academic judgment of 
where the group belongs. This method calls for an in-depth study of each group, looking for 
manifestos, writings and speeches of any kind. This is a practical impossibility for this one-
year study conducted by me alone. It also opens up the possibility of classifying a group 
differently than the group’s own sense of ideological affiliation, simply because the academic 
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 This process is further detailed in the codebook. 
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and group definition of each ideology may differ. In addition, such a method would judge a 
group not only by their representation in the media but by their actions as a whole – leading to 
the same potential difference in classification. This approach was discarded in favour of a 
simpler approach; a group is classified by the words used about them in the media – meaning 
if the media write ‘Marxist’ group, that group will be a ‘communist / socialist’ group. This 
gives us the truest representation of the ideology the group itself holds they are fronting, 
regardless of what the pure academic definition would be. At no point did I consider mapping 
ideological changes across time. The TKB does not do this, and the amount of research which 
it would require is far beyond the scope of a master thesis. Thus, all groups are judged on face 
value based on the most readily available information about them. 
The premise for the entire endeavour is; that all terrorist organizations equally seek to 
communicate their ideological alignment to the world, are able to use the proper terms when 
communicating that ideology, and finally that the media are present and able to report on the 
incident. The problems associated with relying on media sources has already been discussed 
and naturally apply to this process as well. The fact that the research is based on information 
from the GTD shows that the ability to present the media with information is present. Factiva 
does not hold the complete media content (published and unpublished) in the time period 
1970 to 2010. Although the search engine ensures that the research relies on several sources, 
this is the effort of one researcher using one research tool. It is pioneering work which, 
ideally, should be expanded on with other sources in the future. 
Finally, this work is not yet completed. Due to time constraints most of the groups 
before 1985 are not yet looked for in Factiva, and have no ideological profiles coded by me. 
Therefore, the scope in terms of time is narrowed from 1970−2010 to 1985−2010.41 This 
means that I have 26 years of domestic and transnational incidents available for analysis, 
instead of 41. The scope is still much wider than any similar study using both domestic and 
transnational incidents, and the cost of this data loss is that I miss the beginnings of 
Rapoport’s fourth wave. This decision turned out not to significantly hamper the analysis, 
although a wider time frame would be preferred. With the exception of figure 1, all 
information from this point on is based only on the 1985−2010 period of the GTD. 
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 This reduces the number of incidents available for analysis from 98 848 to 74 818. Since the data loss is 
confined to the pre 1985 years, this only has consequences for the time horizon and is not discussed further. 
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Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes how the variables available from the GTD and my own coding is 
readied for analysis. Before I can describe the operationalization of the ideological variable, I 
have to describe the process of separating transnational from domestic incidents in the GTD. 
Once this is done, and the ideological indicators are operationalized, I can evaluate the total 
ideological coverage for both domestic and transnational incidents across the entire time 
period. I also have hypotheses which require and indicator of lethality and suicide attacks. 
Following this, time, regions and countries are briefly discussed. Several variables are used as 
both dependent variables and independent variables, therefore the operationalization is not 
structured after dependent and independent variables at all. 
Separation of Transnational and Domestic Incidents 
The GTD includes both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents, but no variable 
distinguish between the two. Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) describe a method for 
separating the two types of terrorism in the GTD to rectify this problem for researchers. I 
have replicated their method using the GTD 2010 version with the 1993 data appended. In 
short, five filters are applied to identify the transnational incidents in the data; Firstly, the 
nationality of the victims are compared to the country in which the incident took place; 
Second, intentional attacks against clearly transnational objects (such as diplomat’s, NGO’s 
and tourists); Third, targets against U.S. entities abroad and international entities are 
identified; Fourth, If there are U.S. victims in an incident outside the U.S. the incident is 
deemed transnational; and finally, information on the countries where kidnappings and 
hijackings are compared to the country in which the incident took place. In short, using these 
four filters the incidents that can be proven to involve targets and or victims from two 
countries are identified and coded as transnational. The same procedure of confirmation is 
performed for domestic incidents, and the incidents which cannot be confirmed as either 
transnational or domestic are labelled uncertain. 
Figure 1 is a bar graph showing the yearly numbers of domestic, transnational and 
uncertain incidents following the separation procedure detailed above. The towering amount 
of domestic terrorism is the most striking feature of this graph, illustrating the relatively small 
portion of all terrorism that is transnational. There are few uncertain incidents, located in the 
mid-80s, mid-90s and some spread in the late 2000s. Another interesting feature is the fact 
that transnational incidents appear to hold a more steady level than domestic terrorism, and 
appear not to follow the recent upswing in domestic terrorism. It would also appear we are 
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currently at an historical high of domestic terrorism, surpassing the previous peak located in 
1992.
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 The data-loss of 1993 is evident in this graph, and it would appear that a larger 
portion of the domestic incidents are missing than the transnational. 
Figure 1. Distribution of Transnational, Domestic and Uncertain Incidents 
This is not an ideal method for 
separating the two. First of all, 
there could be other factors 
which make an incident 
transnational. For example, a 
perpetrator could arrive from 
another country to carry out an 
attack – and all the variables 
used to describe the incident in 
the GTD would point to a 
domestic incident using the 
method described above. This would, to a certain extent, also be a problem for other open 
source databases should the news articles not mention this fact. Nevertheless, the problem has 
to be considered to be under less control in the GTD than for example ITERATE. The number 
of transnational incidents is, potentially, underestimated because of this. Also, separating the 
incidents in this manner means that it is the terrorist incident, and not group, that is considered 
transnational. An alternative would be to consider all incidents perpetrated by one group as 
transnational if even one of them is – this would yield a group level indicator of whether more 
exclusively religious groups have stepped into the transnational domain than for example 
leftist groups. This option is not explored further in this thesis. The method used is sub-
optimal, but it is the only one available to me at the moment. 
Ideological Indicators 
There are 53 unique ideological categories in the original ideology variable I have created and 
this number has to be reduced. Some examples of how this has been done are found in 
Masters (2008), Rasler & Thompson (2009) and Piazza (2009).  
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 In descending order, the five countries that have experienced the most domestic terrorism are Iraq (5,680), 
India (5,498), Colombia (5,310), Peru (4,056) and Pakistan (3878). The top five countries for transnational 
terrorism are Corsica (977), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (824), Iraq (604), Lebanon (569) and Northern 
Ireland (423). 57 countries have experienced more than 100 domestic incidents while 23 have experienced more 
than 100 transnational incidents. These numbers are calculated using the original GTD countries, which are also 
the basis for the quantitative analyses of this thesis. These are different from other well-known country codes, 
such as the UCDP codes from Uppsala, the World Bank codes or the Correlates of War (COW) codes. 
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The main objective of this thesis is to investigate religious terrorism, thus it is of prime 
interest so separate the religious as clearly as possible from the rest of the ideologies. Many 
incidents are exclusively religious, meaning that ‘religious’ is the only ideology assigned to 
the perpetrator group of that incident. These clearly fall into the category ‘religious’ in any 
analysis. The exclusively religious category also has to be considered the valid measurement 
of the new terrorist because the groups are solely religious. There are combination religious 
groups where religion is mixed with one or more other ideologies. Although there are many 
such combinations, 97.9 percent of these incidents are nationalist-separatist in combination 
with religious. The problem is that there is no way of knowing which, if any, is the dominant 
ideology. This becomes a problem in particular in relation to lethality. Should I expect a 
combination religious group to be tethered or untethered to secular morale? The combination 
religious incidents do not fit comfortably within either the exclusively religious category or a 
nationalist-separatist category. The indicator has to be a valid representation of the theory, 
and only exclusively religious groups are a valid representation of this. Once another ideology 
is involved, the validity is questionable in relation to the theory. The best solution to this 
validity problem is to use two definitions of a religious group; one exclusively religious and 
one combination religious category. That way, all non-secular new terrorists are separated 
from all the secular traditional terrorists. 
 The other categories used are leftist, rightist and nationalist separatists. To make sure 
that these are the truest representations of the political left, right and of nationalist-separatists 
the categories which do not clearly fit in any of these, are put in a final ‘other’ category. 
Incidents with unknown perpetrators are also treated separately as an ideology. Unlike the 
religious variables, these variables are not mutually exclusive. A terrorist group with a 
‘Nationalist Separatist & Rightist’ ideology cannot comfortably be put in either category 
alone, and is therefore put in both. This is a conscious decision of deliberately biasing the 
analysis against the theory of new terrorism because I have no way of determining which 
ideology is dominant. Piazza (2009) also does this, and a figure indicating when the other 
categories are overestimates because if this can be found in the appendix. The problem is not 
at all large. Overall, I argue this is the best solution to achieve valid indicators to test new 
terrorism. 
The incidents with an unknown perpetrator are given their own dummyvariable for 
easy separation. Incidents with a known group name, but no ideological profile are also given 
their own dummy variable, called ‘Known Group, No Ideology’.  
49 
 
This effectively reduces the 53 ideological categories to a dummy set of 8 ideological 
variables. The category reductions are as follows;
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The ‘leftist’ variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Anti-Globalization, 
Communist-Socialist, Leftist, Anarchist & Communist-Socialist, Anarchist & Leftist, Anti-Globalization & 
Communist-Socialist, Anti-Globalization & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & 
Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Right Wing, Environmental & Leftist, Leftist & Nationalist-
Separatist, Anti-Globalization & Communist Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & 
Nationalist Separatist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Racist, Communist-Socialist & 
Nationalist Separatist & Right Wing, Communist-Socialist & Other, Leftist & Other, Communist-Socialist & 
Leftist & Other and finally Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Other. 
The ‘rightist’ variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Right Wing, 
Anarchist & Right Wing, Anti-Globalization & Right Wing, Communist-Socialist & Right Wing, Nationalist-
Separatist & Right Wing, Racist & Right Wing, Anti-Globalization & Racist & Right Wing, Communist-
Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Right Wing and finally Right 
Wing & Other. 
The ‘nationalist-separatist’ variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; 
Nationalist-Separatist, Anti-Globalization & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-
Separatist, Environmental & Nationalist-Separatist, Leftist & Nationalist-Separatist, Nationalist-Separatist & 
Racist, Anti-Globalization & Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-
Separatist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Racist, Communist-Socialist & 
Nationalist-Separatist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & 
Other and finally Communist-Socialist, Nationalist-Separatist & Other. 
The ‘exclusively religious’ variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; 
Religious. 
The combination religious variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; 
Communist-Socialist & Religious, Leftist & Religious, Nationalist-Separatist & Religious, Religious & Right 
Wing, Leftist & Nationalist-Separatist & Religious, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Religious, Nationalist-
Separatist & Religious & Right Wing, Racist & Religious & Right Wing, Religious & Other and finally 
Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Religious & Right Wing. 
The ‘other’ variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Anarchist, 
Environmental, Racist, Other, Anarchist & Anti-Globalization, Anarchist & Environmental, Anti-Globalization 
& Environmental, and finally Environmental & Other.  
The ‘known group, no ideology’ variable is given the value 1 for all incidents where the group name is 
not listed as ‘Unknown’ and is not captured in any of the above variables. Thus, there are real group names in 
this category as well as categories such as “Palestinians”, “Hutus” or “U/I Gunmen”.  
The ‘unknown’ variable is given the value 1 if the perpetrator group name for the incident is 
‘Unknown’.  
Once the ideological categories are defined, I have to evaluate these. My own coding 
needs to be compared against the TKB coding, and the ideological coverage across time has 
to be evaluated in both the domestic and transnational domains. One way to evaluate the 
success of the coding process is to compare with previous studies. As mentioned previously 
Rasler & Thompson (2009) look for Rapoport’s waves in the ITERATE dataset. They do so 
by introducing an indicator for ideology using several different sources and their own 
research, just like this thesis. They identify 763 of 1,483 groups (circa 51 percent), and find 
that these groups are responsible for 44 percent of the incidents in the ITERATE dataset. 
They also perform a correlation test between the total yearly terrorist activity and the covered 
terrorist activity, with a Pearson’s R-value of .938 (Rasler & Thompson, 2009:33). There are 
2,031 unique group names carrying out terrorist attacks in the GTD from 1985−2010 and 
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 There is more information on this in the attached codebook I have written for the thesis. 
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1,141 of these have an ideological profile (or 56.2 percent). The correlation tests were carried 
out for the yearly covered versus total activity for all incidents (r=.8181), domestic incidents 
(r=.8203) and transnational incidents (r=.9161).
44
 The correlation tests for the transnational 
incidents are on par with those Rasler & Thompson (2009) present for ITERATE, which also 
hold transnational incidents. The domestic correlation test is lower but still strong. I have 
better coverage in terms of the number of groups covered out of the total, and I have more 
groups. 35,860 out of 74,818 incidents (or 47.9 percent) have an ideological profile. However, 
many of the 74,818 incidents have an unknown perpetrator and are impossible to assign an 
ideological profile. 41,889 incidents have a known perpetrator group, which means that 85.6 
percent of the incidents with a known perpetrator group has an ideological profile. Overall, 
the coverage is a significant improvement on previous research and is deemed sufficient for 
analysis. 
Figure 2. Comparing the Coverage TKB and My Own Coding 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of the total 
number of groups that were coded as each 
ideology. For example, a little over 10 
percent of my own coded groups were 
leftists, while almost 25 percent of the TKB 
sourced groups were coded as leftist. This 
comparison shows that the proportion of 
groups coded nationalist-separatist and 
exclusively religious are highly similar. I 
have put proportionately more groups in the other and rightist categories, while less in the 
combination religious and leftist categories. This is the closest I will get to comparing how 
my own coding scheme has worked compared to that of the TKB. If I had coded no groups in 
any category, I would have been worried. Also, if the relationships between the bars were 
highly dissimilar from the TKB to my own coding, it would be cause for worry. Overall, it 
would appear that both the coding and the reduction of categories have gone well. This 
comparison should be treated lightly, because the two sets are not directly comparable when I 
have coded the smaller groups while the TKB have coded the larger groups. Differences may 
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 I am uncertain as to how Raufer & Thompson (2009) carried out their tests, but I counted yearly occurences 
and collapsed the dataset to one observation per year. I also performed a test for all incidents in the entire time-
period from 1970-2010 (r= .9044). I’m uncertain why the results are so different using the entire time-period, 
however it looks like the unknown patterns change radically during the 1990s. This fact may also change the 
pearsons r test in the ITERATE data if all pre-1985 incidents were removed in that data set. 
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simply reflect the fact that there are more small-time rightist and other groups that were not 
captured by the TKB project. This is more likely, since the TKB profiles cover most of the 
incidents, yet far fewer of the groups.  
Figure 3. The Ideological Distribution of Groups 
Figure 3 shows how many out of the total 
number of groups are placed within each 
ideology. There most groups are found in the 
nationalist-separatist category, while the 
second-most are found in the other category. 
Exclusively religious groups make up for the 
second-smallest portion of the total number 
of coded groups, the number of rightist 
groups being the only ideology with fewer 
groups coded. 
Figure 4. Ideological Coverage Across Time 
Figure 4 shows the percent of the total 
incidents each year with a known perpetrator  
that have been assigned an ideological 
profile. This means that all the incidents with 
an unknown perpetrator are taken out of the 
calculations. There are a large number of 
unknown incidents, and a short discussion on 
this can be found in the appendix. This thesis 
has to deal with terrorism with known perpetrators because I am mapping the ideologies of 
the perpetrator groups.
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There is one line for the total coverage, one for the domestic (dom.) coverage and one 
for the transnational (tra.) coverage for my own coding and for the TKB coding respectively. 
There is also one line showing the total coverage using both ideology-sources and all 
incidents. The figure shows that the coverage is pretty even across time, which is very 
important for these analyses. It also illustrates the contribution of my own coding, especially 
for transnational terrorist incidents in 1996 and 1997 where the TKB coverage drops below 40 
percent. Overall, my own coding appears to smooth out the variation from the TKB coding. 
The total line in the high-70s or above throughout the graph meaning most of the incidents 
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 A figure where the unknown incidents are part of the calculations can be found in the appendix.  
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with a known perpetrator throughout the time period has been assigned an ideological profile. 
The total coverage is at its lowest from 1991−1999. 
To summarize the ideological indicators; the indicators are considered a valid 
representation of the theory, the joining of my coding and the TKB coding appears to have 
gone well and finally the coverage is good and correlated with the total number of incidents 
each year throughout the time period. All in all, the ideological indicators are deemed fit for 
use in the analyses. 
Lethality 
The GTD variable for the number of killed ‘…stores the number of total confirmed fatalities 
for the incidents. The number includes all victims and attackers who died as a direct result of 
the incident. Where there is evidence of fatalities, but the number is not reported, “-99” or 
“Unknown” is the value given in this field’ (START, 2011c)46 It is necessary to control for 
extremely lethal incidents in the analyses on lethality. Piazza (2009) controls for both al-
Qaida affiliation and 9/11 using dummy-variables in his regression analyses. This tactic 
doesn’t work well for the GTD data because 9/11 are not the only events in the near-
thousand-range. I found it difficult to be the judge of when ‘extremely lethal’ incidents begin 
and ‘normal incidents’ stop, and I chose a different approach altogether. In the time-period 
1985−2010, only 6 terrorist incidents have led to more than 400 fatalities, the twin towers of 
9/11 being two of these. Furthermore, only 32 incidents (or .04 percent) have led to equal to, 
or more than 200 dead. Finally, 102 incidents (or .14 percent) left equal to, or more than, 100 
dead. I created two filter variables for these incidents, one filter for equal to, or more than 200 
dead (200+), and the same for 100 dead (<100 Killed). Only the <100 Killed filter is used, 
nevertheless I produce some statistics for the 200+ filter as well to illustrate the data loss 
caused by the <100 Killed filter. The 200+ filter removes .04 percent and the <100 Killed 
filter removes .14 percent of the total number of incidents respectively, meaning that 99.86 
percent of the incidents are kept in an analysis using the strictest <100 Killed filter.
47
 The data 
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 There are indications that the methods of follow up for each incident could be different in the pre- and post-
PGIS research paradigm. Or at least that they may have had a different practice on how the number is reported. 
Continuous numbers, such as 14.5, are noted when the coders come across multiple different accounts, and a 
point in between is chosen. It is unlikely that the estimates are off in the tens and hundreds, and even more 
unlikely that these deviations are systematic. The sheer number of incidents itself also weigh up for a lot of the 
uncertainty regarding this. The regression method used to analyse this variable requires discrete (whole) 
numbers, therefore all continuous (.5, .8 etc.) registrations are rounded using the ‘round’ command in Stata 11.2. 
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 The practical data loss due to these filters may in fact be smaller because not all of the removed incidents have 
ideological profiles available for analysis, and would have been left out anyway. Also note that out of the 74 818 
incidents from 1985-2010, 39 400 have zero fatalities. 
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loss is minimal and the distribution of the removed incidents among the ideologies are 
presented in table II. 
Table II. Filter Variables for Lethality 
Three of the four exclusively religious 
incidents that are removed with the 200+ 
filter are perpetrated by al-Qaida, and are the 
1998 Nairobi car-bomb and the two twin 
towers of 9/11. Other well-known groups in 
the 200+ filter are the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with 3 incidents, one 
of which is the fourth most lethal of all. The 
Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-
M), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) and finally the Riyadus-Salikhin 
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs. If any-one ideology stands out 
from the rest in terms of incidents lost, it is the Nationalist-Separatists, followed by the two 
religious categories. All in all, the filters removes miniscule number of incidents which 
claimed an extraordinary 21,152 deaths, or 11.9 percent of the total 177,459 fatalities from 
terrorism in the time period. These are indeed extremely lethal incidents, and the filters should 
serve to undercut most arguments regarding how such incidents influence the results of an 
analysis on lethality. If the religious incidents are more lethal, they will have to be so without 
the 15 most deadly incidents, out of several thousands. The same goes for any other ideology. 
The lethality variable itself is considered a valid indicator, and a reliable source of 
information.
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Suicide Attacks 
The indicator of suicide terrorism is a dummy variable in the GTD, and the codebook states 
‘This variable is coded “Yes” in those cases where there is evidence that the perpetrator did 
not intent to escape from the attack alive.” (START, 2011c:21). This is not a valid 
representation of a suicide bombing, but it captures the will and intent to sacrifice one’s own 
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 An alternate solution would be to attempt other operationalization’s by combining the variable listing the 
number of killed with that listing the number of wounded. Digging this deep is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Ideology <100  
Killed 
<200  
Killed 
Leftist 8 4 
Rightist 2 0 
Nationalist-Separatist 21 4 
Exclusively Religious 15 4 
Combination Religious 10 2 
Other 6 3 
Known Group, No Ideology 21 8 
Unknown 19 7 
Total 102 32 
Number of Killed 21,152 12,426 
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life in a terrorist incident, and is as such a valid measure of how religion supposedly inspires 
such acts. 
Other variables 
Time is represented as a dummy set of five-year period dummy variables, for example 
1985−1989 is one dummy-variable.49 There are several benefits with this operationalization; 
first of all, treating time in five-year intervals make the measurements more robust against 
yearly swings and ‘non-normal’ years; second, the dummy variables allow a direct peak into 
the development across time without predicting values with the models; and third, there is 
reason to suspect not all relationships are curve-linear and it may well be that the curve has 
more than one bend. Squared-functions of time, which capture curve-linearity, are unable to 
model more than one bend. Many regression models are presented, and it is important to have 
as similar models as possible to ease the transition from one to the next.  
In addition to listing countries the GTD divides the world into thirteen larger regions 
(START, 2011c:16-17).
50
 These are North America, Central America & The Caribbean, 
South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and the Newly Independent 
States (NIS), and Australasia & Oceania. These regional divisions are kept as is. Alternately, 
the variable could be divided into the five continents of the world although such a division 
holds little more validity than the current 13 regions. Alternate country-codes are not used in 
this thesis either, although there are several alternatives which are frequently used in conflict 
research, such as the UCDP country codes or the World Bank codes. Since country-level 
indicators are not merged into the data, the original country codes are kept. These can be 
viewed in the GTD codebook (START, 2011c). 
                                                 
49
 A linear ‘age’ version of yearly time, 0,1…41 years since 1970, was tested against a curvilinear representation 
and the five-year dummy set representation of time. Both curvilinear time and the five-year dummies proved a 
significant improvement on linear time, but neither curvilinear time nor five-year dummies proved an 
improvement on each other. Therefore, the choice between them is a matter of practicality. 
50
 Although Huntington’s civilizational lines are not tested in this thesis cross-civilizational incidents could 
indeed be identified employing a similar technique to that of Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) to separate 
transnational from domestic incidents. This could be done by duplicating every variable used in their analysis 
where country names are listed and replacing these with the civilization to which they belong. Alternately, a 
dichotomous variable could be created indicating that the country in question lies at the border between two 
civilizations as a measure of fault line activity thus avoiding many of the ‘uncertain’ incidents the first one 
would result in. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table III shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. The first 
column lists the total number of observations (incidents) in the dataset, this column is 
followed by the number and percentages of incidents that have the value 0 and 1 on the 
dummy-variables. These are the usual descriptive statistics used in most research. However, 
these numbers and percentages include both incidents without a known perpetrator and 
incidents with a known perpetrator, but no ideological profile. Therefore, it is an incorrect 
representation of the data used. The final column on the right shows how many percent has 
the value 1 out of the known perpetrators.  
Table III. Summary Statistics of Variables Used 
Discrete Variables Tot. N N 0 N 1 % 0 % 1 
%1 (of 
Known 
Perpetrators) 
With Ideology       
   Leftist 74,818 58,777 16,041 78.56 21.44 38.29 
   Rightist 74,818 73,729 1,089 98.54 1.46 2.60 
   Nationalist-Separatist 74,818 65,724 9,094 87.85 12.15 21.71 
   Exclusively Religious 74,818 74,384 4,340 94.2 5.8 10.36 
   Combination Religious 74,818 71,674 3,144 95.8 4.2 7.51 
   Other 74,818 72,666 2,152 97.12 2.88 5.14 
No Ideology       
   Known 74,818 68,789 6,029 91.94 8.06 14.39 
   Unknown 74,818 41,889 32,929 55.99 44.01 - 
   Total 74,818 35,860 38,958 47.93 52.07 - 
Type of Incident       
   Transnational Incident 74,818 64,596 10,222 86.34 13.66 13.23 
   Domestic Incident 74,818 12,475 62,343 16.67 83.33 84.35 
   Uncertain Incident 74,818 72,565 2,253 96.59 3.41 2.43 
   Suicide Attack 74,818 72,957 1,861 97.51 2.49 2.01 
Continuous Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max - 
Killed 72,679 2.442 12.842 0 1,382 - 
Country-Year Counts       
 Exclusively Religious  5,174 0.839 9.739 0 304 - 
   Transnational 5,174 0.106 1.260 0 43 - 
   Domestic 5,174 0.715 8.514 0 274 - 
 Combination Religious  5,174 0.608 5.272 0 140 - 
   Transnational 5,174 0.106 1.062 0 31 - 
   Domestic 5,174 0.484 4.800 0 139 - 
For example, the 16,041 leftist incidents account for 21.44 percent of the total number 
of incidents in the data, but 44.73 percent of the incidents with a known perpetrator group. 
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This column shows that, of all the incidents with a known perpetrator, most are leftist, 
nationalist-separatist or exclusively religious. 
Analysis Design: Graphs and Regression Models 
In this section I outline how I will approach the analysis of the hypotheses. Some of the 
statistical methods used are quite complex, and the important thing to remember is that the 
approach is chosen in essence to get more reliable standard errors for the variables of interest. 
The interpretation of the models is not complicated by the methods used. 
Figures 
The primary method of analysis will be descriptive statistics, using line plots of the 
developments of religious terrorism across time. This is a valid approach because the dataset 
used is assumed to be closer to a list of the population than a random sample of terrorist 
incidents. Rasler & Thompson (2009), which is the most directly comparable to this thesis, 
use descriptive statistics from the ITERATE dataset. The main objective of the analysis is to 
illustrate development across the entire time-period of 1985−2010. Most of the figures will 
plot yearly counts of incidents for each ideology, and the percentage of the yearly total 
incidents one ideology is responsible for. This should provide a picture not only of the 
increase in terms of numbers, but whether an ideology becomes responsible for the majority 
of incidents at different points in time. Such graphs, and summary statistics, are produced for 
all my hypotheses. 16 graphs and 4 descriptive tables are presented in total.  
Statistical Models Used 
This section will briefly introduce the concept of multilevel longitudinal modelling used for 
the regression analyses of the data. Understanding the concept is not very important to the 
interpretation of the results, however understanding the reasons why I have chosen this 
approach is. I will define the base models mathematically as the concepts are introduced, 
however the model specifications for each hypothesis is laid out in text in the next section. 
Most researchers are familiar with the logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression methods. Both of these methods are unsuitable for dealing with some of the 
hypotheses because of the nature of the dataset used. Time-series data, such as this, means 
that the observations of terrorism are dependent across time, within the countries and likely 
the regions in which they happen - thus violating the assumptions of these regression methods 
(Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008, Field 2009). A multilevel model not only allow the 
observations of the dataset themselves have an effect on the dependent variable but also a 
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second level variable, such as regions, have an effect. There are several techniques available 
to accommodate for clustered data; the fixed effects estimate deal with factors that are the 
same for all units of the analysis at all times, such as time. All incidents that occurred in 1985 
occurred in 1985 – there is no escaping this fact. The catch is that the fixed effects estimator 
is unable to model that which does not vary with time, such as for example gender. 
Conversely there are also random effects which are effects that are not the same for all units 
of analysis but fixed across time, such as gender or regions. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 
2008). Thus, the fixed effects estimator has to be used to model time in our models while the 
random effects estimator must be used to model the regions. This results in a mixed-effects 
model, including both fixed and random effects.  
There are also two random effects estimates available to us; random coefficients and 
random intercepts. If regions are introduced as a second level random effect then a random 
coefficient would supply each region with its own regression slope. If regions are introduced 
as a second level random intercept then each region is given its own intercept, but not slope. 
The reason for this is that the random effects are estimated as variance from the population 
mean, meaning that a random coefficient would start at the population intercept and diverge 
from it at the rate of the random coefficient. Conversely, the random intercept would have the 
same slope as the population average but deviate from that average by the value of the 
random intercept – effectively shifting the regression line for one region away from the 
population average regression line (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). These two different 
solutions hold different types of information; a random coefficient would provide information 
on the direction of development in each region while the random intercept would provide a 
measure of difference between regions. In this thesis the single regional development is not 
the main interest, the fixed development across time is. The random-intercept approach is 
chosen and essentially functions as a control-variable – making sure that the clustering of the 
data is accounted for when estimating the fixed effects. 
Having already given away the fact that time is represented as a fixed effect (meaning 
it will be treated as an independent variable) it is prudent to point out that other alternatives 
for representing time is not suitable for these analyses. The most common other solution to 
representing time, or longitudinal modelling, is to introduce time as a lagged effect. This 
means, for example, that a model with country GDP as an independent variable can introduce 
a lagged version of GDP and to see if changes in the GDP cause changes in the dependent 
variable after for example two years of lag. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008) This solution is 
unsuitable because we have no causal independent variables per se, the causal relationship 
58 
 
between time and new terrorism is known to be spurious. Simply put; the lagged relationship 
between time and new terrorist traits are both meaningless and uninteresting in the context of 
this thesis. 
To sum up, we require a longitudinal model treating time as a fixed effect and 
clustering the incidents around regions or countries as a random effect. The math of such a 
model is, at its base, a standard regression model with the random intercepts added as an error 
term at the end of the equation to indicate the random intercept’s distance from the population 
regression line. 
                                       (1) 
Where     is the dependent variable of the model for occasion, i, and region, j. On the 
estimation side of the equation,    denotes the population average intercept for the model 
while                 are independent variables as we know them from other regression 
equations.    is the j
th region’s random intercept variance from the population average, or the 
level two residual. In other words, it denotes the j
th 
regions intercept deviation from the 
population average intercept   .  Finally;     is the level one residual. (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal 2009:192).  
The longitudinal random intercept model above assumes that both the level 1 and level 
2 error terms are normally distributed around the population average with a mean of zero. The 
error terms are also assumed to be independent, which has different implications for the two 
terms; the level 1 error term contains both occasions of measurement and regional variance 
and has to be independent across both, while the level 2 error term has to be independent 
across the level 2 units (regions). (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009:192). The above is, in a 
sense, an alternative to including all the regions of the world as independent dummy variables 
however such a model would assume that the residual between regions is the same as that 
within regions, which is unreasonable. Also, it would add 13 dummy variables to the existing 
equation containing time dummy variables making for a highly complex model (Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal 2009). 
Several of the hypotheses of this thesis have to be tested with a dichotomous 
dependent variable. The more familiar logistic model can bit specified as a longitudinal model 
with random intercepts without any changes on the right side of the equation, simply 
substituting the outcome with… 
                                                       (2) 
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The assumptions of this logistic regression model remain largely the same. The level 
two error term remains normally distributed with a mean of zero while the level one error 
term follows the logistic distribution of continuous probabilities. The assumptions of 
independence for both error terms remain the same (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009). This 
method can be modelled using xtmelogit in Stata 11.2. 
We require one more regression model because some dependent variables are discrete 
count variables, such as the number of killed, which are ill suited for an OLS regression. This 
is primarily because the observations are neither independent across time nor across the units 
of analysis (see Field 2009:133). They cluster in a non-random manner around specific points 
in time and regions, and there is cause to assume there is interplay between these across time. 
Hox (2010:115) recommends the Poisson distribution and regression model is more suitable 
for these types of analyses. The Poisson regression model often has a problem with what is 
called overdispersion
51
. Overdispersion means, essentially, that the model (using the Poisson 
distribution instead of the normal distribution) underfits the amount of dispersion present in 
the data. In short, there is more variation in the data than the Poisson-distribution assumes, 
leading to a distribution of the error terms that expands well past the Poisson distribution 
(Hox, 2010:118). A sign of this is when the standard deviation of the dependent variable is 
larger than the average value. This means that the standard error estimates are biased 
downward, increasing the risk of wrongfully rejecting a null hypothesis and concluding that 
there is a significant relationship between the independent and dependent variable (or what is 
called a Type I error) (Long & Freese, 2006:372). An alternative to this model would have 
been the Negative Binominal Regression (NBRM) (as used by Piazza (2009)), however this 
leads to problems once the random intercept is introduced because it, and the level-1 
overdispersion factor (introduced to solve the problem of overdispersion in NBRMs), are 
estimated from the same parameter. As a consequence, the regions cannot vary without 
overdispersion at level-1. Therefore, the NBRM is not recommended if we want to introduce 
a region specific intercept to the model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008:394). Instead, Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal (2008:395) recommend using a random intercept Poisson model and re-
estimate the standard errors only using the sandwitch estimator, which can be obtained by 
using the gllamm model in STATA 11.2. By doing so we effectively avoid the problems 
introduced by a NBRM and reduce the risk of a Type I error caused by overdispersion. (See 
Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008:395; Rabe-Hesketh & Everitt 2000:95 ). Once again, the 
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 Also known as ‘Extra-binominal variation’ or ‘extra-Poisson variability’. 
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random intercept is once again introduced to model unobserved heterogeneity between 
regions. The mixed effects Poisson regression model can be expressed as… 
                                    (3) 
The level-two error term is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. It 
is also independent across the second level units of analysis, like the previous models 
introduced. However, the number of incidents for a region at two occasions are treated as 
conditionally dependent (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2009:381). This model can be estimated 
using xtmepoisson in Stata 11.2. 
The main contribution of the random intercepts are more accurate level-1 standard 
errors, which is exactly what I am after. This should make the results more robust against 
variation between regions and countries, allowing me to more accurately observed the global 
phenomenon instead. The random intercept need not be interpreted in order to contribute to a 
regression model, it is used more as a control-variable in this case. This is the reason why I 
use random intercepts in the models that treat time. 
Interpretations of Regression Models Used in this Thesis 
Since the Poisson regression model is not interpreted in the same way as the more commonly 
used OLS or Logistic regression models, I will briefly outline how they can be interpreted. 
The interpretations used in this thesis are rather superficial since the models are used as a 
complementary tool to confirm the trends seen in the figures. The logistic models have a 
dependent variable which can either have the value 0 or 1. For example, if exclusively 
religious incidents are the dependent variable, this dependent variable will have the value 1 if 
the incident was perpetrated by an exclusively religious group and 0 if it was not. The point of 
the logistic regression model is to tell us what the probability of the value 1 is, or what is the 
probability of an exclusively religious incident. The logistic regression coefficients are given 
in natural logarithms, or ‘logged numbers’, which say little by themselves save the direction 
the probability will go; either more or less probable. You can obtain what is called a logit by 
solving the regression equation, and that logit can be turned into a probability.
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. Such 
detailed information is not devoted time in this thesis because there is no room for it nor is it 
of prime interest. I therefore use the third option, which is the oddsratio interpretation. By 
exponentiating the logistic regression coefficients I obtain the oddsratio (OR), which is the 
ratio between two odds. If the oddsratio is above 1, then the odds are increased and if it is 
below 1 then the odds are decreased. 
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 Once you have the logit, or L, you solve the following equation; P = 1/(1-e^-L) 
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 Interpretation of the oddsratio is best given by examples. Let’s say that the dependent 
variable has the value 1 if the incident was exclusively religious. As independent variables, 
we have a dummy set of five-year time periods using the years 1985−1989 as a reference 
category. If the oddsratio of the time period 1990−1994 is 1.8 I immediately know that the 
odds of an incident being exclusively religious is higher from 1990−1994 than it is for the 
reference category of 1985−1989. Furthermore, this can be changed into a percentage by 
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100. Thus, an oddsratio of 1.8 means that the odds of an 
exclusively religious incident is 80 percent higher in 1990−1994 than in 1985−1989. Since the 
analyses of this thesis are complemented by descriptive statistics from what I assume is a 
close approximation of the population of terrorist incidents, the oddsratio interpretation is 
deemed sufficient to substantiate the trends seen in the graphs. All independent variables in 
this thesis are dummy variables, so keep in mind that there is always a reference category. 
The poisson regression models have dependent variables that are counts, meaning that 
they can go anywhere from 0 to infinity. Probabilities won’t make sense when dealing with 
such discrete counts, but the interpretation of the poisson model is very similar to that of the 
logistic regression. I require no deeper interpretation in the poisson models than I do for the 
logistic models, therefore I will skip directly to the oddsratio equivalent of the poisson 
regression model; the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR). 
Let’s say the dependent variable is the number of exclusively religious incidents, and 
the independent variable is the time period 1990−1994 with an IRR of 1,5 – and the reference 
category is still 1985−1989. The interpretation of that IRR would be, just like oddsratios, that 
there are more exclusively religious incidents in the time period 1990−1994 than in the time 
period 1985−1989. In fact, this model would expect to observe 1.5 times as many exclusively 
religious incidents in 1990−1994 as in 1985−1989. Thus, the IRR can also be converted to a 
measure of increase in percentages by subtracting 1 from the IRR, and multiplying it by 100. 
An IRR of 1,5 yields a 50 percent increase in the expected number of incidents produced on 
the dependent variable. The NBRM also provide an IRR, which is interpreted in the exact 
same manner. 
I mentioned previously that the random intercept is introduced as a control, to help the 
model fit the data structure I have. Therefore, the intercept receives practically no weight in 
terms of interpretation other than to say that there is variation going on between countries or 
regions of the world. Also, the random intercept makes little sense for direct interpretation 
since the only figure provided is the standard deviation of all the regions or countries from the 
population average regression line. Therefore, the random intercept’s true explanatory value 
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only comes to show if values are predicted for each country or region alone and then plotted 
in a graph. Such a graph would show the developments for each country across the time 
period, and such an interpretation is beyond the scope of this thesis. There also is no room for 
it. 
Finally, the most important thing about all the logistic models of this thesis is to 
remember what the population I am generalizing to is. The dataset is a list of terrorist 
incidents, and as such the logistic models tell nothing about the likelihood of an exclusively 
religious incident taking place at all. The logistic models show what the likelihood of a 
terrorist incident being exclusively religious is, once the incident has happened. The incident 
is already a fact for the logistic models and they only provide information on that incident 
once it has already happened. 
Checking the Assumptions of Multilevel Models 
The assumed normal distribution of the second-level residuals are not checked because the 
model is not used for predicting values on the second level, the population is already 
registered in the data, and they are not used to draw major conclusions, and in some cases 
there are very few second level units. There is a debate regarding the quality of second-level 
interpretations models, especially for the cases where the number of second level units is low, 
as is the case with the 13 regions of the logistic models in this thesis. In the end, if the random 
intercept is of high interest, then the number of second level units needs to be high enough not 
to run out of degrees of freedom. If the random intercept is not of principal interest, such as in 
this thesis, the number can be much lower, and this becomes less of a problem. For more 
information on the discussion of second-level units, see Hox (2010:46-47). The models 
should not have multicolinearity, autocorrelation and discrimination (Eikemo & Clausen, 
2007:113). Multicolinearity is was tested for, but since most of the dependent variables are 
more or less mutually exclusive dummy variables this doesn’t present a problem, 
autocorrelation is what I control for with the random intercept and discrimination is not a 
problem with the variables used.
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Model Specifications 
The rest of this section is devoted to the regression models alone, which by larger are meant 
to support the conclusions drawn from the figures. 
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 Rightist have carried out no suicide attacks, and is the only discrimination problem to speak of. However, 
STATA automatically omits a variable if this is the case and so this is not a problem. 
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 H1 asks whether the number of religious incidents has increased with time. Since the 
GTD is a list of terrorist incidents, the dataset is collapsed into country-year observations of 
counts of religious terrorism incidents for the regression analysis. All gaps are filled in, 
meaning that all countries have 21 observations (one for each year), even if that observation is 
a count of 0 incidents. This results in a highly balanced
54
 time dataset with a dependent count 
variable, which can be analysed using the Poisson regression model. The number of religious 
incidents is the dependent variable, while five-year time dummies are the independent 
variables. This model also uses a random intercept to account for the dependence between the 
observations within a country from one observation to the next. The random intercept fitted 
for these models are the countries of the GTD. 
 H2 asks whether the religious proportion of all terrorist incidents has increased with 
time. This will be tested with a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the 
value 1 if the terrorist incident was religious and five-year time dummies are the independent 
variables. The dataset is kept in its original form for this analysis, meaning one where the 
terrorist incidents are the observations. This model also uses a random intercept to account for 
the dependence between the observations within each region from year to year. The 13 
regions of the GTD are fitted as a random intercept.
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H3 specifies that H1 and H2 are true for both domestic and transnational incidents. This 
requires the two models from H1 and H2 to be re-run for domestic and transnational incidents 
separately.  
H4 holds that there is a leftist decline through the time-period. This hypothesis is a 
slight sidestep from the real purpose of the thesis, and the trends seen in the graphs are very 
clear. This hypothesis is not tested with a regression model at all. 
H5 deals with the higher lethality of religious incidents. Once again, the dependent 
variable is a count variable of the number of killed in each incident. Due to problems with 
overdispersion, this dependent variable is analysed with the Negative Binominal Regression 
Model (NBRM), which is really a special case of the Poisson regression model suited for 
dealing with overdispersion. The dependent variable for this analysis is the number of killed 
in each incident, and the ideologies are the independent variables. In essence, this is a 
replication of Piazza (2009).  
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 Meaning that all countries have an equal amount of observations carried out at the same points in time. One 
observation, for each country, for every year. 
55
 I was unable to fit the models with countries as random intercepts. In essence, the maximum likelihood 
estimation process was unable to find the direction to go to produce more likely coefficients (‘not concave’ error 
in Stata 11.2). I argue that regional random intercepts are still better than no random intercepts at all. 
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H6 states that all strains of terrorism have become lethal over time. This hypothesis is 
not tested with a regression model. 
H7 states that a religious terrorist incident is more likely to be a suicide attack. This 
hypothesis is tested using a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the 
value 1 if the incident was a suicide attack, and the different ideologies are the independent 
variables. 
H8 states that a religious incident is more likely to be transnational than an incident 
using any other ideology. This is tested with a logistic regression model where the dependent 
variable has the value 1 if the incident was transnational, and the ideologies are the 
independent variables.  
In essence, I have specified five different regression models; one for the increase in 
the number of religious incidents, one for the proportional increase, or increased likelihood, of 
religious incidents, one for the increased lethality, one for suicide attacks, and finally one for 
transnational incidents. However, I use two different definitions of religious; one for 
combination religious incidents and one for exclusively religious incidents. There are also 
models which need to treat domestic and transnational incidents as separately. Thus, the 
number of regressions run quickly multiplies. A total of 20 regression models are presented, 
but there is only one regression table for each hypothesis, with the exception of hypothesis 3 
which has two. Keep in mind that they are all, in essence, slight variations of the same model 
– exchanging the dependent variable with another definition or separating between domestic 
and transnational incidents. The relevant dependent variable is always listed when results are 
presented, along with information on when domestic and transnational incidents are included. 
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Results and Discussion 
I have structured this section after the eight hypotheses put forth earlier. Relevant results are 
presented and discussed before moving on to the next hypothesis. This type of structure was 
necessary simply because there is too much information to take in all at once. I attempted to 
graph as much information as possible in each graph, but nearly all figures in this chapter 
exclude unknown incidents or incidents by a known perpetrator, but without an ideological 
profile. This does not mean that these have been left out of the analyses; Unknown and 
Known Group, No Ideology are part of all the calculations – they are just not plotted. If you 
note discrepancies between the trends from one graph to another, the cause of this discrepancy 
is found in the number of unknown incidents. Keep in mind that these graphs essentially show 
the counts and percentages of incidents with known perpetrators. If you’re interested in full 
plots, some can be found in the appendix along with a short discussion on the implications of 
unknown incidents. 
Hypothesis 1: The Numerical Increase of Religious Terrorist Incidents 
H1 The number of religiously motivated terrorist incident has risen significantly since 1979. 
Figure 5. Yearly Number of Incidents for each Ideology 
Figure 5 display the number of incidents for 
each year for the different ideologies. For 
example, roughly 1500 incidents were 
carried out by leftist groups in 1985. The 
data-loss of 1993 is also apparent as a sharp 
decline to very low levels – this real value 
for this year is likely somewhere between 
1992 and 1994. This is true for all graphs 
dealing with counts. 
The most apparent feature of the staggering number of leftist incidents from 
1985−1991, and the rapid decline from 1991 to 1992 and finally 1994 (not counting 1993). 
The resurgence of leftism is also apparent at the end of the time period. There is some 
exclusively  religious activity throughout the time period, but the first substantial activity is 
found from 1992−1996. From 2001 and on, the number of exclusively religious incidents is 
on a steady rise each year up until 2010. This graph is therefore supportive of a significant 
increase of religious terrorism, and the steady growth begins in 2001−2002. No other 
ideology is showing such a clear incline over time. 
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Table IV. Poisson Regression of Religious Terrorism 
Table IV show two poisson regression models 
of country-year counts of Exclusively 
Religious (Exclus.) and Combination 
Religious (Comb.) incidents. The Incidence 
Rate Ratios are reported, along with robust 
standard errors. The models show no 
significant changes within combination 
religious incidents, and highly significant 
increases within exclusively religious 
incidents. The random intercept is given as a 
standard deviation from the regression line, 
‘Country Std. Dev’, as noted previously I will 
not read more into this control than to say that 
there is significant variation between the 
countries. The significance-test of the multi-
level model against a normal poisson model is 
given by LR vs. Poisson, and is highly 
significant indicating that a multilevel model 
is indeed required for the data.
56
 The LR    line show the model significance tests for the 
five-year time dummies. All such significance tests in this thesis are highly significant, and 
are not discussed further. 
The lack of significant values in the combination religious models are supportive of 
the trend seen in the graph; that combination religious incidents appear to by a highly varying, 
yet constant feature throughout the time period. The same is not true for exclusively religious 
incidents, which increases significantly with every time period. Exclusively religious 
terrorists have indeed become more active in the 1990s and 2000s, clearly perpetrating more 
terrorist incidents. All in all, the evidence so far is highly supportive of H1. 
Hypothesis 2: The Proportional Increase of Religious Incidents 
H2 The proportion of all terrorist incidents that are religiously motivated has risen 
significantly over time since 1979. 
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 I you want to predict values using the random intercept, it has to be made part of the logit and turned into a 
probability. However, there are 199 countries and predicting only one makes little sense. Prediction of multilevel 
models is best done using statistical software. 
 
All Incidents 
Dependents Exclus. Comb. 
Model 1 2 
 
IRR (S.E.) IRR (S.E.) 
1990−1994 9.198*** 1.206 
 (.658) (.248) 
1995−1999 8.398*** .477 
 (.645) (.652) 
2000−2004 11.905*** 1.126 
 (.681) (.608) 
2005−2010 40.326*** 1.305 
 (.714) (.636) 
Constant -8.346 .266 
Country Std.Dev. 3.650 (.307) 3.800 (.357) 
Country-Years (N) 5,174 5,174 
      2557.54*** 232.26*** 
LR vs. Poisson 26073.35 
*** 
18608.44 
*** 
Second Level N 199 199 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 6. Percentages of All Yearly Incidents 
Figure 6 shows the percentages of the yearly 
total number of incidents that were 
perpetrated by each ideology. For example; 
leftists perpetrated nearly 50 percent of all 
the incidents in 1985. Most of the incidents 
up until 1992 are perpetrated by leftists, 
however the nationalist-separatist incidents 
catch up with the leftist line in 1993, and 
these two track each other throughout the 
rest of the 1990s. It is not until 2002 that the exclusively religious incidents make up the 
largest single-ideology percentage of yearly incidents, and can in a sense be said to be 
‘dominant’ throughout much of the 2000s. The recent resurgence of leftism is also evident in 
this graph, following 2007 and on. As per 2009−2010, leftists are once again responsible for a 
higher percentage of the yearly number of incidents than the exclusively religious ideology is. 
Both nationalist-separatists and combination religious experience a downward trend following 
2002. The rightist and other-category are clustered at the bottom, and appear to be less active 
throughout most of the time period. Although there is exclusively religious activity 
throughout the 1990s, the real increase is located in 2002. There is a notable increase of 
combination religious activity from around 1998 to 2005, but the combination religious 
incidents never quite reach the same levels as those seen in the leftist, nationalist-separatist 
and exclusively religious lines. The combination religious activity is not sustained at high 
levels for many years either. 
Table V shows a logistic regression model for exclusively religious and combination 
religious incidents. All time periods are associated with clearly increased oddsratios for 
exclusively religious terrorism, meaning in essence that the likelihood of a terrorist incident 
being exclusively religious is higher throughout the entire time period, compared to the 
reference category of 1985−1989. Although there are significant changes in the oddsratios for 
combination religious incidents as well, only the period from 2000−2004 has an oddsratio of 
over 1, inevitably meaning an increase in the likelihood of a terrorist incident being 
combination religious. 
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Table V. Logistic Regression Models 1-6 for Hypotheses 1 & 3 
The oddsratios for the exclusively 
religious model appear to be incredibly 
high, while the combination religious 
increase of the early 2000s is relatively 
low. The reason for this is that there 
are 55 exclusively religious incidents 
in the reference category of 
1985−1989. Therefore, the odds of a 
terrorist incident being exclusively 
religious in 2005−2010 are 1693.9 
percent higher than in 1985−1989. The 
random intercepts for this model are 
the regions because I was unable to fit 
country-intercepts.
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 The significance 
tests for a multilevel model are still 
significant, and there is variation 
between the regions as well. 
 The evidence is highly supportive of H2, and the marked increased probability of an 
exclusively religious incident. Exclusively religious terrorism has grown to unprecedented 
levels in the 2000s, and are at times responsible for the largest single percentage of yearly 
incidents worldwide. 
Hypothesis 3: H1 & H2 is True for Domestic and Transnational Incidents 
H3 Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold for both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents. 
Hypothesis 3 requires all the figures and models seen so far to be re-run for domestic and 
transnational incidents separately. 
Figures 7 and 8 separate the counts of domestic and transnational incidents throughout 
the time period. First of all, the number of domestic incidents far outnumbers the domestic 
incidents, which is why the transnational curves appear more erratic than the domestic curves.  
 Both graphs show the same general trends seen already. The leftist decline is evident 
in both graphs – but the recent resurgence appears to primarily locate in the domestic domain.  
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 The Maximum Likelihood estimation process had trouble finding the direction to go in order to produce more 
likely coefficients. I was unable to resolve the problem, and fitted regional intercepts instead. I believe this may 
be second-level discrimination problem. 
 
All Incidents 
Dependents Exclus. Comb. 
Model 3 4 
 
OR (S.E.) OR (S.E.) 
1990−1994 6,54*** 
(0.143) 
.783*** 
(0.060) 
1995−1999 8,101*** 
(0.144) 
.39*** 
(0.076) 
2000−2004 20,635*** 
(0.142) 
1,452*** 
(0.062) 
2005−2010 17,939*** 
(0.138) 
.399*** 
(0.056) 
Constant -7,401 -4,901 
Region  
Std. Dev. 
2.420 
(.583) 
2.503 
(.581) 
Incidents (N) 74,818 74,818 
      976.17*** 723.97*** 
LR vs. Logistic 2374.01*** 3622.43*** 
Second Level N 13 13 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figures 7 & 8. Yearly Number of Domestic and Transnational Incidents 
The number of exclusively religious incidents grows steadily from at least 2004 and on, while 
the number of exclusively religious transnational incidents grows markedly from 2002 to 
2003. After this, the transnational incidents maintain similar levels until another peak in 2007. 
Note that both the number of domestic and transnational incidents rise, and are sustained at 
unprecedented levels throughout much of the 2000s. Nationalist-separatists appear to have 
produced the largest number of transnational incidents in a year ever in 1994. This level drops 
dramatically in the late 1990s. No other ideology shows such clear signs of steady growth and 
high levels as exclusively religious incidents, with the exception of the recent domestic leftist 
upswing. In terms of numbers, there is a much clearer exclusively religious presence in the 
domestic domain than in the transnational domain before 2002. 
Figures 9 & 10. Yearly Percentages of Domestic and Transnational Incidents 
 Figures 9 & 10 show the percentages of yearly incidents separated between the 
domestic and transnational incidents. All in all, the trends are the same. The transnational 
graph is clearly influenced by the fact that there are few transnational incidents, and that an 
increase of relatively few incidents cause large spikes in terms of percentages. Exclusively 
religious incidents make up the largest single ideological portion of domestic terrorism 
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throughout much of the 2000s, and the same can be said for transnational incidents for 
slightly less years. 
Notably, the exclusively religious domestic incidents remain at a slow decline throughout the 
2000s, and arrive at this level from 2001 to 2002. The exclusively religious entrance into the 
transnational domain is even more marked, jumping from a sub-5 percentage to nearly 20 
over the course of two years from 2002 to 2003. After a slight decrease, the levels increase 
yet again to a little over 20 percent. It would appear that exclusively religious incidents are 
present in significant numbers much earlier in the domestic domain, than in the transnational 
domain. They move into transnational incidents dramatically from 2001 to 2002. 
 The poisson regression model for counts, and the logistic regression model for 
proportions are run again with exclusively religious and combination religious as the 
dependent variable. This time, they are run for domestic and transnational separately, leading 
to 8 regressions that are practically identical. The poisson count models are presented first. 
Table VI. Poisson Regression Domestic and Transnational Religious Terrorism 
 Domestic Transnational 
Dependents Exclus. Comb. Exclus. Comb. 
Model 5 6 7 8 
 IRR (S.E.) IRR (S.E.) IRR (S.E.) IRR (S.E.) 
1990−1994 11.001*** 1.137 4.076*** 2.266 
 (.723) (.219) (.712) (.479) 
1995−1999 10.496*** .391 2.462*** 1.235 
 (.727) (.719) (.597) (.245) 
2000−2004 13.303*** 1.051 8.998*** 2.282 
 (.794) (.688) (.65) (.735) 
2005−2010 47.229*** 1.339 21.349*** 1.484 
 (.786) (.716) (.759) (.696) 
Constant -9.074 -11.163 -8.524 -8.187 
Country Std.Dev. 3.749  
(.321) 
5.904 
(1.247)  
3.046  
(.324) 
3.519 
(.498)  
Country-Years (N) 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 
      2137.73*** 234.37*** 341.91*** 52.62*** 
LR vs. Poisson 22603.26*** 15572.50*** 2868.07*** 3249.17*** 
Second Level N 199 199 199 199 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
All model significance tests are highly significant, and the country-standard deviation is 
unequal to zero, meaning there is significant difference between the countries of the world. 
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Note that all the time periods of the exclusively religious models are significantly different 
from the reference category of 1985−1989, while none of the combination religious models 
are. This is caused by the fact that combination religious incidents have a constant presence 
throughout the time period, and despite yearly variation the overall levels remain much the 
same. The growth of exclusively religious terrorism, however, is apparent. All time periods 
are associated with a higher number of exclusively religious incidents, and the growth is 
especially high from 2005−2010. The growth is also more dramatic in the domestic domain 
than in the transnational domain, although the IRRs aren’t directly comparable because the 
same incidents are not found in the reference category of domestic and transnational 
incidents.  
Table VII. Logistic Regression Domestic and Transnational Incidents 
 Domestic Transnational 
Dependents Exclus. Comb. Exclus Comb. 
Model 9 10 11 12 
 OR (S.E.) OR (S.E.) OR (S.E.) OR (S.E.) 
1990−1994 7,523***  
(0.166) 
.776 *** 
 (0.067) 
2,954  
(0.315)*** 
1,234 
 (.159) 
1995−1999 10,288***  
(0.167) 
.326*** 
 (0.089) 
3,193***  
(0.336) 
1,528 ** 
 (0.181 
2000−2004 23,689***  
(0.166) 
1,401***  
(0.069) 
11,554***  
(0.300) 
2,382***  
(0.162) 
2005−2010 19,011***  
(0.161) 
.386***  
(0.062) 
13,846*** 
 (0.289) 
1,241 
 (.167) 
Constant -7,74 -4,823 -6,378 -5,132 
Region  
Std. Dev. 
2.852 
 (.778) 
2.475  
(.582) 
1.762 
 (.500) 
2.084  
(.565) 
Incidents (N) 62,343 62,343 10,222 10,222 
      719.38*** 618.62*** 194.58*** 41.77*** 
LR vs. Logistic 2036.90*** 2874.31*** 436.81*** 812.98*** 
Second Level N 13 13 13 13 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
The logistic models show significant values for both exclusively religious and combination 
religious incidents in all models. Only the transnational combination religious incidents of the 
early 1990s and late 2000s are not significantly different from the reference category of 
1985−1989. It would appear that the oddsratio of an exclusively religious domestic incident 
was at its highest from 2000-2004, while the transnational incidents peak a little later in 
2005−2010. This is in line with what has been shown in the graphs so far. All time periods are 
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associated with increased oddsratios of exclusively religious terrorism, both in the domestic 
and transnational domain. This is not true for combination religious incidents, which are 
lower in all time periods but 2000-2004 in the domestic domain, and significantly higher in 
the transnational domain from 1995−2004.  
 All in all the regression models confirm the patterns seen in the graphs, and are highly 
supportive of H3. The increase in both numbers and proportions hold for both domestic and 
transnational incidents. Also, combination religious incidents appear to be a constant feature 
throughout the time period, unlike the exclusively religious incidents. Although the 
combination religious incidents peak in terms of proportion, their number is not significantly 
higher in any of the time periods. This means that there is a change in the counts of the other 
ideologies which lead to an increased likelihood of a combination religious incident, without 
significant changes in their overall number of terrorist incidents. 
Hypothesis 4: The Decrease of Leftist Incidents 
H4 The number of incidents motivated by a leftist ideology have declined significantly after 
the Cold War. 
Figures 11 & 12. Yearly Counts and Percentages of Leftist Terrorism 
Figures 11 & 12 show the yearly numbers and proportions of all terrorist attacks that were 
leftist. They also separate between transnational and domestic leftist terrorism since evidence 
has been put forth so far that support a domestic leftist resurgence in the latter years. In 
relation to H4, these graphs tell a pretty clear story; after 1992(or maybe 1993) there is a 
drastic decline in both the yearly number and percentages of leftist terrorism. Leftist terrorist 
incidents drop from near 2000 in 1991 to just over 500 in 1994. The trend continues in a 
general downward direction up until 2007 when leftist terrorism rises once again to levels not 
seen since 1994 and earlier. Although the number of transnational leftist incidents is low 
compared to domestic incidents, they were responsible for roughly 20 to 30 percent of the 
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yearly transnational incidents up until at least 1992. There is strong support for H4 up until 
2007, and the recent resurgence is not in line with new terrorism. It would appear that leftist 
terrorists do not need the Cold War to remain active, but a large fraction of their activities 
may have depended on it. 
Hypothesis 5: Increased Lethality 
H5 Religiously motivated terrorist incidents cause significantly higher casualties than 
incidents motivated by any other ideology. 
During the variable operationalization in the method chapter I introduced two filters for the 
number of killed. For this thesis I have settled on using the <100 Killed filter, meaning the 
102 incidents which caused 100 or more casualties are removed from the analysis. Unless 
specified with ‘Without <100 Killed filter’, all the figures and tables on this hypothesis use 
the <100 Killed filter. 
Table VIII. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed 
 
Without <100 Killed Filter <100 Killed Filter 
Ideologies Mean Std. Dev Freq Mean Std. Dev Freq 
Leftist 1,911 7,753 15,366 1,800 5,253 15,358 
Rightist 4,043 10,656 874 3,783 9,174 872 
Nationalist-Separatist 3,227 14,315 8,953 2,812 7,269 8,932 
Exclusively Religious 4,364 31,675 4,273 3,334 7,776 4,258 
Combination Religious 3,944 13,428 3,027 3,366 7,545 3,017 
Other 2,964 13,678 2,088 2,415 7,174 2,082 
Known Group, No Ideology 3,530 20,863 5,877 2,709 7,485 5,856 
Unknown 1,805 6,334 32,221 1,708 4,823 32,202 
Total 2,442 12,842 72 679 2,154 5,996 72 577 
 
   
Table VIII presents more in depth descriptive statistics so that the means and standard 
deviations can be observed when the <100 Killed filter is applied to the lethality variable. For 
example, the mean number of killed in a leftist incident is 1,9 without the filter, and 1,8 with 
the filter. The total-row at the bottom show the descriptive numbers for the whole GTD, so 
the mean number of killed in a terrorist incident in the GTD is 2,442 without the filter - and 
2,154 with the filter on. The exclusively religious incidents are clearly the hardest hit by the 
<100 Killed filter, dropping the mean lethality rate by 1,03. The standard deviation of the 
exclusively religious category also drops drastically by 23,899, many times that of nationalist-
separatist, and combination religious incidents. This clearly shows how removing the 102 
most lethal incidents from the GTD impact the mean lethality rates. Using the <100 Killed 
filter, the exclusively religious incidents have the second-highest mean lethality rate of all, 
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second only to rightist incidents. Also note that the mean values are low all over, and that 
none were above 5 even before the filter was applied. Most ideologies are above the total-
mean of the GTD because there are so many unknown and leftist incidents – and on average, 
these appear to be the least lethal of all. Rightist incidents followed by combination and 
exclusively religious are the most lethal incidents, and the standard deviations indicate that 
the rightist incidents vary more than the other two categories. This is because there are 
relatively few incidents in the rightist category. Although exclusively religious incidents are 
in the most lethal section, they do not separate themselves from the rest of the ideologies in 
the way I would expect. These numbers are not very supportive of H4.  
Table IX. Negative Binominal Regression of Lethality 
 
Without <100 Killed Filter <100 Killed Filter 
 
All Dom. Tran. All Dom. Tran. 
Model Number 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
IRR  
(S.E.) 
IRR  
(S.E.) 
IRR 
 (S.E.) 
IRR  
(S.E.) 
IRR  
(S.E.) 
IRR  
(S.E.) 
Rightist 2.168*** 2.171*** 2.305*** 2.1*** 2.147*** .598 
(.071) (.072) (.324) (.069) (.070) (.343) 
Nationalist-Separatist 1.68*** 1.835*** 1.408*** 1.556*** 1.758*** 1.116 
(.028) (.030) (.100) (.027) (.029) (.096) 
Exclusively Religious 2.286*** 2.123*** 5.254*** 1.852*** 1.701*** 4.998*** 
(.036) (.038) (.136) (.035) (.037) (.128) 
Combination Religious 2.067*** 2.054*** 3.225*** 1.87*** 1.917*** 2.63*** 
(.042) (.045) (.138) (.041) (.043) (.131) 
Other 1.553*** 1.647*** .735 1.342*** 1.401*** .909 
(.049) (.051) (.198 (.048) (.050) (.186 
Known Group  
No Ideology 
1.85*** 1.958*** 1.662*** 1.505*** 1.57*** 1.551*** 
(.032) .035) (.112) (.032) (.034) (.107) 
Unknown .946*** .993 .837** .949** .986 1.007 
(.021) (.022) (.090) (.020) (.021) .086 
Constant .646 .683 .094 .588 .63 -.12 
lnalpha 1.422 1.354 1.831 1.335 1.27 1.665 
Incidents (N) 72,679 60,510 9,964 72,577 60,426 9,949 
      1769.62 
*** 
1493.75 
*** 
459.86 
*** 
1192.12 
*** 
1088.51 
*** 
375.31 
*** 
LR-test of Alpha = 0 
460 000 
*** 
380 000 
*** 
55 000 
*** 
310 000 
*** 
260 000 
*** 
28 000 
*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
The IRR’s of the negative binominal regression are interpreted the same way as in the poisson 
regression models. Models 13-15 show all, domestic and transnational incidents respectively, 
including all incidents – or no filter. Models 16-19 show the same, only with the <100 Killed 
filter. Rightist incidents appear to be the most lethal in comparison to leftist groups. Without 
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the filter they are marginally more deadly in the transnational domain than in the domestic 
domain, however once the filter is applied the domestic incidents are revealed as the most 
deadly while the transnational rightist incidents are not significantly different from 
transnational leftist incidents. Nationalist-separatist incidents are also more lethal than leftist 
incidents, but this also appears only to be true for domestic incidents once the filter is applied. 
Exclusively religious incidents are more lethal than leftist incidents, and although the IRRs 
are somewhat reduced once the filter is applied this finding is robust and evident across all 
models. Model 17 shows that exclusively religious domestic incidents are about as lethal as 
nationalist-separatist incidents in comparison to leftist incidents, and that the most lethal 
domestic forms of terrorism are rightists and combination religious groups. Model 18 shows 
that exclusively religious terrorism which produces less than 100 casualties, still produces 
399% more casualties than transnational leftist incidents. Exclusively religious transnational 
terrorism is the most lethal form of all compared to leftist terrorism. Also note that 
exclusively religious, along with combination religious and the remaining known groups with 
no ideology are the only three which appear significantly different from leftists in the 
transnational domain. 
The effects of the filter are both in line, and contrary, to the theory of new terrorism. 
First of all, exclusively religious domestic terrorism is brought down to the same level as 
nationalist-separatist incidents once the filter is applied. The opposite effect is observed in the 
transnational domain, where nationalist-separatist groups are no longer any different from 
leftist groups. The filter drops all IRRs down, which is to be expected since high lethality 
incidents are removed, however all ideologies appear to be effected by this and the differences 
are in general found in the transnational domain. All in all, there is partial support for H4; 
exclusively religious transnational terrorism is markedly more deadly than leftist terrorism – 
and is along with combination religious incidents the only ones that separate themselves 
significantly from leftist incidents. In the domestic domain, the exclusively religious incidents 
are not only on par with the rest of the ideologies, but much less lethal. There are, of course, 
many more incidents in the domestic domain and the results from the transnational analyses 
may be more heavily impacted by a few highly lethal incidents. This is controlled for quite 
harshly using the <100 Killed filter, and further investigations into this are not carried out for 
this thesis. 
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Hypothesis 6: All Terrorist Incidents Have Become More Lethal 
H6 All ideological strains of terrorism have become more lethal with time. 
A potential counter-argument to the findings from hypothesis 5 would be that the average 
incident lethality changes with time, and is influenced by factors such as technological 
development or competition for media space. The surprising lethality of rightist incidents also 
stems from relatively few incidents, and pin-pointing their location in time should also reveal 
whether rightists can be expected to be the most lethal throughout the time period. To 
investigate this I divided all incidents between those that were exclusively religious and all 
other ideologies. This means that the incidents without an ideological indicator are treated 
separately as well, so that I have control over what I am comparing the religious incidents to. 
This will give some measure of whether religious terrorism has become more deadly with 
time, than all other ideologies. 
Table X. Average Lethality over Time 
 
Exclusively Religious All Other Ideologies 
Time Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Freq. 
1985−1990 2,291 7,169 55 2,217 6,052 10,547 
1990−1994 1,653 3,382 502 2,279 6,415 9,098 
1995−1999 4,209 10,315 455 2,745 7,527 3,487 
2000−2004 4,902 9,215 635 2,908 6,407 2,427 
2005−2010 3,146 7,409 2,611 2,233 6,522 4,702 
N 
  
4,258 
  
30,261 
Total N 
      
Table X shows the mean lethality rate per incident for exclusively religious incidents, all 
other incidents with an ideological value, and finally all the incidents without an ideological 
profile. This means that the values for the all other ideologies-category stem from leftist, 
rightist, nationalist-separatist and other incidents as per the variable operationalization of this 
thesis. Note that the standard deviation of the exclusively religious incidents is consistently 
larger than all other groups with an unknown profile. Exclusively religious terrorist incidents 
appear to be more deadly than the other incidents from 1995 and onwards. All other 
ideologies are also more lethal from 1995−2004, but return to pre-1995 levels from 2005 and 
on. Exclusively religious terrorism does not return to pre-1995 levels. It would appear that 
terrorism was, for at least a decade, more lethal than usual – and that the average was 
markedly higher for exclusively religious incidents. However, collapsing all other ideologies 
into one may only show part of the picture. I have already shown that the average lethality 
rate varies greatly between the ideologies and that the least lethal of them all were leftists, 
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who are responsible for the most incidents. This fact may be dragging the average values 
down for the all other category, undermining the comparison done in table X. This problem 
can be addressed by treating each ideology separately throughout the time period, and these 
results are best presented in a bar graph. 
Figure 13. Average Incident Lethality 
Figure 13 shows the average incident 
lethality for each ideology in the five-year 
time periods. The horizontal lines are drawn 
at 2, 4 and 6 killed, on average per incident. 
First of all, until 1995−1999 no one ideology 
crosses the middle reference line which 
indicates an average of 4 killed per incident. 
From 1995−2004 rightist and exclusively 
religious incidents have an average of above 
4 killed per incident, and are the only two ideologies to ever cross this line until combination 
religious incidents follow suit in 2005−2010. Leftist and unknown incidents rarely cross an 
average of two dead, and remain the least lethal ideologies in most time periods. All in all, 
exclusively religious terrorism wasn’t always as lethal, but was on average at its most lethal 
from 1995−2005. The highest spikes are found with 1995−1999 and from 2000−2004. The 
main contributor to the rightist spikes is the Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU) from 
1995−1999 and the United Self-Defense Units of Columbia (AUC) from 2000−2004 – both 
from Colombia. In terms of incidents, these are very few with and 76 incidents in 1995−1999 
and 28 from 2000−2004. The exclusively religious Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), al-Gma’at al-Islamiyya (IG) appear to have been responsible for the 
most lethal incidents in 1995−1999 while al-Qaeda, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, Students 
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and once again the LRA appears to have been most active 
in high lethality incidents from 2000−2004. The exclusively religious incidents from the two 
periods are 460 and 648 respectively.  
 So far, it would appear that most ideologies have varying average lethality rates, most 
peaking from 1995−2005. Exclusively religious incidents are on average highly lethal in this 
time period, but are surpassed by rightist incidents. If religious terrorism is perceived as more 
lethal, it could be that they are simply more active in this time period. Although the average 
incident may not kill many more people, the total number of killed could be higher due to 
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their increased activity. The final piece to this puzzle is to see how many are killed by 
incidents from each ideology across time.  
Figures 14 & 15. The Number of Killed by each Ideology 
 
These are stacked bars, meaning they are put on top of one another, and the point of this is to 
illustrate proportional growth across time. Figure 14 shows the number of incidents within 
each time-period, while figure 15 shows the percentage of all incidents within each time-
period. 
Both figures show that more people are killed by exclusively religious incidents as 
time progress, and that this is true in terms of both hard numbers and percentages of yearly 
totals. This distinction is crucial. This means that exclusively religious terrorism not only kills 
more people than before, but that the other ideologies kill less people. In terms of hard 
numbers, the number of killed in terrorist incidents for each five-year period has a downward 
trend after the first half of the 1990s. Leftists markedly decline until the second half of the 
2000s when there is a slight increase to pre 2000-levels. Nationalist-Separatist groups clearly 
increase in the first half of the 1990s, and decline from then on until the second half of the 
200s. Exclusively religious is the only category that grows with each five-year period, and 
apparently becomes much more lethal in the second half of the 2000s than any previous time 
period. Combination religious groups appear to have one high-point along with nationalist 
separatist groups in the early 1990s, before declining and peaking once again in the early 
2000s. In terms of percentages, exclusively religious incidents are clearly responsible for the 
majority of casualties at the very least in the late 2000s. 
Hypothesis 7: Religious Suicide Attacks 
H7 A terrorist incident perpetrated by a religious group is significantly more likely to employ 
suicide terrorism. 
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Table XI shows how many incidents within each ideology that were not suicide-
attacks, and how many that were. The ‘Percent Suicide Terrorism’-column show the 
percentage of all the incidents by each ideology that are suicide attacks. For example, 2.4 
percent of all the nationalist-separatist incidents were suicide attacks. 
Table XI. Number of Suicide Terrorism Incidents 
Ideology 
Not Suicide 
Terrorism 
Suicide 
Terrorism 
Percent 
Suicide 
Terrorism 
Leftist 16,030 11 .069 
Rightist 1,089 0 0 
Nationalist-Separatist 8,879 215 2.364 
Exclusively Religious 4,046 294 6.774 
Combination Religious 2,897 247 7.856 
Other 2,148 4 .186 
Known Group, No Ideology 5,959 70 1.161 
Unknown 31,909 1,020 3.098 
Total 72,957 1,861 2,487 
7.9 percent of all registered combination religious incidents are suicide attacks, 6.8 percent of 
all exclusively religious terrorist incidents are suicide attacks and 2.4 percent of all nationalist 
separatist incidents are suicide attacks. Notably, more than half of all suicide terrorism 
incidents have an unknown perpetrator. The table clearly shows that suicide attacks are 
predominantly found in the nationalist-separatist, exclusively religious and combination 
religious incidents. Although they are similar in terms of number, and clearly separated from 
the rest of the ideologies, they are dissimilar in terms of how often they use suicide attacks as 
a method. 2.4 percent of all nationalist-separatist incidents are suicide attacks, compared to 
the 6.8 percent for exclusively religious, and 7.9 percent for combination religious. Keep in 
mind that 97.9 percent of the nationalist-separatist incidents are religious in combination with 
nationalist-separatist. This indicates that once the religious component is introduced into the 
nationalist-separatist ideology, the suicide attack is more oftenly used. Exclusively religious 
incidents are clearly the most likely single-ideology to use suicide attacks, but they are 
surpassed by over 1 percent by the combination religious category. There are no incidents of 
rightist suicide terrorism in the data, and the Other category along with leftists have a very 
small number both in total and in relation to their overall activity. 2.5 percent of all incidents 
are suicide attacks, but the leftist, rightist and other ideologies are far less likely to use this 
tactic. 
 Suicide attacks are a highly localized phenomenon in terms of geography. Iraq (757), 
Afghanistan (292), Pakistan (198), Israel (116) and Sri Lanka (112) are the five countries that 
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have experienced more than 55 suicide attacks in the GTD. A total of 53 countries have 
experienced suicide attacks, 21 of these have only one registered incident, 17 have 
experienced between 2 and 10, and 10 have experienced between 10 and 55 incidents. 
Additionally, the ideologies are concentrated within specific countries as well. Nationalist-
Separatist suicide attacks are mainly clustered in Sri-Lanka (108), Russia (31), Israel (17) and 
Turkey (11). Combination Religious Incidents are mainly clustered in Iraq (75), Israel (68), 
Pakistan (32) and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (25). Exclusively Religious Terrorism is 
mainly clustered in Afghanistan (155), Pakistan (21), Iraq (21), Algeria (20) and Yemen (12). 
Removing any of these substantially alters the analysis and hampers any reliability there is in 
such an analysis.  
There is also something to be said for the spread of nationalist-separatist, combination 
religious and exclusively religious suicide terrorism. There are registered incidents of 
nationalist-separatist suicide attacks in 10 countries, 15 countries for combination religious 
groups and finally 26 countries for exclusively religious suicide attacks. Only 7 countries 
have experienced any mix of the three, and outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Iraq 
this is a very rare occurrence. Exclusively religious suicide terrorism has spread to the most 
countries, while nationalist-separatist has the least spread.
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Since suicide attacks are so highly localized, and relatively few in numbers compared 
to the total number of incidents, removing any one of these countries from the analysis will 
substantially alter the analysis. The attacks are also highly clustered in time, especially from 
2000 and on. 
Figures 16 and 17. Suicide Terrorism 
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 A table showing the distribution of suicide attacks between the countries of the GTD can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Figures 16 & 17 show the number of suicide terrorism incidents perpetrated each year by each 
ideology. These are the only two graphs which display the number of unknown, and known 
groups with no ideology coded. Note that the exclusively religious ideology produces the 
most incidents every year from 2006 and on. Exclusively Religious incidents are the only 
ones that approach 50 in one year (2007 and 2008), these are unprecedented heights for any 
ideology. Nationalist-Separatist groups have never reached similar yearly levels, and appear 
to have increased their activity towards the end of the 1990s and reduced in once again in the 
first half of the 2000s. Combination Religious groups appear to start using suicide terrorism 
more actively from 2000 and on, peaking in 2005 and declining dramatically in 2006. All in 
all, the evidence is supportive of the fact that exclusively religious terrorists are more likely to 
employ suicide terrorism – at the very least since 2005 and onwards. Suicide attacks did not 
start out exclusively religious, but appears to have become much more so. Overall, suicide 
terrorism appears to become a terrorist tactic in the early 1990s, continually rising throughout 
the time period and reaching peak levels in 2007.  
These numbers are dwarfed by the number of unknown suicide attacks. The unknown 
incidents are particularly important in this case, because so many of them are found in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
59
 Moghaddam (2006) holds that most of the unknown incidents in Iraq are 
in fact perpetrated by religious groups – meaning that any plot of suicide attacks is biased in 
disfavour of either combination or exclusively religious suicide attacks. The impact of the 
unknown, and likely incidents, are exemplified by removing all unknown incidents from 
either Iraq or Afghanistan from the graph altogether. This is what you see in figure 17, and 
the reduction of incidents listed is dramatic. There are still a large number of unknown 
incidents from 2006−2010, many of which stem from Pakistan.60  The exclusively religious 
ideology is already heavily represented, but there is reason to believe that the number of 
exclusively religious terrorist attacks, and potentially combination religious, is much higher in 
reality. Since few incidents have a radical impact on the graph, this is a real problem.  
1 020 suicide attacks have an unknown perpetrator, 10 of which occurred from 
1985−1989, 2 from 1990−1994, 21 from 1995−1999, 117 from 2000−2004 and a staggering 
869 from 2005−2010. 621 of these unknown incidents of these took place in Iraq – 551 from 
2005−2010 alone. This means that the unknown, but potentially religious, suicide attacks in 
Iraq make up 60 percent of the total number of suicide attacks by an unknown perpetrator. 
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 Unknown incidents are also discussed at more length in the appendix. 
60
 48 in 2007, 27 in 2008, 28 in 2009 and 13 from 2010. 
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Also, Moghaddam (2006:719) holds that 500 suicide attacks took place in Iraq from 
2003−2005 and the GTD only lists 247 for the same time period.61  
Table XII. Logistic Regression of Suicide Terrorism 
Table XII shows a logistic 
regression using a dependent 
variable with the value 1 if the 
incident was a suicide attack. I have 
used nationalist-separatist incidents 
as a reference category because it is 
the only category which holds a 
large number of suicide attack and 
is easily distinguishable from 
exclusively religious. Since 97.9 
percent of the combination-
religious incidents are nationalist-
separatist combined with religious, the combination religious category has traits of the two 
other main exponents of suicide terrorism; nationalist-separatists and exclusively religious 
incidents.  
Interestingly, combination religious incidents are significantly more likely to be 
suicide terrorism than nationalist-separatist incidents. The same goes for exclusively religious 
groups, albeit with a somewhat smaller oddsratio. All other ideologies, save unknown, appear 
significantly less likely to use the suicide terrorism tactic. The large number of suicide attacks 
in Iraq with an unknown perpetrator is likely the reason why unknown groups appear more 
likely than nationalist-separatists to use suicide terrorism. I have already noted that many of 
these likely belong in either of the two religious categories. Only 193 of the suicide attacks 
were coded as transnational. Given the problems above, an analysis of transnational and 
domestic suicide attacks will not yield reliable results at all and is not presented in this thesis. 
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 This discrepancy could at least in part be due to a difference in definitions – nevertheless the discrepancy is 
very high. 
Dependent Suicide Attack = 1 
Model. 19 
 OR (S.E.) 
Leftist .071 (.184)*** 
Exclusively Religious 2.651 (.095)*** 
Combination Religious 3.108 (.099)*** 
Other .068 (.506)*** 
Known Group, No Ideology .428 (.141)*** 
Unknown 1.165 (.080)* 
Constant -3.597 
Incidents (N) 73,698 
      1 300.82*** 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Hypothesis 8: More Religious Incidents are Transnational 
H8 Transnational incidents are significantly more likely to be motivated by a religious 
ideology than any other ideology. 
Table XIII. Descriptives of Domestic, Transnational and Uncertain Incidents 
 
Leftist Rightist 
Nationalist-
Separatist 
Exclusively 
Religious 
Combination 
Religious Other 
Number 
Domestic 14,734 1,028 6,894 3,698 2,505 1,874 
Transnational 1,099 55 1,904 548 548 232 
Uncertain 208 6 296 94 91 46 
Total N 16 041 1 089 9 094 4 340 3 144 2 152 
Percent 
Domestic 91.85 94.4 75.81 85.21 79.68 87.08 
Transnational 6.85 5.05 20.94 12.63 17.43 10.78 
Uncertain 1.3 0.55 3.25 2.17 2.89 2.14 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table XIII shows how many percent of the ideology’s incidents are coded as domestic, 
transnational and uncertain. For example, 20.94 percent of nationalist-separatist incidents are 
transnational. The nationalist-separatist category is followed by the combination religious and 
exclusively religious categories respectively. Exclusively religious incidents appear to be 
predominantly domestic – with only 12.63 percent transnational incidents. 
Figure 18. The Domestic Percentage of Incidents With Five-Year Intervals 
A potential point of criticism here is that 
these relationships could have changed with 
time. Figure 18 plots the domestic 
percentage of incidents for each ideology in 
the five-year time periods.
62
 In general, it 
appears that there is in fact more activity in 
the domestic domain in recent years than in 
previous years. It also appears to be more 
even amongst the ideologies in the last five-
year period. The nationalist-separatist incidents of the late 1980s appear to have the lowest 
percentage of domestic incidents of any ideology from any time period. Exclusively religious 
terrorism doesn’t appear to be very different from any of the other ideologies throughout the 
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 I attempted to make a stacked bars diagram which showed both the domestic, transnational and uncertain 
percentage for each ideology in each time period. Such a figure holds too much information in too many colours. 
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time period. If anything, the domestic proportion of exclusively religious terrorism is higher 
in all the time periods following the late 80s.  
The final test for this hypothesis is a logistic regression model where the dependent 
variable has the value 1 if the incident was transnational.  
Table XIV. Logistic Regression of Transnational Incidents 
This regression analysis uses the leftists as 
the reference category.
63
 All oddsratios, 
except the rightist oddsratio, are above 1 
meaning they are associated with an 
increased likelihood of a transnational 
incident, compared to the leftist reference 
category. The biggest increase in oddsratio 
is found in the nationalist-separatist 
category. The second largest oddsratio 
increase is found in combination religious 
groups which are often also nationalist-
separatist. The exclusively religious incidents are also significantly more likely to be 
transnational than leftist incidents, and this category is closely followed by the final other 
category. There appears to be a substantial amount of transnational incidents left to code, as 
indicated by the known groups with no ideology. Also, a large amount of transnational 
incidents are found in the unknown category.
64
 All in all, an exclusively religious incident is 
more likely to be transnational than a leftist incident, but exclusively religious incidents are 
not the most likely ideological category.  
Summary of Main Findings 
Figure 19 shows a partial summary of the most important findings for hypotheses 1-4.
65
 The 
findings are highly supportive of H1, H2, H3 and H4. There is an increase in both the number 
of exclusively religious incidents, and the proportion of all terrorism that is exclusively 
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 Leftists have perpetrated 1 099 transnational incidents, second only to nationalist-separatist groups with 1 904, 
Since the leftist category are the clearest representation of traditional, political, third wave terrorists they are the 
preferred choice for the reference category. 
64
 This is probably in large a product of the separation method. For example, the perpetrator group name may be 
unknown – but the incident may be coded as transnational because a foreigner was killed in the incident. 
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 It also shows the number of Unknown incidents across time for both the domestic and transnational domain. A 
further investigation into the unknown incidents is not an important part of this thesis, and is a constant feature in 
any terrorism database. A short discussion on the unknown incidents can be found in the appendix as well. 
Independent Transnational = 1 
Model 20 
 
OR (S.E.) 
Rightist .791 (.131)* 
Nationalist-Separatist 3.618 (.040)*** 
Exclusively Religious 1.974 (.055)*** 
Combination Religious 2.883 (.056)*** 
Other 1.65 (.076)*** 
Known Group, No Ideology 3.235 (.045)*** 
Unknown 2.264 (.035)*** 
Constant -2,614 
Incidents (N) 74,818 
      1 400.43 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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religious. The clearest and most robust pattern for exclusively religious terrorist incidents is 
found in the domestic domain.  
Figure 19. Transnational and Domestic Separately 
The leftist decline following the cold war is 
also evident, and the 1990s appear if 
anything to be a transitional period where 
leftist incidents decline and exclusively 
religious incidents begin to show up in 
greater numbers. Combination religious 
incidents appear to be a constant feature 
throughout the time period, not varying 
significantly.  
The results from both hypotheses on lethality gave mixed results. First of all, it 
appears that exclusively religious transnational terrorism is more lethal– even when 
controlling for extreme incidents. Domestic exclusively religious incidents are significantly 
more deadly than leftist incidents, but do not separate themselves from the rest of the 
ideologies in this regard. In the domestic domain, rightist incidents appear to be the most 
lethal.  
The average lethality-rate of exclusively religious incidents varies across time, like all 
ideologies. If the exclusively religious groups are untethered from secular morale, and care 
less about high casualties then the average lethality rate of their incidents should be 
consistently high throughout the time period. This is definitely not the case. Exclusively 
religious groups are more lethal in the transnational domain, but not markedly so in general 
across time. Further investigations revealed that exclusively religious incidents claim more 
lives because of the rise in numbers of exclusively religious incidents. In other words, the 
increase in number of dead is predominantly due to an increase in activity – and not 
significantly higher average lethality rates.
66
 
Exclusively religious incidents are far more likely to be suicide attacks than 
nationalist-separatist incidents, but the likelihood is even higher for combination religious 
groups. It is plausible that the religious component of the combination religious incidents is 
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 I also carried out a descriptive analysis of mass casualty attacks similar to Masters (2008) design. This analysis 
can be found in the appendix. The main findings are that mass-casualty attacks is a feature of all five time 
periods, and that mass casualties is more associated with leftist and nationalist separatists than with exclusively 
religious. Also, exclusively religious groups perpetrate most of their high-casualty incidents from 2005-2010. 
The trends in mass casualty attacks appear to be reflections of the overall activity level within each ideology at 
different points in time, rather than a distinguishing feature of exclusively religious incidents. 
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promoting suicide attacks because combination religious incidents are clearly significantly 
different from nationalist-separatist incidents. As such, combination religious incidents appear 
a deadly mix of the other two ideologies that use suicide attacks frequently. Suicide attacks 
are highly localized in time, space and within ideologies – and this fact makes generalization 
problematic because countries are very different. Exclusively religious suicide attacks have 
taken place in more countries than any other, and this also partly supports the notion that 
religion plays an important part in choosing suicide attacks as a tactic. In recent years, most 
suicide attacks are indeed exclusively religious and this is supportive of the hypothesis. 
However, the analyses are likely biased in disfavour of the religious categories and it is hard 
to say anything concrete about whether the combination religious or exclusively religious 
would receive the numerous unknown suicide attacks from Iraq if they were coded. In the 
end, the results have questionable reliability and provide mixed support. The religious 
component appears to be important, but exactly how is hard to say. 
Exclusively religious incidents do not separate themselves from the rest of the 
ideologies as much more likely to be transnational. The analysis rather served to show that 
with the exception of rightist incidents, leftist incidents are by far the least likely to be 
transnational. The remaining ideologies vary, but the nationalist-separatist and combination 
religious incidents are by far the most likely to be transnational. 
Table XV. Support for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Number & Topic Findings of this Thesis 
H1 : Increase in Number Highly Supportive 
H2 : Increase in Proportion Highly Supportive 
H3 : For both Domestic and Transnational Highly Supportive 
H4 : Leftist Decline Highly Supportive 
H5 : Higher Incident Lethality Partial Support 
H6 : Incident Lethality Across Time Not Supportive 
H7 : Suicide Attacks Mixed Support, questionable reliability 
H8 : Transnational Not Supportive 
Potential Points of Criticism 
The results from the analyses provide a lot of support for hypotheses 1-4, but there are some 
potential problems with how this analysis is conducted that could help produce these results. I 
mentioned in the introduction that new terrorism became especially popular outside the 
academic arena following the events of 9/11. Much of the information used to code 
ideological profiles used in this thesis are news articles and press wires published after 9/11. 
The TKB also coded their profiles after 9/11. This raises the question of whether there is 
indeed an increase of religious terrorism, or if it is our perceptions of terrorism that has 
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changed. Do we label more organizations ‘religious’ today because of our perceptions, or 
would the label be the same of 9/11 and the war on terror never happened? I have attempted 
to control for this throughout the analysis by clearly separating the organizations that were 
labelled exclusively religious from those that received a combination of religious and another 
ideology. This distinction made sense in terms of the theory of new terrorism because 
exclusively religious incidents should be the ultimate example of new terrorism. However, it 
should also be harder to label an organization as exclusively religious, than simply adding 
religious to another ideology because of recent perceptions of religious terrorism. This is 
definitely not a perfect solution to the problem, and ideally I would have had followed each 
organizations ideological preferences throughout the time period they have existed.  
This problem can, in part, be addressed by looking at when the different group are 
created. For example, if there are almost no exclusively religious groups founded in the pre 
9/11 years, and a high amount in the post 9/11 years – then there is less support for the 
assumption that the perceptions of exclusively religious terrorism haven’t changed radically 
since 9/11. If almost all exclusively religious groups are formed after 9/11, then there is 
strong support for the argument that we perceive more groups as religious following 9/11.  
I do not have any data on when the groups in the GTD were founded, but I am able to 
locate their first registered terrorist incident. A group could have been formed years prior to 
their first attack, their first attack could have been missed by the GTD coders and a group 
could have lain dormant from before 1985 and only become active at a much later point in 
time. Treating the first terrorist attack by each group as their ‘formation date’ is not an ideal 
solution, but should at least shed some more light on the matter.  
Figures 20 and 21. Number of New Groups & Average Group Activity 
Figure 20 was created by locating the first attack of every terrorist group in the GTD, and 
counting that incident as a group formation within each ideology. For example, if an 
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exclusively religious terrorist group carries out their first attack somewhere between 1985 and 
1989 –the bar in figure 20 receives a registration of one more exclusively religious group. All 
subsequent observations of that group is dropped, therefore there are no double registrations 
of the same group and the graph shows how many groups first become active throughout the 
time period for each ideology. The graph clearly shows that the highest number of exclusively 
religious groups is formed in 1990−1994 and that the 1985−1989 levels are the lowest. 
Overall, the level of new groups appears similar throughout the five time-periods and the 
cause for worry about our perceptions is lessened. Figure 21 shows the average number of 
incidents that are carried out by a terrorist group within each ideology for the five-year 
periods. For example, a leftist terrorist group carried out 75 incidents on average for the time 
period 1985−1989.67 Combined, these two graphs provide the final answer to the patterns 
seen in the previous analyses; there are not many more exclusively religious groups formed in 
recent years than in previous years. The lethality rate hasn’t increased on average, but the 
exclusively religious groups have become far more active. They perpetrate more incidents, 
and this development is striking for the period 2005−2010.68 
 Another point of potential criticism is regarding the analysis on the likelihood of an 
exclusively religious incident being transnational. The analyses showed that the nationalist-
separatist element was important, and it can be argued that the reason for this pattern lies in 
the method the domestic and transnational incidents are separated in this thesis. Nationalist 
separatist struggles sometimes involve a group seeking separation from two states and not just 
one. Some of the major nationalist separatist struggles lie in border regions (for example the 
ETA or PKK). The transnational incidents are identified by indicators, such as the nationality 
of the victim compared to the country where the incident took place, and border regions can 
provide these conditions in plenty without there every having been an ‘intentional’ 
transnational incident. This is not to say that the attack doesn’t involve two states, however 
they may be coded transnational more often due to the nature of the separatist struggle. Put to 
a point, 9/11 is an intentional transnational event, while nationalist-separatist incidents may be 
coded as transnational by ‘accident’. This is a plausible explanation for part of the nationalist-
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 These numbers are not controlled for extremely active groups which carry out incidents in the thousands. 
68
 Some of the leftist groups who became active in the period from 2005-2010 are for example; the Comminist 
Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) (1 036 incidents), the Conspiracy Cells of Fire (43 incidents), and the 
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) (24 incidents). Some more obscure groups may be the Terai Janatantrik 
Madhes Party in Nepal, the Greek ‘Solidarity with Imprisoned Members of Action Directe (AD)’. Some 
exclusively religious group are Al-Shabaab (156 incidents), Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb 
(AQLIM) (127 incidents) and Boko Haram (26 incidents). 
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separatist dominance in the transnational analysis. One potential solution would be to identify 
the incidents which involve states not directly adjacent to one another, but this solution would 
not be perfect either. Many unknown incidents are also coded transnational because of the 
separation method used. I have no method ready for addressing this potential weakness of the 
analysis at the moment. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This section will address the consequences of the findings in relation to the theory of new 
terrorism, present some potential policy implications and finally discuss future research. 
The Findings in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’ 
The findings of this thesis support the emergence and growth of an exclusively religious 
terrorism. Exclusively religious terrorism grows practically from the bottom of every graph, 
and appears to be distinct from combination religious incidents which are a more constant 
feature throughout the time period. Therefore, the observation of something ‘new’ and 
exclusively religious appears to make sense. The timing of this growth is not entirely in line 
any of the proposed beginnings of new terrorism. Although it is clearly present in the 1990s, 
the real growth happens from 2002. The timing therefore seems to be off by about a decade 
for the authors who pinpointed it to the early 1990s. In relation to Rapoport’s wave concept, 
the timing of the leftist decline is also off by about a decade. The third leftist wave appears to 
ebb quickly in the early 1990s, and there is a transitional period of mixed development before 
the religious growth begins predominantly in 2002. From this point on, the exclusively 
religious presence is sustained, and for all intents and purposes it can be labelled a religious 
wave. Finally, the leftist resurgence from 2007 and on is not in accordance with the wave 
concept – unless the religious wave was exceptionally short and we are heading into yet 
another leftist wave. The leftist resurgence does not fit well with the remaining new terrorism 
literature either. If the days of the traditional, political terrorist are over – then there should 
not be growth in political terrorism. Not only is there growth, but leftist terrorist incidents are 
now dominant in the domestic domain. 
 Apart from exclusively religious transnational terrorism, the new terrorists do not 
appear to be extraordinarily lethal. The new terrorism theory cannot survive on the lethality of 
exclusively religious transnational terrorism alone. The exclusively religious incident lethality 
varies across time, which is contrary to the notion that they are untethered from secular 
morale. The analysis rather show that leftist groups aren’t very lethal, which could also 
contribute to the perception that the current dominant form of terrorism must be more lethal. 
However, exclusively religious terrorist incidents are far from alone in being more lethal than 
the leftist groups and this is not explained by the theory of new terrorism. 
 There is suggestive evidence that the religious component may be important in 
promoting suicide attacks, and that exclusively religious groups have perpetrated the most 
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suicide attacks. Nevertheless, exclusively religious terrorists are not the most likely or 
frequent user of suicide attacks. Nor are they the most likely to be transnational. 
 The total weight of evidence does not provide clear support for the theory of new 
terrorism, but there is definitely support for the growth of religious terrorism. This is a partial 
problem for the theory of new terrorism, because the new terrorists are here – but appear not 
to be so different from other terrorists as prescribed by the theory. If anything, it would appear 
that leftists is the category which more often distinguish itself from the other ideologies. The 
grand ideological trends nevertheless support the notion of a change within terrorism, and also 
the wave concept. The timing, however, seems to be off by about a decade. 
Policy Implications 
There are clearly identifiable ideological trends in terrorism. This means that there are 
different causes for different ideological strains of terrorism. Governments should support 
research into the causes of terrorism which attempts different explanatory variables for 
different ideological strains of terrorism. Since terrorism is predominantly a domestic 
phenomenon, information on the causes for particular ideological strains of terrorism could 
provide invaluable information to governments seeking a more effective counter-terrorism 
policy. Keeping track of the ideological trends of domestic terrorism is key to an effective 
counter terrorism policy at an early stage to minimize casualties. 
Although religious terrorism has had a strong presence throughout the 2000s, the 
religious terrorism does not appear to be so different from other types of terrorism. If the new 
conceptions are not needed, then the old remedies may still work and should not be discarded. 
It is also worth noting that religious terrorism, nor any other ideology for that matter, has 
reached the levels seen in leftist terrorism during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The number 
of terrorist incidents with a known perpetrator was at a low point up until 2004, which is well 
after religious terrorism became a primary concern of the international community. The 
number of terrorist incidents is now at levels not seen since 1994, and a significant portion of 
this is religious and found in the domestic domain. There has been a consistent rising trend 
since 2004 which show no signs of flattening out in the last year of 2010.  
 Although exclusively religious transnational incidents are indeed highly lethal, the 
lethality of religious terrorism is a consequence of increased activity and not higher lethality 
per incident. The fact that both average incident lethality, and activity, varies throughout the 
time periods means that the key to reducing casualties lie in identifying the causes of 
increased activity. Morale and world view may be to blame with certain extreme groups, but 
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overall this is not the root cause of the current high lethality due to terrorist activity. Domestic 
terrorism is by far the biggest killer. The number of domestic incidents outnumbers the 
number of transnational incidents several times over, and rightist incidents have the potential 
of being highly lethal. These groups are not produced often, and are not highly active in 
relation to the other ideologies – but when they do attack the casualties are likely to be high. 
If there is an increase in rightist activity policy advisors should be aware that this is a 
potentially very lethal form of terrorism. Incidents that are motivated by both religion and 
nationalist-separatist agendas also appear to be lethal, both in their domestic and transnational 
incidents. These groups also appear more likely to perpetrate suicide attacks.  
 The recent leftist resurgence is also cause for concern. It climbs rapidly from 2007, 
and now outnumbers the total number of exclusively religious terrorism. Although a lot of 
these incidents are caused by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M), there is ample 
evidence for a broader rise of leftist terrorism as well. The rise is predominantly found in the 
domestic domain, which should be a cause for concern with any government. Since the cold 
war ended leftist terrorism has maintained relatively low levels, and the cause of its continued 
presence and recent upsurge should be a cause for concern. This is especially true for the 
governments who are aware of leftist terrorist groups existing in their country. There are also 
indications that the cause is not primarily the formation of new groups, but increased activity 
in the leftist groups. This also indicates that there is renewed potential for recruitment which 
could be met with counter-policies at an early stage. 
Future Research 
This thesis has shown that domestic incidents should receive more attention by researchers in 
the future. Most terrorism incidents are domestic, and although the ideological trends of 
domestic and transnational terrorism track each other well, they are not identical. I have 
presented a thorough review of the GTD, and recommend researchers to begin using this 
database actively in their research because it offers unique opportunities within terrorism 
studies. 
 The causes of terrorism should also be researched in relation to each ideological 
subdivision and not terrorism in general (See Crenshaw 2007) The fact that there are 
ideological trends speak to the point that there are different causes for different ideologies. 
The best models to model the causes of terrorism are therefore found when the incidents are 
separated between the ideologies. The timing of some of the trends in this thesis are highly 
suggestive, and could provide a place to begin this research. First of all, the rise of exclusively 
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religious incidents arrives only after 9/11, and appears not to be highly influenced by the Iraq 
invasion in 2003. It is possible that the war on terror has provoked a response and ironically 
caused the trend it set out to subdue. This evidence is circumstantial at best, yet it is a valid 
question to ask why the rise of religious terrorism arrives 10 years later than expected. 
Secondly, the resurgence of leftism is suggestive of a connection with the current financial 
crisis. Economic causal variables may have more explanatory power after the ideological 
Cold War ended. 
The dataset is the result of 7 months of work and provide ideological profiles for more 
terrorist groups than previous similar studies. For example, Piazza (2009) identified 473 
groups, Rasler & Thompson (2009) identified 763 groups, the TKB held 856 (START 2012c). 
In the future, the dataset can shed new light on the ideological aspects of domestic and 
transnational terrorism. I have classified an unprecedented amount of groups and incidents, 
but there is much work to be done still. Completing the ideological coverage should be the 
first undertaking of researchers. The TKB has been used by most researchers up until now, 
but the smaller groups are not at all well covered by the TKB. These groups should be equally 
important to any analysis. Additionally, they could be compared to the major organizations to 
see why some organizations carry on with a sustained effort and other collapse. What type of 
group is more likely to splinter? What type of group is likely to last longer? These are also 
questions which have real world applications in counter-terrorism policy. 
Any future research into suicide terrorism should at least cover at least the entire 
2000s. This decade is clearly the decade with the most suicide attacks, and since this is such a 
localized phenomenon analyses are heavily impacted by a reduced time horizon.  
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Appendix 
I have referred to figures and table in the appendix at several points throughout this thesis. A 
larger number of tables and graphs were produced, and not all were deemed relevant. A 
selection of the most interesting and important graphs that did not fit the thesis are presented 
here in the appendix. I will not comment extensively on most of these.  
Tables 
Table XVI. Database Information from the GTD 
Data Source Freq. Percent Cum. 
Anti-Abortion Project 2010 186 0.19 0.19 
Armenian Website 40 0.04 0.23 
CAIN 1,589 1.62 1.85 
CBRN Global Chronology 49 0.05 1.9 
CETIS 16,205 16.52 18.42 
Disorders and Terrorism 
Chronology 5 0.01 18.42 
Eco Project 2010 135 0.14 18.56 
HSI 99 0.1 18.66 
Hewitt Project 1,013 1.03 19.69 
Hijacking DB 54 0.06 19.75 
Hyland 74 0.08 19.82 
ISVG 13,213 13.47 33.29 
PGIS 63,882 65.11 98.4 
Sageman 3 0 98.4 
State Department 1997 
Document 27 0.03 98.43 
UMD Algeria 2010 645 0.66 99.09 
UMD Assassinations Project 19 0.02 99.11 
UMD Black Widows 2011 7 0.01 99.12 
UMD Miscellaneous 12 0.01 99.13 
UMD South Africa 449 0.46 99.59 
UMD Sri Lanka 2011 406 0.41 100 
Total 98 112 100 - 
Table XVI is a tabulation of the different sources used by the GTD. It shows the number of 
incidents coded with information from each source, how many percent that source makes up 
of the total number of incidents and the cumulative percent.  
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Table XVII. Summary Information About the GTD 2010  
Information GTD 1970 – 2010 GTD 1985 – 2010 
Incident Level   
   Total Number of Incidents 98,848 74,818 
   Incidents with Ideology 47,447 35,860 
   Incidents with TKB Profile 39,401 28,790 
   Incidents with Own Profile 8,046 7,070 
   Unknown Incidents 40,872 32,929 
   Known Group, No Ideology 10,529 6,029 
Group Level   
   Total Number of Groups 2,871 2,031 
   Groups with Ideology 1,227 1,140 
   Groups with TKB Profile 491 405 
   Groups with Own Profile 736 735 
   Known Group, No Ideology 1,644 891 
Table XVII shows some descriptive statistics of the number of incidents for the complete time 
series GTD, and the time-period used for this thesis (1985−2010).  
 
Table XVIII. Poisson Risk Regression of Leftist Decline 
Dependent Leftist 
Independents OR (S.E.) 
1990−1994 .736 
 
(.2) 
1995−1999 0,204*** 
 
(.432) 
2000−2004 .114*** 
 
(.476) 
2005−2010 .256** 
 
(.669) 
Constant -3,852 
Country Intercept 4.037 (.324) 
N 5,174 
      8132.46*** 
LR Test Vs. Logistic 98515.12*** 
Second Level N 199 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table XVIII is a Poisson regression model of the leftist decline. Because the graph showed 
such a clear trend, and the hypothesis is somewhat on the side of the main objective with the 
thesis, the regression is not presented in the thesis. The dependent variable is a country-year 
count of leftist incidents. 
 
iii 
 
Table XIX. Domestic and Transnational Incidents for Remaining Incidents 
Table XIX is the missing piece of table XIII, and 
holds the number and percentages of incidents that 
are domestic and transnational for the known group, 
no ideology and unknown categories. A relatively 
large percentage of these incidents are transnational, 
but no interpretation of these numbers can be made 
as I have no information on the ideology of the 
perpetrator group.  
 
Table XX. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed 
Filter Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
None 72,679 2.442 12.842 0 1382 
<100 Killed 72,577 2.154 5.996 0 97 
200+ 72,647 2.272 7.138 0 189 
*1-99 dead 33,177 4.711 8.161 1 97 
*1-99 dead is an additional category where only incidents which led to between 1 and 99 dead are listed. 
 
Table XX show the impact of the <100 Killed and 200+ lethality filters. The 200+ lethality 
filter was not used at all, nevertheless the descriptive statistics for it provides some 
information on the incidents lost using the <100 Killed filter. The last line of the table 
removes the incidents which caused zero fatalities, and show descriptive statistics using the 
<100 Killed filter, as noted by the range of the variable from 1-97. Obviously, the number of 
incidents with zero killed pulls the mean down significantly – however; I have no way of 
distinguishing the incidents which were meant not to lead to fatalities from those who were 
meant to lead to fatalities, but failed to do so. Thus, removing all the zero-counts from the 
data material skews any analysis on lethality. 
The investigations into lethality indicated some highly lethal rightist incidents, but 
overall the average incident lethality was relatively low and similar. Masters (2008) defined 
high-casualty incidents by stating that they were incidents that were .5 standard deviations 
more lethal than the sample incident average. However, Masters (2008) had removed the non-
fatal incidents from the data material – which has an effect on the average value. I do not 
remove non-fatal incidents as they are attempts at terrorism regardless of the degree of 
success. It may also be an intentional non-fatal incident, as such it is an important part of the 
lethality of each ideology. Therefore, I define a high casualty incident as one that is more than 
two standard deviations higher than the average incident casualty rate. 95 percent of the data 
exists within two standard deviations of the mean, thus if we disregard the portion below the 
 Known Group, 
No Ideology Unknown 
Dom. N 4,599 27 011 
Trans. N 1,155 4 681 
Unc. N 275 1 237 
Total N 6,029 32 929 
Dom. % 76.28 82.03 
Trans. % 19.16 14.22 
Unc. % 4.56 3.76 
Total % 100 100 
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mean and turn our attention to the portion above the mean – this definition will yield a 
definition of high casualty incidents as the 2,5 percent most lethal. The calculations are still 
done after applying the <100 Killed filter. Using the total numbers, with the <100 Killed 
filter, high casualties can be defined as; incident average + (2*standard deviation) = 2,154 + 
(2*5,996) = 14.146 = 14. If I count all the incidents the yielded equal to, or more than, 14 
deaths within each ideology throughout the five-time periods I get a measure of the 
development of mass-casualty incidents. The table below shows the number of high casualty 
attacks committed by the different ideologies throughout the time period, as per the definition 
of high casualties above. Also, note that even two standard deviations out – my mass-casualty 
definition is still under half of that set my Masters (2008). This is likely not only caused by 
the inclusion of non-fatal incidents, but also by the fact that I use the <100 Killed lethality 
filter. 
Table XXI. Mass Casualty Attacks By Ideology and Five Year Periods 
 
1985− 
1989 
1990− 
1994 
1995− 
1999 
2000− 
2004 
2005− 
2010 
Ideo. 
Total 
Leftist 206 106 35 25 26 398 
Rightist 51 2 7 3 0 63 
Nationalist-Separatist 68 148 98 41 43 398 
Exclusively Religious 3 4 31 47 105 190 
Combination Religious 15 20 5 38 75 153 
Other 25 35 13 1 15 89 
Known Group, No 
Ideology 62 57 101 15 55 290 
Unknown 45 48 120 71 365 649 
Time-Period Total 475 420 410 241 684 - 
The totals on the far right show that all ideologies have engaged in high casualty incidents, 
and that nationalist-separatist and leftist groups have caused the most of these incidents. 
Exclusively Religious and Combination religious are a distant third and fourth respectively. 
Also, note that there is high amount of high-casualty incidents with an unknown perpetrator, 
especially from 2005-2010. 290 high casualty incidents have also yet to receive an ideological 
profile. Nonetheless, the numbers show that high casualty incidents have been present 
throughout the time period, and in great numbers within each five-year period.  
Table XXI show the number of suicide attacks within each country for the three 
ideologies that turned out to be the main exponents of suicide attacks. The list is sorted after 
the number of exclusively religious suicide attacks. 
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Table XXII. Number of Suicide Attacks by Country and Ideology 
Country 
Exclusively 
Religous 
Combination 
Religious 
Nationalist-
Separatist 
Afghanistan 155 - - 
Pakistan 21 32 8 
Iraq 21 75 - 
Algeria 20 - - 
Yemen 12 - - 
Saudi Arabia 9 - - 
Indonesia 8 1 - 
Bangladesh 6 - - 
Morocco 6 - - 
Somalia 6 1 - 
United States 5 - - 
Great Britain 5 - - 
Iran 4 - - 
Turkey 2 - 11 
Egypt 2 - - 
Mauritania 2 - - 
Kenya 1 - - 
Tunisia 1 - - 
Qatar 1 - - 
Panama 1 - - 
China 1 - - 
India 1 12 5 
Sweden 1 - - 
Croatia 1 - - 
Israel 1 68 27 
France 1 - - 
West Bank and Gaza 
Strip - 25 17 
Russia - 8 31 
Lebanon - 6 6 
Philippines - 5 - 
Palestine - 4 1 
Uzbekistan - 4 - 
Jordan - 3 - 
Argentina - 2 - 
Tajikistan - 1 - 
Sri Lanka - - 108 
Sudan - - 1 
Total Number 294 247 215 
Total All Three Ideologies 
 
756 
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Figures 
Figure 22. Ideological Coverage With Unknown Incidents 
Figure 22 shows the ideological coverage 
with the unknown incidents included in the 
calculation. This version was not presented 
in the thesis because the incidents without a 
known perpetrator are impossible to classify 
within an ideology. The reason the coverage 
gets worse as time progresses is that more 
and more incidents have an unknown 
perpetrator. I do not see this as a particularly 
serious problem with the analysis, however I will dedicate some time to explain why now. 
Figures 23 & 24. Percentages and Counts of All Ideologies 
Figures 23 & 24 show the percentages and counts seen from earlier graphs for all ideologies. 
These graphs were discarded because they are messy, and the huge number of unknown 
incidents make the rest of the ideologies entangle in the bottom of the graph. Keep in mind, 
that in terms of percentages the GTD has far less unknown incidents than the RDWTI for 
example. It has marginally more than the ITERATE. Nevertheless, the number is very high 
and this may put of researchers. However, what are unknown incidents? They are acts that fall 
within the definition of terrorism given by the dataset (GTD in this case), but without a known 
perpetrator group. This could be anything. Does the huge number of unknown incidents 
invalidate the research done here? The number of unknown does not appear to be a function 
of systematic errors on part of the database developers, and it appears to be a constant feature 
throughout terrorism history. If this fact invalidates this research, then it invalidates any 
quantitative study based on a terrorism event history database. The consequences of unknown 
incidents are really in relation to what population you are generalizing to. Any researcher 
vii 
 
which depends on having access to a perpetrator group name will have to discard these 
incidents. The consequences of the number of unknown incidents could really be summed up 
in an additional point in the definition section, if it were necessary; A terrorist incident must 
have a known perpetrator. This may not be unreasonable, however it should not be done 
without any research into the geographic clustering of these unknown incidents. There are 
places in the world in which the conflict is practically self-evident, in which a perpetrator 
group  name is not needed to communicate the terrorist agenda to the audience. In such an 
instance, it would likely not be in the interest of a terrorist organization to call unneeded 
attention upon itself by signing its name on the incident. Some terrorists may be in it for the 
fame, but terrorism is a form of communication – and if it can be anonymous it is easy to see 
how this would be preferred. The number of unknown incidents are not a problem. Why there 
are so many of them, that is an interesting question. 
 The number of unknown incidents only posed a problem in the analyses on suicide 
terrorism. This analysis made me a little uncomfortable because Moghadam (2008) gave good 
reasons to suspect that most of the unknown incidents in Iraq were indeed exclusively 
religious. This isn’t a problem until I deal with a phenomenon that is highly localized in both 
time and space – and where the occurrences of the phenomenon in relation to the total list of 
incidents is incredibly low. 
Figures 25 & 26. Suicide Terrorism With, and Without Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
Figures 25 and 26 shows the impact of removing Iraq and Afghanistan from the analysis on 
suicide terrorism. Since I have good reason to believe that most of the unknown incidents in 
Iraq are indeed exclusively religious suicide attacks, there is reason the believe the figures 
presented in the thesis are as biased because of the huge number of unknown incidents. Figure 
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26 illustrates how this type of bias will play out with such a rare, and highly localized 
phenomenon.  
 To illustrate how this does not appear to impact the other large N analyses, I present 
the percentages and counts used to test hypotheses 1-2 without any registrations from Iraq and 
Afghanistan whatsoever. These can be seen in figures 27 & 28. The reason I choose these two 
countries is that these are the two major battlegrounds of the war on terror which followed 
9/11. Although slightly subdued, which is to be expected, the trends are overall the same. 
Naturally, the removal of Iraq and Afghanistan changes the picture of which ideology is 
dominant when, but not the overall trends. There is significant exclusively religious activity 
outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Figures 27 & 28. Percentages and Counts Without Iraq and Afghanistan 
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Figures 29 & 30. Percentages of Yearly Killed for Domestic and Transnational 
Incidents. 
 
Figures 29 & 30 show the percentages of the yearly number of killed by terrorist incidents 
that are attributable to the exclusively religious, combination religious and all other 
ideologies. Note that Known Group, No Ideology and Unknown incidents are not plotted in 
the graphs, but are part of the calculations. These figures show that exclusively religious 
groups have become responsible for a larger percentage of the number of yearly killed from 
the early 1990s and on. This trend is markedly different from 2002 within both the 
transnational and domestic domain. In the transnational plot, exclusively religious groups 
appear to be responsible for almost all the fatalities with known perpetrators. This is a 
significant development, and is clearly unprecedented before the last five-year period. With 
these graphs, it is important to remember that domestic terrorism kills far more people than 
transnational terrorism because it outnumbers transnational terrorist incidents many times 
over. As such, although the development in the transnational graph may appear more dramatic 
– the major amount of casualties are expected to be in the domestic domain. The relatively 
low number of incidents in the transnational domain is the reason why the lines are more 
erratic, showing that relatively few incidents will have an impact on the graphs. As with all 
graphs on lethality, the <100 Killed filter is used for the calculations. 
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Figure 31. Stacked Bars of Yearly Ideological Percentages 
Figure 31 shows the yearly percentage of the 
total number of incidents that can be 
ascribed to the different ideologies. This has 
commonly been presented in line-graphs in 
the thesis. These stacked bars illustrate at 
which points in time the leftist, rightist and 
nationalist-separatist categories are 
overestimated because these ideological 
categories are not mutually exclusive. This problem appears to peak in the early 1990s, but is 
generally not a large problem throughout the time period. 
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Codebook 
This codebook outlines how an ideological indicator was introduced for the perpetrator 
groups in the GTD 2010 dataset. This work was carried out by graduate student in political 
science Torbjørn Kveberg with the assistance of Ådne Naper, Master in Science in Political 
Science (2011), NTNU. The work was carried out in two stages from September 2011 until 
February 2012 during which 47 447 incidents, out of the total 57 976 incidents, in the 2010 
edition with known perpetrators, received an ideological profile in the form of a numerical 
value. 
 The STATA do-file containing this work carries out all the coding automatically into a 
mint version of the GTD 2010. If you want to append the 1993 data, this should be done prior 
to running the do-file to ensure that groups in 1993 are coded properly as well. 
Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) 
During the years 2004-2008 the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) at 
the University of Maryland developed the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB). The TKB was 
unavailable at the time of coding, but the TOPs from the TKB was hosted by START on their 
websites. The work started with coding these profiles into the GTD dataset. 
Every group name was searched for in the TOPs profiles available on the START 
website. If you choose to do this over again keep in mind that the search tool need not return 
the group name you searched for at all, and that a great many groups have to be browsed for 
alphabetically instead. Also, searching with Google may be helpful as groups often use many 
different names or aliases and several different spellings of that name. The GTD and TKB 
names often do not match exactly. This process was finished on the 17
th
 of November 2011 at 
which point a total of 491 groups had been coded using TKB information, responsible for a 
total of 39 401 incidents. 
Variable list and description 
The following variables are only available for the groups which received an ideological 
profile from the TKB; 
- tkb_ideology 
- tkb_strength 
- tkb_bo 
- tkb_starty 
 
Ideology 
tkb_ideology - Ideology listed in the ‘Classification’ field in the TKB. 
This variable is coded differently from all other ideology indicators in the dataset. It’s values 
are; 
1 Anarchist 
2 Anti-Globalization 
3 Communist / Socialist 
4 Environmental 
5 Leftist 
6 Nationalist / Separatist 
7 Racist 
8 Religious 
9 Right Wing Conservative 
10 Right Wing Reactionary 
11 Nationalist / Separatist + Religious 
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12 Nationalist / Separatist + Other 
13 Anarchist + Communist / Socialist 
14 Other + Religious 
15 Leftist + Nationalist / Separatist 
16 Anti-Globalization + Communist / Socialist 
17 Religious + Right Wing Reactionary 
18 Communist / Socialist + Leftist 
19 Communist / Socialist + Leftist + other 
20 Racist, right wing reactionary 
21 Racist, right wing conservative 
22 Environmental + other 
23 Racist, religious, right-wing reactionary 
24 Communist/Socialist + Nationalist/Separatist 
25 Nationalist / Separatist + Racist 
26 Anti-Globalization + Nationalist / separatist 
27 Leftist, Nationalist / Separatist, Religious 
28 Anti-Globalization + Leftist 
29 Nationalist / Separatist + Racist + Religious 
30 Communist / Socialist + Nationalist  / Separatist + Other 
31 Communist / Socialist + Other 
32 Anti-Globalization + Communist / Socialist + Nationalist / Separatist 
33 Leftist + Other 
34 Nationalist / Separatist + Right Wing Conservative 
35 Nationalist / Separatist + Right Wing Reactionary 
36 Anarchist + Anti-Globalization 
37 Anti-Globalization + Nationalist / Separatist 
66 Other 
. No profile available for incident, missing. 
 
Group Strength 
tkb_strength - Member-size of group listed in the ‘Strength’ field in the TKB. 
Values; 0 = Inactive group (as per the TKB, 2004-2008). 3 = Unknown number of members. 
All other values = number of members in group at some point between 2004-2008. 
Bases of Operation 
tkb_bo  - Countries listed in the ‘Bases of Operation’ field in the TKB. 
Foundation Year 
tkb_starty - Reflects the earliest year of known activity for the group. This variable is not 
always based on the TKB data. If the TKB has a specific year listed for the formation of the 
group, then this year is coded without further consideration. The TKB data does not always 
give a precise year, therefore the following coding rules were established; 
- No dates are coded. 
- If “mid-1990s”; 1995. 
- If “early 1990s”; 1992. 
- If “early to mid 1990s”; 1992, unless first attack listed in the GTD precedes 1992 
in which case earliest attack is coded. 
- If “late 1990s”; 1998. 
- If “1990s”; 1990. 
- If none is specified, earliest attack will be coded as “starty”. At least this gives us a 
point in time when the group first became violent. 
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- If “late 1960s to early 1970s” then 1970 (being the natural quasi-interpolation 
midpoint between 1968 and 1972. Unless first attack precedes that year of course 
- If “mid to late 1990s” then 1997. 
Mismatches between the GTD and TKB 
This table lists the group names that were problematic when matching the GTD name to the 
TKB name. GTD name is listed first, then the TKB name and finally the resolution to the 
problem.  
*CFA is short for “Coded by first attack”. This refers to the variable tkb_starty in the cases 
where a group was given a formation year that reflected their earliest attack. For example, the 
TKB lists ‘mid-1990s’, the rules for the tkb_starty variable stipulate that the year 1995 should 
be used however the group has carried out an attack in 1994 in the GTD. In such cases, 1994 
was used as the formation year for the group – meaning they were coded by first attack 
(CFA). 
 
Table I. Documentation of Problems 
GTD gname TKB / Problem Problem and resolution 
Breton Liberation Front (FLB) Breton Revolutionary ARmy 
(ARB) 
ARB is listed as gsubname in the 
GTD dataset. TKB information 
used. 
Brother Julian Brother Julian Possibly just a disgrunteled 
individual with a stick of dynamite. 
Little is known of this attack 
according to TKB. Not likely more 
information will surface. No 
information from TKB to code. 
Brunswijk Jungle Commando 
 
National Liberation Union, a.k.a. 
Bushnegro Jungle Commandos led 
by Ronnie Brunwijk. 
 
Concluded that this is indeed the 
same group by comparing the TKB 
information to GTD information. 
Canary Islands Independence 
Movement 
 
 CFA. 
Comite de Liberation et de 
Detournements d'Ordinateurs 
(Committee for the liberation and 
hijacking of computers) 
Committee for Liquidation of 
Computers (CLODO) 
 
Concluded these two are the same. 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Party 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Army 
The army is the militant wing of 
the party according to TKB. I have 
coded this group according to the 
TKB data on the army itself. 
“starty” was coded as 1972 when 
the party was formed. 
Fatah Uprising Al-Fatah Uprising Concluded these two groups are 
one and the same. 
Hector Rio De Brigade Hector Riobe Brigade Concluded that these two groups 
were the same.  
Hizballah Hezbollah One and the same. 
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad Jund al-Sham Jund al-Sham seems to be a type of 
religious organization according to 
TKB. Research this before coding. 
Karbi Longri National Liberation 
Front (KLNLF). Also listed below, 
Karbi Longri North Cachar 
Liberation Front (KLNLF). 
Karbi Longri North Cachar 
Liberation Front (KLNLF) 
North Cachar coded, the other is 
not. 
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Contras  CFA 
Dev Genc   
Dev Yol   
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist 
International Conspiracy 
(EMETIC) 
 CFA 
Front for the Liberation of Cabinda 
/ Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-
FAC) 
FLEC exists in TKB. FAC does 
not. 
Given same code as FLEC 
(Nationalist / Separatist). 
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth 
(EAN) 
 CFA 
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-
Islami fi al-Iraq) 
 CFA 
Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI)  Starty interpolated 
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and, 
separate in GTD, Islamic Jihad 
Union 
Groups are listed as one and the 
same in TKB. 
Both groups received the same 
coding from TKB. 
Islamic Liberation Organization Presumed formed after the six day 
war in 1967. 
Starty: 1967 
Jagrata Towhidi Janeta (Rising 
Faithfuls) 
Potential GTD typo. Not corrected. 
Khristos Kasimis Khristos Kasimis Revolutionary 
Group for International Solidarity 
Concluded this group is one and 
the same. CFA. 
Kurdish Independence Group 
(name unk) 
Example of unknown names being 
listed as something other than 
“unknown” 
Revision of remaining group 
names during my own 
classification process. 
Lashkar-e-Omar  CFA 
Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT) TKB says the organization has 
been funded since 1994. 
1994 set as starty 
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary 
Organization 
No known “Bases of Operation”. 
Text indicates Lebanon. 
Origin set to Lebanon. 
Mahaz-e-Inquilab Islami Inqulabi Mahaz Concluded this group is one and 
the same. Dehli bombings of 2005 
fit. 
Mujahedeen Shura Council  CFA 
Mujahedin-e-Khalq(MeK) Mujahideen-I-Khalq(MK) Concluded these are one and the 
same. 
Muslims Against Global 
Oppression (MAGO) 
 CFA 
Muttahida Qami Movement 
(MQM) 
 CFA 
National Liberation Union  CFA 
National Youth Resistance 
Organization 
 CFA 
Nihilists Faction  CFA 
November 17 Revolutionary 
Organization (N17RO) 
Revolutionary Organization 17 
November (RO-N17) 
Concluded groups are one and the 
same. 
Nuclei Communist Combatants Lacks TOP CFA, no resolution as of yet. (No 
way of knowing if they are 
communist or are combating 
communists either) 
Orly Organization  CFA 
Oromo Liberation Front TKB says inactive. GTD has 
attacks listed in 2010. 
No resolution as of yet. 
Pan-Turkish Organization  CFA 
Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP)  CFA 
Paupa New Guinea Troops GTD typo. - 
People’s Liberation Forces (FPL) No origin No resolution yet. 
People’s Revolutionary Army No origin. No resolution yet 
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(ERP) 
People’s Revolutionary Militias 
(MRP) 
 CFA 
People’s Revolutionary 
Organization 
 CFA 
People’s Revolutionary Home 
Army 
 CFA 
Popular Resistance Committees TKB; Late 2000. Intepreted as late in the year 2000 
and coded as such. 
Popular Revolutionary Action “Approximately 1 members” CFA 
Purbo Banglar Communist Party  CFA 
 
Raul Sendic International Brigade  CFA 
Recontras  CFA 
Red Brigades Missing origin. Text says they are 
concentrated in Italy. 
No value given for origin. 
Revolutionary Action Party Missing TOP. According to TKB 
the detonated bombs to protest 
American support for the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. 
Coded as ‘Other’. 
Revolutionary Autonomous Group  CFA 
Revolutionary Leninist Brigades  CFA 
Revolutionary Nuclei  CFA 
Revolutionary Perspective  CFA 
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative 
Nuclei (NIPR) 
 CFA 
Revolutionary United Front 
Movement 
 CFA 
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance 
and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen 
Martyrs 
 CFA 
Roque Dalton Commando  CFA 
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)  CFA 
Salafia Jihadia  Starty interpolated to 1997. 
Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) are listed separately 
from the Sandinistas. 
TKB treats these two as one and 
the same. 
Treated these two as one and the 
same 
Save Kashmir Movement  CFA 
Secret Organization Zero  CFA 
Seikijuku  CFA 
Shahin (Falcon)  CFA 
Socialist-Nationalist Front (SNF)  CFA 
Sons of the South  CFA 
Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of 
Thrace 
Hawks of Thrace Concluded these are one and the 
same. 
Sword of Islam  CFA 
Tawid and Jihad  Starty interpolated to 1998 
Terra Lliure  Starty interpolated to 1972 
The Front for the Liberation of the 
Cabinda Enclave – Renewed 
(FLEC) 
 Starty interpolated to 1968 
The Inevitables  CFA 
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front 
(TPLF) 
 CFA 
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist 
(TKP-ML) 
No listing of this organization. 
TIKKO (the militant wing of TKP-
ML) is listed. Some, but not all, of 
the attacks have gsubname in GTD 
with TIKKO listed. 
Coded as Communist / Socialist 
and Leftist 
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Ummah Liberation Army  CFA 
United Arab Revolution  CFA 
United Kiku Liberation Front 
(UKLF) – India 
 Starty interpolated to 1998. 
United Popular Liberation Army of 
America 
 Starty interpolated to 1965 
Usbat al-Ansar (League of 
Partisans) 
 Starty interpolated to 1990 
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)  Starty interpolated to 1992 
World Punishment Organization  CFA 
Young Liberators of Pattani  CFA 
Zapatista National Liberation 
Army 
EZLN Concluded these are one and the 
same. 
Zimbabwe African Nationalist 
Union (ZANU) 
 CFA 
Al-Intiqami al-Pakistani Missing origin. Origin set to “Pakistan” as both 
GTD and TKB list the 2002 attacks 
as the only ones and those were in 
Pakistan. 
Red Line  CFA 
   
Own Research Using Dow Jones Factiva 
Variable name; author_ideology 
* NOTE; This variable utilizes a different, more efficient coding scheme than the 
tkb_ideology. 
Values 
1 Anarchist 
2 Anti-Globalization 
3 Communist / Socialist 
4 Environmental 
5 Leftist 
6 Nationalist / Separatist 
7 Racist 
8 Religious 
9 Right Wing 
99  Other 
.     Missing 
 
Combinations are allowed; meaning a value of 78 indicates a Racist (7) and Religious (8) 
group. The bulk of incidents were covered by relatively few groups coded using the TKB. It is 
reasonable to assume the remaining groups are the more obscure groups, perhaps only 
responsible for one incident ever. Thus, complete coverage may be hard to achieve. 
First, all duplicates of group names were dropped from the dataset. Second, all groups 
with profiles from TKB were dropped from the dataset. This produced a rough list of 2381 
organizations without TOPs out of a total number of unique group names of 2871. 1272 of 
these were searched for by me using Dow Jones Factiva search engine. This leaves 738 
organizations still not researched for the future and yielded a further coverage of 8186 
incidents, bringing the total coverage up to 47 605. 
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An estimated 3000
69
 plus press wires and news articles were deemed relevant and 
downloaded to serve as sources for the classifications of the groups ideologies. Thousands 
more were reviewed and deemed irrelevant. Through a process of trial and error the following 
served as rough rules of searching; first, attempt to search for the entire group name within a 
relevant timeframe to the incident listed; second, attempt the same search using a segment of 
the group name eliminating any special characters that may confuse the search engine; finally 
attempt a broader search throughout the entire period of time covered by Factiva. If the above 
fails, attempt to find the incident itself by searching for location and mode of attack, for 
example ‘Bomb’ and ‘Rome’ on or after the date of the incident listed. If all above fails, move 
on to the next group. 
This process was time consuming and highly repetitive. The most effective way of 
proceeding was to quickly review the articles, see if they held relevant information, and 
download the article if it did, before continuing with the next article on the same group. The 
goal was to find 2-3 unique articles per group, however sometimes there were many more and 
sometimes there was one or none. The main point of getting more articles was to get multiple 
accounts from different journalists. The information was then sent to fellow political scientist 
Ådne Naper to be classified in an Excel-document. Naper reviewed the articles and used the 
categories supplied by the TKB to classify the group going after the specific words used by 
journalists, such as ‘marxist’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalist’. Once a group was classified, the 
sources were referenced together with the numerical codes for the ideology in an document 
for future review by other researchers. Naper was paid by the hour and if he should feel 
uncertain about a classification told to leave the group un-coded or contact me. He also had a 
field available in the Excel document in which he could write notes should he deem the 
decision needed further substantiation than the articles referenced. The process began in late 
November 2011 and ended in late February 2012. It involves a high degree of subjective 
qualitative decisions on part of both of us. By large, the research process was one of learning 
by doing, however we proceeded carefully and thoughtfully rather than with the focus on 
getting done in time. The coding process was cut short due to time constraints, meaning that 
no groups prior to 1985 are covered in my own coding’s. This also illustrate the fact that we 
were in no hurry, and rather stopped at a certain point in time than attempting to rush through 
the entire list of group names. 
Researchers must be aware of these problems when using these data. I recommend 
dropping all incidents prior to 1985, waiting for me to finish the work or finishing the work 
yourself.  
Figures 1 show the ideological coverage achieved so far. There are many unknown 
group names which are impossible to code. Therefore, the coverage of the incidents with 
known perpetrator groups are plotted in figure 1, while figure 2 show the total yearly 
coverage including unknown incidents. 
  
                                                 
69
 Estimating the exact number downloaded and used is difficult because several files are created when an article 
is stored on the computer, and not always the same amount for every article. The estimate is based on a 
guesstimated average number of files per article by browsing a few random folders and counting the number of 
files, then counting the total number of files and dividing that number with the guesstimation. 
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Figures 1 & 2. Percent of yearly incidents with ideological profiles. 
Constructed Variables 
tkb_new_format 
ideology 
 
The tkb_new_format contains the TKB profiles in the author_ideology coding scheme, 
meaning tkb_ideology categories 9 and 10 are joined into one single 9: Right Wing category. 
The ideology variable contains both author_ideology and tkb_new_format bringing the 
ideological coverage up to a maximum. This variable has the same categories as the 
author_ideology and tkb_new_format variables do.  
Three sets of broader ideological profiles 
The ideology variable has 53 unique categories and is ill suited for analysis. The dataset was 
constructed for the purpose of investigating religiously motivated groups. Three sets of 
broader ideological profiles were created with the goal of investigating the differences 
between religious groups and all other types of groups. All variables are dichotomous 
variables where the value 1 indicates the group holds the ideological trait described. 
Variable Sets Created: 
Set1: Exclusively Religious 
 
 
 
 leftist_1 
 rightist_1 
 natsep_1 
 rel_1 
 other_1 
 
Set2: Religious + any 
combination 
 
 
 leftist_2 
 rightist_2 
 natsep_2 
 rel_2 
 other_2 
 
Set2: Exclusively Religious 
and 
religious + any combination 
 
 leftist_3 
 rightist_3 
 natsep_3 
 rel_exclus_3 
 rel_comb_3 
 other_3 
 
The difference between the sets lie in the religious variable, rel_1, rel_2 and rel_exclus3 & 
rel_comb3. In set one, a group has to be exclusively religious to be counted in the religious 
categories. In set two, a group may combine a religious ideology with any other ideology to 
be in the religious category. This means that if the group is ‘Right Wing and Religious’ it is 
only counted in the rel_2 variable and not in the rightist_2 variable. The third sets creates a 
separate variable for exclusively religious groups and groups that employ religious and any 
ix 
 
other combination. Once again, if a group falls within the rel_comb_3 variable, meaning 
combining a religious ideology with another ideology, it will no longer be counted among the 
other ideologies. 
I emphasize that these sets are created with the goal of separating religious groups in 
particular from all other. Thus, a group may combine both a ‘Right Wing’ and ‘Left Wing’ 
ideology, should it wish to do so, and be counted in both variables. The same will not be true 
for any group with a religious ideology. 
Further elaboration on this will only lead to confusion, as there are 53 categories in the 
original variable. In essence, only groups that can for certain be put in leftist, rightist, 
nationalist / separatist or religious are put there. If a group is exclusively ‘Environmentalist’ 
there are no grounds for calling them ‘Leftist’, so the group will end up in the ‘Other’ 
category. Thus, the variables attempt to isolate groups on as clear terms as possible, 
maximizing the validity of the measures. 
 
Variables compatible with all three sets; 
The following three variables are created to represent the incidents without an ideological 
profile and are thus compatible with all the above sets of variables. Two versions are 
available; One where all groups without profile are treated the same, and one where known 
groups without profiles are separated from unknown groups. 
Ideo_unkn - Known groups without ideological profiles, i.e. MISSING, are given the     
  value 1. 
Ideomiss - Unknown Groups are given the value 1 
Unknown - Both known groups without ideological profiles and unknown groups are  
    given the value 1. 
 
Table II displays the coding in practice. On the far right there are two religious variables; 
Exclusively religious (rel_1 & rel_exclus3) and Combination Religious (rel_comb3). If you 
are using set number 3, meaning the Combination Religious variable, then the ‘X’ from either 
the ‘Leftist’, ‘Rightist’, ‘Nationalist-Separatist’ or ‘Other’ categories are to be interpreted as 
moved into the Combination Religious variable. If you wish to create the rel_2 variable, then 
you combine the rel_exclus3 and rel_comb3 variables to create an all-encompassing religious 
category. 
 
 
x 
 
Table II. Coding of Ideological Sets 
Old Values New Variables 
Val. N Description Leftist Rightist Nat-Sep Other Excl. Rel. Comb. Rel 
1 64 Anarchist 
   
X 
  2 8 Anti Globalization X 
     3 18,175 Communist – Socialist X 
     4 209 Environmental 
   
X 
  5 2,112 Leftist X 
     6 10,12 Nationalist – Separatist 
  
X 
   7 62 Racist 
   
X 
  8 4,608 Religious 
    
X 
 9 1,336 Right Wing 
 
X 
    99 2,308 Other 
   
X 
  12 1 Anarchist, Anti Globalization 
   
X 
  13 48 Anarchist, Communist – Socialist X 
     14 1 Anarchist, Environmental 
   
X 
  15 83 Anarchist, Leftist X 
     19 8 Anarchist, Right Wing 
 
X 
    23 131 Anti Globalization, Communist – Socialist X 
     24 7 Anti Globalization, Environmental 
   
X 
  25 2 Anti Globalization, Leftist X 
     26 48 Anti Globalization, Nationalist – Separatist 
  
X 
   29 2 Anti Globalization, Right Wing 
 
X 
    35 126 Communist – Socialist, Leftist X 
     36 1,975 Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist X 
 
X 
   38 5 Communist – Socialist , Religious X 
    
X 
39 7 Communist – Socialist, Right Wing X X 
    45 1 Environmental, Leftist X 
     46 1 Environmental, Nationalist – Separatist 
  
X 
   
xi 
 
56 13 Leftist, Nationalist – Separatist X 
 
X 
   58 1 Leftist, Religious X 
    
X 
67 5 Nationalist – Separatist, Racist 
  
X 
   68 3,363 Nationalist – Separatist , Religious 
  
X 
  
X 
69 96 Nationalist – Separatist, Right Wing 
 
X 
    79 42 Racist, Right Wing 
 
X 
    89 13 Religious, Right Wing 
 
X 
   
X 
236 136 Anti Globalization, Communist–Socialist, Nationalist–Separatist X 
 
X 
   279 1 Anti Globalization, Racist, Right Wing 
 
X 
    356 1 Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist Leftist X 
 
X 
   367 5 Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Racist X 
 
X 
   369 10 Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Right Wing X X X 
   399 31 Communist – Socialist, Other X 
     499 8 Environmental, Other 
   
X 
  568 32 Leftist, Nationalist – Separatist,  Religious X 
 
X 
  
X 
599 9 Leftist, Other X 
     678 4 Nationalist – Separatist, Racist,  Religious 
  
X 
  
X 
679 22 Nationalist – Separatist, Racist, Right Wing 
 
X X 
   689 5 Nationalist – Separatist , Religious, Right Wing 
     
X 
699 33 Nationalist – Separatist, Other 
  
X 
   789 5 Racist , Religious, Right Wing 
 
X 
   
X 
899 2 Religious, Other 
   
X 
 
X 
999 4 Right Wing, Other 
 
X 
    3599 2,203 Communist – Socialist, Leftist, Other X 
     3699 24 Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Other X 
 
X 
   6789 5 Nationalist – Separatist, Racist,  Religious, Right Wing 
 
X X 
  
X 
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